Barber v. Gladden’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 2 district · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Appellant’s first contention here, as it was in the court below, is that the indictment to which he pled guilty in the Douglas County Circuit Court was defective because one, it failed to allege the ownership of the building in which the burglary occurred, and two, it failed to identify the subject matter under inquiry by the Douglas County Grand Jury at the time the indictment was returned, and that he was thereby deprived of his constitutional right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. “The indictment charged that appellant ‘on the 25th day of October A. D. 1953, in the said County of Douglas and State of Oregon * * * did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously break and enter in the night time a certain building not a dwelling, to-wit: Neilson’s Market located at South Stevens Street near the South City Limits of the City of Roseburg, County and State aforesaid’ with the intent to commit larceny therein with the aid of explosives. This allegation, it seems to us, states plainly that the building belonged to one Neilson, particularly in view of the apostrophe ‘s’, denoting possession or ownership, punctuation-wise, and this understanding of the indictment from a reading thereof is confirmed by appellant’s statement in his petition that one Lester Neilson testified at the preliminary hearing that he was the owner of the building entered. Whether this is a sufficiently direct allegation of ownership of the building under the common law authoritie”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 29 Ohio App. 2d 105 - State v. Flowers

2. “"At the time he entered his plea, appellant was represented by an attorney of his own choosing, who had experience in criminal law as a former member of the District Attorney's staff. This attorney testified he advised appellant not to plead guilty if he was not guilty, but that if he were guilty he should consider the habitual criminal statute in deciding upon his plea because appellant's attorney had been informed by the District Attorney that the habitual criminal charge would be filed if the case were tried. The maximum penalty for the offense with which appellant was charged was 40 years, but if the habitual criminal charge were added and proved, the minimum penalty would be 80 years. There could have been no doubt in appellant's mind of the state's ability to prove the habitual criminal charge. These facts, together with the fact appellant knew at the time that his two co-defendants were prepared to testify against him, warrant the conclusion that his plea of guilty was induced not by coercion, but by a well considered, prudent choice of the lesser of two evils."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Weston v. Erickson

3. “That he was coerced into pleading guilty by threats of Oregon State officials that if he did not plead guilty and was found guilty after a trial, habitual criminal charges would be filed against him thereby increasing his minimum sentence to 80 years.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Weston v. Erickson