United States v. Jackson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

23 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “To be sure, some portions of the videotape were properly admissible to rebut portions of Mrs. Jackson’s testimony. For example, Mrs. Jackson testified that her son seemed depressed in the month leading up to the murder, and he had to be reminded to bathe and change his clothes. In the videotaped interview, however, Jackson describes his life as “normal” in the month leading up to the murder. It is equally certain, however, that broad portions of the videotape cannot properly be characterized as rebuttal evidence. For example, Jackson lapses during the interview into rants about politicians, prosecutors, and police, describing them as “scum,” and “the devil.” In addition, he repeatedly asserts his innocence and advances theories about a government conspiracy against him. The trial court erred in admitting these portions of the videotape as rebuttal evidence because of a lack of the required “nexus” between Jackson’s diatribe about politicians, prosecutors, and police, and his conspiracy theories, on the one hand, and any portion of his mother’s testimony on the other. In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the government to show to the jury the entire videotape, the major portion of which goes beyond the scope of proper rebuttal. Nevertheless, ... “the Government [has] established] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.” [T]he jury unanimously found that the evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the four aggravating factors advan”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 638 F. Supp. 2d 514 - Jackson v. United States

2. “[T]o impose the death sentence on Jackson in this case, the indictment must allegé all elements of an aggravated offense, and because at least one aggrava ting factor is necessary to charge such an offense, the indictment must allege that at least one aggravating factor exists. • The district court, finding the allegation of at least two statutory aggravating factors [in the indictment], denied Jackson’s motion [to dismiss the indictment]. And insofar as Jackson appeals the denial of that motion, affirmance is required. On appeal, Jackson also makes a new argument in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring , contending that “[b]ecause the totality of the aggravating factors increase the authorized punishment for Jackson, all of the aggravating factors must be raised in the indictment.” In this case, because the applicable statute requires that at least one aggravating factor be found to justify imposition of the death penalty, 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (d), at least one must be alleged [in the indictment] to charge the aggravated crime for which the death penalty is authorized.... And thus, only if the aggravated crime is charged may the jury also consider the sentence of death. In this case, the indictment did allege at least one aggravating factor so that the indictment charged an aggravated crime, and therefore, on conviction, the “heaviest punishment” of death could be, but need not be, imposed.... [Whether to impose the death penalty becomes the product of the sentencing fa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 638 F. Supp. 2d 514 - Jackson v. United States

3. “Established rules of pleading in an indictment do not require that each term or fact be fully defined, so long as the defendant is provided fair notice of the elements of the offense with which he is charged and sufficient detail so that he can plead an acquittal or a guilty verdict as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, (citations omitted). But while it is true that an indictment must include all the elements of an offense, these elements may employ the statutory language defining the offense, (citations omitted). In this case, Jackson was charged with the offense set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924 (j)(l), coupled with the fact that the violation involved an aggravating factor to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The crime is charged simply by alleging all the elements of the murder together with a sufficient disclosure of an aggravating factor to inform the defendant of the crime charged. One aggravating factor identified in Jackson’s indictment is the commission of the crime of kidnapping, as specified by 18 U.S.C. § 1201 . Jackson does not dispute that the indictment fairly describes a violation of § 924(3)(1) and of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (a), defining first-degree murder. Nor can he dispute the fact that the indictment alleges that the death resulting from the charged offense occurred during the commission of a felony, i.e., kidnapping as specified in 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2). His only complaint is that the elements of kidnapping are not also set forth”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Barrett