Oken v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 195 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 201 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““While it is true that ... a conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence alone, we have also explained: ‘to ensure that the trier of fact bases a finding of guilt on the appropriate degree of certainty, ... a conviction [based] upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ Here, aside from the evidence of ruses employed by Oken in connection with the entry or attempted entry of other residences in the neighborhood of the victim’s apartment, the record is completely devoid of any evidence showing a breaking, either actual or constructive, of [the victim’s] apartment. Consequently, we are not convinced that a jury could find such circumstantial evidence inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis that the victim’s apartment was entered by Oken without a constructive breaking. Therefore, we hold that Oken’s conviction for burglary must be reversed.” (Citations omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Williams v. State · 205 Md. App. 334 - TETSO v. State

2. “[generally, ... the prosecuting attorney is as free to comment legitimately and to speak fully, although harshly, on the accused’s action and conduct if the evidence supports his comments, as is accused’s counsel to comment on the nature of the evidence and the character of witnesses which the [prosecution] produces. While arguments of counsel are required to be confined to the issues in the cases on trial, the evidence and fair and reasonable deductions therefrom, and to arguments of opposing counsel, generally speaking, liberal freedom of speech should be allowed. There are no hard-and-fast limitations within which the argument of earnest counsel must be confined—no well-defined bounds beyond which the eloquence of an advocate shall not soar. He may discuss the facts proved or admitted in the pleadings, assess the conduct of the parties, and attack the credibility of witnesses. He may indulge in oratorical conceit or flourish and in illustrations and metaphorical allusions.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Grandison v. State · Degren v. State

3. “In this case, counsel’s advice was not inherently, overtly, and facially erroneous. Her admonition that appellant’s prior convictions could be used to impeach him was not framed as an incorrect proposition of law that could be readily identified as such by the court. Nor did counsel provide appellant with specific advice that was incorrect on its face.[ ] Although counsel’s advice was specific to appellant and to his circumstance, its legal accuracy depended upon, and could not be ascertained fully without knowledge of, appellant’s criminal record. To the trial judge, who did not know, and had no reason to know, the nature of appellant’s prior convictions, or even if he had any convictions, counsel’s advice would not have appeared to be incorrect. Given that counsel’s advice was not erroneous per se, the presumption of proper advice remained in force, and the trial court did not err.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 189 Md. App. 20 - Gregory v. State · 104 Md. App. 203 - Brooks v. State