¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶2I believe that the Court of Appeals reached the right result in this case and that both the majority and dissenting opinions in this Court are incorrect in part.
¶3In State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 236-37, 287 S.E.2d 810, 817 (1982), this Court said that
the crimes of larceny, receiving, and possession of stolen property are separate and distinct offenses, but having concluded that the Legislature did not intend to punish an individual for receiving or possession of the same goods that he stole, we hold that, though a defendant may be indicted and tried on charges of larceny, receiving, and possession of the same property, he may be convicted of only one of those offenses.
¶4When the legislature made it unlawful to “manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance,” N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(l), I believe that the legislature intended that the crimes of sale and delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(l), though separate and distinct offenses, would be treated as one crime for purposes of punishment when the sale and delivery constitute one transaction for the same controlled substance. Stated differently, the legislature did not intend to punish an individual for selling a controlled substance and then punish him again for delivering that same substance pursuant to the sale when both are handled in one transaction. Had it intended to do so, the statute would have made it unlawful to “manufacture, sell, deliver, or possess . . . a controlled substance,” rather than making it unlawful to “manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess ... a controlled substance.” I believe that the punctuation controls.
¶5I vote to affirm the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals to the effect that the delivery convictions in this case, for sentencing purposes, are merged into the sales charges and defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the convictions of selling a controlled substance.