Dewey Doucet v. Stanley H. Middleton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Whatever vestige of the outmoded direct/indirect distinction between trespass and trespass on the case still exists in Alabama, I would now abandon and adopt instead the more modern tort concept of measuring the cause of action in terms of the degree of culpability of the alleged wrongful conduct. Wanton conduct, as that term is traditionally used and understood in the jurisprudence of our State, signifies the intentional doing of, or failing to do, an act, or discharge a duty, with the likelihood of injury to the person or property of another as a reasonably foreseeable consequence. Such conduct, resulting in injury, is actionable in trespass and governed by the six-year statute of limitations, in my opinion. "The rationale for my view comports with the fundamental concepts of our fault-based system of tort law. One who injures another, or another's property, as a result of conduct intentionally committed should be held to a higher degree of accountability than one who injures another through a simple lack of due care. Just as the former, because of its higher degree of culpability, carries a potential for punitive damages, so should it also carry a longer period within which to enforce accountability for such intentional wrong. One who knowingly sets into motion, by intentionally doing (or failing to do) an act, a sequence of events resulting in reasonably foreseeable injury to another, whether the resulting injury is immediate or consequential, in my opinion, has committe”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 887 So. 2d 861 - McKenzie v. Killian

2. “It would seem incongruous for the Legislature of Alabama to allow six years for the commencement of an action for trespass to property and only one year for trespass to person. As applied to Dou-cet’s complaint, it would be anomalous to hold that his action for personal injuries is barred by limitations but that he may prosecute his action for damages to his automobile.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cloud v. Olin Corp.

3. ““The Supreme Court of Alabama in the Johns case, supra, and the Legislature of Alabama in enacting what is now section 176 of Title 7 of the Code of Alabama clearly recognized that an action against a defendant for a willful or wanton injury committed by the defendant himself was in trespass and was covered by the six year statute of limitations,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 48 Ala. App. 224 - City of Fairhope v. Raddcliffe