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← 328 F.3d 708 - United States v. Clausen

United States v. Clausen’s Empirical Analysis

328 F.3d 708 · 2003

Citation profile

36
cited by 36 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
March 2018
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 3 district ·

Appellate journey

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 844 · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on United States v. Lopez · United States v. Morrison · United States v. Bolton · United States v. Stevens · United States of America v. Jamaal Adeem Atif Singletary

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[wjhoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “'general issue' [term] has been defined as 'evidence relevant to the question of guilt or innocence.' " 428 F.3d at 246 (quoting Ayarza-Garcia , 819 F.2d at 1048 ). Several sister Circuits have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g. , United States v. Clausen , 328 F.3d 708 , 710 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[A] de minimis effect on commerce is sufficient [where a] jurisdictional element ensures that the Act is only applied to crimes whose impact crosses state lines. A substantial effect would only be required if the crimes proscribed were purely intrastate.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The standard for admitting evidence of a pretrial identification is the same as the standard for permitting an in-court identification in the wake of a pretrial identification. In both cases, the eyewitness testimony will be permitted unless the pretrial identification procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to such a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification that admitting the identification testimony would be a denial of due process.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.