Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 328 F. Supp. 2d 50 - Armstrong v. Vance

328 F. Supp. 2d 50 - Armstrong v. Vance’s Empirical Analysis

2004

Citation profile

19
cited by 19 later decisions
January 2012
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 16 district ·

Relationships

Applies 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975) · 20 U.S.C. § 1413 · 20 U.S.C. § 1414 · 20 U.S.C. § 1415 · 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (§ 505 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988 · 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (§ 801 of the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968))

Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Wilson v. Garcia · Buckhannon Board and Care Home Incs v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources · Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District · Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Prior to 2001, courts applied the “catalyst” theory to determine whether a plaintiff was a “prevailing party” under fee-shifting statutes such as the IDEA. See Smith v. Roher, 954 F.Supp. 359, 363 (D.D.C.1997) (catalyst theory applied to IDEA fee claim); see also Blackman v. District of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.2d 37, 41 (D.D.C.1999) (catalyst theory applied in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 context). In 2001, however, the Supreme Court in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 , 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), changed the landscape for awarding attorneys’ fees under fee-shifting statutes by rejecting the “catalyst” theory and adopting a more stringent definition of “prevailing party.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “in light of the plain language of the prospective provision of Section 140 (2002), defendants cannot pay — and will never be required to pay — [above-cap fees]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “obtain a subsequent court order enforcing the settlement agreement.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.