Watkins v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

51 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As a general rule, pending criminal charges are not admissible to impeach a witness. An exception to that rule, however, is when the pending charges are offered to show bias, prejudice or motive of the witness in testifying. In determining whether to admit the evidence, the judge must engage in a balancing test giving wide latitude to cross-examine for bias or prejudice but not permitting the questioning "to stray into collateral matters which would obscure the trial issues and lead to the factfinder's confusion." The trial judge is in the best position to balance the probative value of the unrelated pending charges against the prejudicial effect and to decide when their admission would enmesh the trial in confusing or collateral issues. * * * * * * On voir dire, Timmons and Allen testified that the State had not offered and that they did not expect leniency in exchange for their testimony. They denied any expectation of leniency in return for their testimony and there was no basis for any expectation of leniency.... * * * * * * In determining the admissibility of the evidence, the trial judge considered the testimony of the witnesses, i.e., that they were not offered and did not expect leniency. He made a preliminary finding that based on the denial of the witnesses and the uncontroverted representation of the prosecutor that there was no offer of leniency, there was a complete lack of probative value or that the value for impeachment was so slight as to be overcome by the p”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 191 Md. App. 48 - Washington v. State · Washington v. State

2. “DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I have information that Mr. Brown has a pending case that’s a theft charge and he goes to trial on April 3rd. THE COURT: Don’t mention it. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: The reason I’m saying that, I believe that I have a basis for thinking he may have been given some consideration in exchange for probation. I want to ask about the fact this happened. PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, of course, that’s exculpatory evidence and I certainly would have told [defense attorney] any deals that I had made with anybody that is testifying. THE COURT: Alright DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Thank you. (In open court.) DEFENSE ATTORNEY: That’s all I have.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Icgoren v. State · Church v. State

3. ““Faulkner seeks to apply the mitigation defense of imperfect self-defense to the statutory offense of assault with intent to murder under Md.Code (1957,1982 RepLVol.), Art. 27, § 12. A proper analysis of this statute requires us to take heed of the principle of statutory construction that in determining the real legislative intent, we consider the ‘language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification.’ In view of this principle § 12 does no more than use the term ‘murder.’ The statute does not define the term or limit it in any manner. The ‘natural and ordinary signification’ of this term is that the General Assembly intended to incorporate the common law of murder into this particular statute. Indeed, we have repeatedly defined the offense of assault with intent to murder as an assault upon the victim coupled with an intent to murder, which can be shown that the crime would have been murder if the victim had died. Logically, because the statutory offense is defined in terms of murder, all the defenses available in a murder prosecution are applicable in an assault with intent to murder prosecution. There is, however, one difference in the effect that the defenses to the statutory crime have on the offense. For murder, mitigation defenses reduce the offense to manslaughter. By contrast, for assault with intent to murder, a mitigation defense reduces the crime to, at most, simple assault. The rationale behind this result is that Maryland does not recognize the off”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Christian v. State