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328 So. 2d 48

Docket No. Z-101.

Adams v. State

Robert William ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided March 5, 1976.

Rehearing Denied March 26, 1976.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1976-03-05

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently May 1978

8 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““After an agreement on a plea has been reached, the trial judge may, with the consent of the parties, have made known to him the agreement and reasons therefor prior to the acceptance of the plea. The terms of the agreement shall be placed in the record. He shall thereafter advise the parties of whether other fac tors (unknown at the time) may make his concurrence impossible. Should such other factors make ultimate judicial concurrence impossible, any plea of guilty or nolo contendere entered based upon such agreement may thereafter be withdrawn.””

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Peterson v. State, Wood v. State

“"While the trial court emphasized when appellant tendered the guilty plea that the court was not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation and that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment, at no point did the sentencing judge advise appellant that judicial concurrence with the bargain was impossible." 328 So.2d 48 .”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Fleming v. State, 342 So. 2d 818 - State v. Adams

Relies on Schubert v. State · Thomas v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1976-03-05

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

¶2Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

¶3SMITH, Judge.

¶4The trial court determined to sentence appellant to a term of twenty years rather than to the maximum ten recommended by the State pursuant to a plea bargain. At issue is whether the court erred by failing to announce his determination not to sentence in accordance with the bargain and by failing to give appellant an opportunity, in those circumstances, to withdraw his plea of guilty.

¶5While the trial court emphasized when appellant tendered the guilty plea that the court was not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation and that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment, at no point did the sentencing judge advise appellant that judicial concurrence with the bargain was impossible. We do not conceive that a sentencing judge may knowingly receive a plea which is the product of a bargain with the prosecutor and yet declare himself independent of the bargain, so avoiding by finesse the provisions of Rule 3.171(c), R.Cr.P. See Thomas v. State,327 So.2d 63 (Fla.App. 1st, 1976). Sentencing judges who wish to be free of the consequences of bargains and of the Rule should refuse to "have made known to him *49 the agreement and reasons therefor prior to the acceptance of the plea." Rule 3.171(c), R.Cr.P. Kurlin v. State,302 So.2d 147 (Fla.App. 1st, 1974).

¶6The sentence is vacated and the case is remanded so that the court may either impose sentence in accordance with the plea bargain or vacate the judgment and offer appellant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

¶7Reversed.

¶8RAWLS, Acting C.J., and MILLS, J., concur.

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