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← 328 U.S. 707 - Hust v. Lines

Hust v. Lines’s Empirical Analysis

328 U.S. 707 · 1946

Citation profile

249
cited by 249 later decisions
34
cited 34 times by the Supreme Court
5
states following
February 2008
most recently cited

71 federal appellate · 15 district · 27 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 249 later decisions (34 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2008 · most notably Farrell v. United States (1949), Cardillo US v. Liberty Mut Ins Co (1947)

71 federal appellate · 15 district · 27 state decisions

14101946195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. · Panama Co v. Johnson · Garrett v. Co · Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation · Warner v. Goltra

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 249 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““We are told, however, that the Jones Act applies by its specific terms only in the presence of the relation of employer to employee, to give the latter a remedy for the employer’s negligence; and, since the effect of the General Service Agreement was to make the seaman technically an employee of the United States, the necessary result was to remit him exclusively to the Suits in Admirality Act for remedy to enforce the substantive right given by the Jones Act. “The premise is not controlling. We may accept the Oregon court’s conclusion that technically the agreement made Hust an employee of the United States for purposes of ultimate control in the performance of his work, although the meticulous differences in this respect between its terms and the corresponding provisions of the Maritime Commission’s standard contract make it hardly more than dubious that respondent did not stand pro Hac vice as employer with the Government. But it does not follow from the fact that. Hust was technically the Government’s employee that he lost all remedies against the operating ‘agent’ for such injuries as he incurred. This case . . . involves something more than mere application to the facts of the common-law test for ascertaining the vicarious responsibilities of a private employer for tortious conduct of an employee. “Here indeed is the respondent’s fallacy, for it assumes the case would be controlled by the common-law rules of private agency. It is true these are applied in the normal ev”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “1. That at all times mentioned in the complaint the defendant was and still is a domestic corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York. 2. At all times mentioned in the complaint, the United States of America owned a certain steamship known as the-Benjamin Hawkins of American registry, flying the American flag, and engaged in the loading of Government owned cargo at an Army Base in Brooklyn, New York, for transportation to the armed forces of of the United States- of America overseas. 3. By Executive Order No. 9054, 50 U.S. C.A.Appendix, § 1295 note, the President of the United States established a War Shipping Administration in the Executive Office of the President, and defined its functions and duties. 4. Through the Administrator of the-War Shipping Administration, the United States of America entered into a service agreement with the defendant, as of August 10, 1942, whereby the defendant accepted the appointment as general agent and undertook, amongst other things, to manage and conduct for the United States, the S/S Benjamin Hawkins, in accordance with such directions, orders or regulations as had been from time to time, or might be, prescribed for the operation of said vessel. 5. The plaintiff was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the Borough of Brooklyn, County of Kings, City and State of New York, employed by the United States of America, as a longshoreman at the said Army Base, as a civil employee and eng”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “Claims arising under clause (1) hereof shall be enforced in the same manner as such claims would be enforced if the seaman were employed on a privately owned and operated American vessel. Any claim referred to in clause (2) or (3) shall, if administratively disallowed in whole or in part, be enforced pursuant to the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act [46 U.S.CApp. § 741 et seq], notwithstanding the vessel on which the seaman is employed is not a merchant vessel within the meaning of such Act. 1”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.