Rowe v. Brooks’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending. # sj< * # * # (e) In respect of loss of life or bodily injury the privity or knowledge of the master of a seagoing vessel or of the superintendent or managing agent of the owner thereof, at or prior to the commencement of each voyage, shall be deemed conclusively the privity or knowledge of the owner of such vessel.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 663 F. Supp. 915 - Bates v. Merritt Seafood, Inc. · Rowe v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

2. “In Cullen Fuel Co. v. W. E. Hedger, Inc., 290 U.S. 82 , 54 S.Ct. 10 , 78 L.Ed. 189 , petitioner owned a deck scow and chartered his boat by oral contract to respondent. Following the demise, the scow capsized and dumped her cargo. Respondent, as bailee of the cargo, sued petitioner as owner of the scow. Petitioner sought limitation of liability under the provisions of 46 U.S.C.A. § 183 , but the District Court, finding that the scow was unseaworthy at the time of the demise, refused limitation of liability. The Court of Appeals concurred in this finding, and affirmed the trial court’s decision “upon the ground that as the charter was the personal contract of the owner and included an implied warranty of seaworthiness the petitioner was precluded from the benefit of the limitation statutes.” The court said (290 U.S. p. 88, 54 S. Ct. p. 11, 78 L.Ed. 189 ): “we pass, without discussion, the contentions that the court below erred in its rulings that the owner’s contract was personal and that the respondent as bailee of the cargo was entitled to recover from the charterer, as we are of opinion that both points were correctly decided (The Benjamin Noble [D.C.], 232 F. 382 ; Id. (C.C.A. 6) 244 F. 95 ; Capitol Transportation Co. v. Cambria Steel Co., supra [ 249 U.S. 334 , 39 S.Ct. 292 , 63 L.Ed. 631 ]; Pendleton v. Benner Line, supra, [pages] 355-356 [of 246 U.S. 353 , 38 S.Ct. 330 , 62 L.Ed. 770 ]), and come to the question of petitioner’s right of limitation notwithstanding the im”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Daniels v. Trawler Sea-Rambler

3. ““With this we disagree, because we are definitely of the opinion, as will presently appear, that the Rowes were :passengers for hire, that in taking them out in the boat for the purpose of demonstrating it for sale, Dallas Hodge, under the law, was required to have a license, and since he did not have a license, the boat was unseaworthy which was known or should have been know to Brooks and Carr.” (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 402 F. Supp. 508 - Eason v. Weaver