Eldridge v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

38 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We conjure up this scenario. Eldridge parks his car on the bar’s parking lot. He removes the starter pistol from the glove compartment, gets out of the car and puts the pistol in his pocket. He walks toward the bar and on the way removes the pistol from his pocket, checks it and replaces it in his pocket. He enters the bar. In the men’s room he again checks the pistol and then pockets it. Entering the barroom, he pulls the pistol from his pocket and at pistol point commits the robbery, threatening to kill the victim. Upon fleeing the scene he again puts the pistol in his pocket. During the course of this conduct he carried the weapon concealed five times and carried it openly four times. Under the trial court’s interpretation, Eldridge could be convicted of five offenses of carrying a deadly weapon concealed and of four offenses of carrying the weapon openly. He would be subject to a sentence of 3 years on each offense for a total 27 years. This would be absurd. We cannot conceive that such pyramiding of sentences reflects the intention of the Legislature.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Melton v. State

2. “Section 36B concerns handguns. Handguns were expressly excepted from the provisions of § 36 and § 36B was enacted to fill the void.... We think that § 36B, concerned with handguns, is, to all intents and purposes, the counterpart of § 36, concerned with deadly weapons generally, except handguns. The proscribed conduct in both § 36(a) and § 36B(b) is the same— the carrying of the designated weapon. In view of the similarity of the statutes and our holding in Webb [ v. State, 311 Md. 610 , 536 A.2d 1161 (1988) ], we conclude that the unit of prosecution in § 36(a), as we have found it to be in § 36B(b), is one offense — the carrying of a deadly weapon, regardless' of whether it is carried concealed or openly.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Colby H.

3. “Every person who shall wear or carry any dirk knife, bowie knife, switchblade knife, star knife, sandclub, metal knuckles, razor, nanchaku, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind, whatsoever (penknives without switchblades and handguns, excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any such weapon, chemical mace, pepper mace, or tear gas device openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful manner shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 143 Md. App. 97 - Thomas v. State