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33 Cal. 459

Bollo v. Navarro

California Supreme Court

Decided October 15, 1867

California Supreme Court · decided 1867-10-15

<p>Appeal from the District Court, First Judicial District, Los Angeles County.</p> <p>This was an action for the partition of a certain lot and improvements in the City of Los Angeles. The plaintiff assorts title and possession of four sevenths by purchase, by deeds of conveyance from Juan Augustin Navarro, Teodoro Navarro, Clement Navarro and Nicoloso Navarro, heirs, each, of one seventh of the estate conveyed, by their mother, Maria Del Carmen Rochini de Navarro. The plaintiff denies that the ancestor derived a title to the land under a grant of the Ayuntamiento and Government of the City or Pueblo of Los Angeles, and has continuously possessed the same for twenty-five years. The complaint is in conformity to our code of practice, providing for the partition of real estate among joint tenants, or tenants in common, and recites the joint tenancy with plaintiff of the remaining children of Carmen Rochini de Navarro, to wit: her daughters Dolores, Concepcion, ancl Maria Ciriaca Navarro—conceding to each of them one seventh of this property in dispute.</p> <p>Of the defendants, Dolores Navarro alone answers. She denies the seizen at any time by her mother, Carmen, of the premises set forth in the complaint, and asserts complete title in herself and uninterrupted possession for thirty years, and derived her title from the' authorities of the old Pueblo of Los Angeles.</p> <p>The cause was tried before a referee appointed by the Court, who found the following facts and conclusions of law, to Wit l</p> <p>“ First—That defendant, Dolores Navarro, was put in possession of the lot described in plaintiff’s complaint more than thirty years ago, by Antonio Maria Lugo, then First Alcalde of the Pueblo of Los Angeles.</p> <p>“ Second—That said Dolores has remained in continuous and uninterrupted possession of said lot ever since, asserting exclusive right and title thereto.</p> <p>“ Third—That Maria del Carmen Bochini de Navarro, the mother of Dolores, from whom plaintiff assumes to derive his title, entered upon the lot simultaneously with her daughter Dolores, and occupied the. same continuously until the period of her death, in eighteen hundred and sixty-three, but through the sufferance and courtesy of Dolores, and always disclaimed any right or title thereto.</p> <p>“Fourth—That plaintiff obtained from the four sons of Carmen deeds of conveyance for the portions of the lot, as recited in the complaint, but that such conveyances vested no title or interest with plaintiff in said lot.</p> <p>“ I find, as conclusions of law, that plaintiff has no title to the lot in question; that the land and its appurtenances are the property of Dolores Navarro, and that plaintiff is not entitled to a, partition of the premises.”</p> <p>Judgment was rendered accordingly.</p> <p>The evidence was conflicting as to whom the parol grant was made. The evidence—much of it—was of a loose, vague and uncertain character. There was much evidence of the statements of the mother of the respondent while living on the demanded premises, to which the plaintiff objected as irrelevant and incompetent, and to its introduction excepted.</p> <p>.The plaintiff moved for a new trial on the grounds that the findings and judgment were against the evidence and against law, which motion was denied; and from the order denying said motion and the judgment the plaintiff appealed, and relied on the grounds assigned by him for the granting a new trial.</p> <p>The other facts necessary to an understanding of the points decided are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Whether the plaintiff and defendant are tenants in common is the first issue to he tried, if made, in an action of this character [partition]. If the court finds the issue in favor of the defendant, the action is at an end. The idea that a party sued in partition cannot deny that he is a tenant in common, and set up that he is the sole owner of the premises, is simply preposterous. There never has been a time when he could not. Under the old system [the chancery system], if this was done, the partition was stayed, and the parties were sent to a court of law to try the issue, for the simple reason that a court of equity could not try it. If the court of law found the issue in favor of the plaintiff, the court of chancery then proceeded with the partition; if for the defendant, the bill was dismissed. But the reason for this practice does not exist under our system. On the contrary, we have but one court, which has in the premises all the powers of both law and equity courts under the old system; and there is therefore in such a case no necessity for two actions, one at law and the other in equity, as under the former system. On the contrary, the court proceeds in one action, and first tries and determines all the questions at law, and, if the decision is favorable to the plaintiff, then takes up and disposes of the equitable part of the case; if for the defendant, the partition is denied without any further action. This was expressly decided in De Uprey v. De Uprey, 27 Cal. 3”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Heinze v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Min. Co.

Relies on De Uprey v. De Uprey · Morenhout v. Higuera

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1867-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently February 1908

1 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

4018671870188018901900decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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By the Court, Sanderson, J.:

¶1The point that the Court below could not try title in this action is answered by the cases of De Uprey v. De Uprey, 27 Cal. 329, and Morenhout v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 289.

¶2Whether Alcalde grants were required to be in writing it *466is unnecessary to consider. The plaintiff failed to show any grant in writing to Carmen Navarro, and if his counsel is correct in his point, that Alcalde grants could be made only by an instrument in writing, it follows that Carmen, under whom he claims, had no title, or at least only such as may be founded upon possession only. We do not consider the proceedings of the Ayuntamiento upon the petitions of Manuel Valencia and another at its sessions in 1846 and 1847, as amounting to a grant by that body to Carmen Navarro. The question before the Ayuntamiento was whether the lot should be granted, not to Carmen Navarro, but to another party, and they resolved not to grant it to that party, but to return to him his petition and leave Carmen undisturbed in the possession, for certain reasons therein set forth. Instead of amounting to a grant to Carmen, those proceedings show that she had no title, for it is therein so expressly recited.

¶3The title, then, as between Carmen and Dolores, rests upon the parol grant of the Alcalde Lugo and the delivery by him of the possession. Whether that amounted to a good title or not is of no consequence in this action. If it is good for one party it is good for the other. We may, therefore, assume it to be good. Then the only question is, was it made to Carmen or Dolores ? If the latter, the plaintiff has no interest in the lot. The referee found that Lugo granted or gave the lot to Dolores, and delivered to her the possession, and it is sufficient to say that we are entirely satisfied with his finding.

¶4It is not necessary to specially notice the plaintiff’s objections to certain portions of the defendant’s testimony. The plaintiff claims under Carmen, and the admissions made by her in her lifetime while living upon the lot, to the effect that it belonged to or was in the possession of Dolores, was competent evidence against him.

¶5Judgment and order affirmed.

¶6Mr. Justice Rhodes did not express an opinion.

By the Court, Sanderson, J., on petition for rehearing:

¶7In his petition for a rehearing counsel complains that we have assumed, rather than decided, that an “ outstanding-title” may he tried in an action for partition. On that head it is sufficient to say that we have assumed nothing of the kind. No question as to an “ outstanding title” is made in the case. As to title the only question presented is whether, at the time of the death of Carmen, she, or Dolores, was the owner of the lot. If Carmen was the owner, then the plaintiff has become a tenant in common with Dolores. If Dolores was the owner, then the plaintiff has acquired no title and is not a tenant in common with Dolores, and is, therefore, not entitled to a partition. That such a question may be tried in an action for partition may have been assumed rather than decided, for, in common with other Courts, we sometimes assume what is too obvious for argument.

¶8Whether the plaintiff and defendant are tenants in common is the first issue to be tried, if made, in an action of this character. If the Court finds the issue in favor of the defendant, the action is at an end. The idea that a party sued in partition cannot deny that he is a tenant in common and set up that he is the sole owner of the premises, is simply preposterous. There never has been a time when he could not. Under the old system, if this was done, the partition was stayed, and the parties were sent to a Court of law to try the issue, for the simple reason that a Court of equity could not try it. If the Court of law found the issue in favor of the plaintiff, the Court of Chancery then proceeded with the partition; if for the defendant, the hill was dismissed. But the reason for this practice does not exist under our system. On the contrary, we have hut one Court, which has in the premises all the powers of both law and equity Courts uuder the old system; and there is, therefore, in such a case no necessity for two actions, one at law and the other in equity, as under the former system. On the contrary, the Court proceeds in one action, and first tries *468and determines all the questions at law; and if the decision is favorable to the plaintiff, then takes up and disposes of the equitable part of the case ; if for the defendant, the partition is denied without any further action. This was expressly decided in De Uprey v. De Uprey, and reaffirmed in Morenhout v. Higuera ; but as counsel is disposed not to so understand those cases, we have thought proper again to declare such to be the rulé.

¶9Upon the other points we have no occasion to add to our former opinion.

¶10Rehearing denied.

¶11Neither Mr. Justice Rhodes nor Mr. Justice Shatter expressed an opinion.

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