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← 33 CAL2D 876 - In Re Pedrini

In Re Pedrini’s Empirical Analysis

1949

Citation profile

34
cited by 34 later decisions
5
states following
February 1991
most recently cited

32 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently February 1991 · most notably 52 Cal. 2d 521 - People v. Thomas (1959), 32 Cal. 3d 338 - People v. McCart (1982)

32 state decisions

140194919501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on United States v. Daugherty · People v. Ferlin · 15 Cal. 2d 519 - People v. McAllister · 3 Cal. 2d 441 - People v. McNabb · 27 Cal. 2d 637 - In Re Cowen

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “" If the sentence has been entered in the minutes of the court, of if the defendant has begun serving said sentence or has been restrained by the sentence imposed, then the court is without jurisdiction to vacate, add to, or in any manner modify the sentence originally pronounced. On the other hand, if the sentence pronounced has not been entered by the clerk in his minutes, and no legal restraint has been imposed upon the defendant by reason of said sentence, then it is proper for the court to change the sentence originally pronounced." 102 P.2d at 1075 (emphasis added).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““The practical considerations expressed in People v. Hayes, supra, impel to the conclusion that, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a sentence which in a technical sense is expressly for life — but which does not necessarily mean actual imprisonment for life — can run consecutively to lesser sentences. We recognize that in People v. McNabb (1935), 3 Cal. 2d. 441, 457, 45 P. 2d 334 , and in People v. Jones (1936) supra, 6 Cal. 2d 554, 557 , 59 P. 2d 89 , are statements to the effect that a ‘life sentence’ cannot be made consecutive to other sentences ‘because a prisoner cannot in fact serve a term longer than his natural life.’ These statements — whether they be regarded as referring to life sentences with, or to life sentences without, possibility of parole — were unnecessary to the decision of those cases and are, therefore, not controlling here. The effect of the view so suggested in- the McNabb and Jones cases, which view petitioner urges us to declare as law of the state, retroactively applicable to his sentences, would be (and the effect of Section 669 since its 1941 amendment is) that once a defend ant is sentenced to life imprisonment he is immune from punishment for a further crime unless that crime is. one for which sentence of death is imposed. To illustrate-. A defendant sentenced to life imprisonment for murder of the first degree and paroled after the - expiration of seven years may commit as many robberies, burglaries, and rapes as he has opportunity t”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.