¶1I concur in the majority’s conclusion that, in this case, the extent and nature of the trial judge’s comments improperly invaded the jury’s sphere. A judge’s comments must be scrupulously fair and may not usurp the jury’s role as the exclusive trier of fact. When a jury is deadlocked the chances that a judge’s comments on the evidence may affect the jury’s deliberations may well be increased, and we should rigorously scrutinize the judge’s remarks. Here the jury had been deadlocked. The probability that the court’s statements improperly affected the jury here is underscored by the fact that only 14 minutes after the comments the well established deadlock dissolved and the jurors arrived at an unanimous verdict. Under these facts, I therefore would find that the judge’s comments improperly intruded upon the jury’s function as ultimate factfinder and would, accordingly, reverse the judgment.
¶2I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s sweeping principle that a judge may never comment upon the evidence when the jury is deadlocked. This goes too far. The people of California have ordained in their Constitution that “The court may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) While compelled to acknowledge this constitutional grant of authority to the trial courts, my colleagues nonetheless add their own judicial language to the section and thereby substantially narrow the extent of the trial court’s authority. In contrast, I would retain the case-by-case approach which we have historically followed in considering claims such as those herein advanced. The successful and consistent application of this method is amply demonstrated by the cases cited by the majority.
¶3We are presented here with a constitutional provision containing no internal limitations as to when a judge may comment on the evidence. We should not, in advance, forever close the door to evidentiary comments at any particular stage of trial. It is entirely possible that under different circumstances such judicial comment might be altogether appropriate. I would avoid the majority’s broad generalizations, and limit our review to a case-by-case resolution, not being able fairly to anticipate the multiple factual variants which may give rise to the issue. Particularly, I would avoid engrafting our own judicial limitations on the *416wide procedural authorization which the people themselves have placed in their fundamental charter.
¶4Reynoso, J., concurred.