GOLDSMITH
V.BROWN.
691
the federal oonstittition, or the purpose of congress, to make the federal court a'rbitratorsof disputes between citizens of the same state. To their own courts such Citizens must look, and the repeated monitions of the supreme Caution 'the, trial courts not to take jurisdiction of cases of whichthei'r jurisdiction is doubtful. Believing that,unlel:;s the line be drawn so;as to give jurisdiction of such questions only as exist in the case at the time it is submitted, can be no definite line placed, and the door will be opened to an indefinite exercise of jurisdiction by the federal courts over matters of purely local nature, I feel constrained' to sustain the demurrer. The matters presented by these subsequent bills and amendments are purely local in their nature; of them, by themselves, e<;>nfessedly the federal' courtawould have no jurisdiction. When they were brought into the case there remained no federal question in it for detertmination;and there being no federal question, there is nothing upon which to hal1g the jurisdiction ,of this court. The demurrer will be sustained, and 'the case will be passed to decree upon the original pleadings and the report oithe commissioners, as modified.
GOLDSMITH et' al. v.
BROWN et
at. BY CoNFEBBION-
(Oif'Cttit OOUf't, ]G; D. Mi88ouri, E. D. fQwlllR TO DEQLARE AS AN ASSIGNMENT.
February'S, 1888.) . ·.·
. A. federal court cannot decree a judgment by
in a state court, to be an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
entered
In Equity:. .Upon demllrrer,to the bill. Complainants filed a 'bill in the United States circuit court for·the Eastern division' pf the Eastern judicial district of Missouri, the purpose of which waS ito have a judgment by confession entered, in the circuit court of the state decreed to be a voluntary assignment for: the benefit of all the creditors of ,the judgment debtQr, and asking to have the moneys which had been collected by execution under such judgment distributed pro rata among all the creditors of the judgment debtor, according to the ':}fovisions of the assignment laws of the state of Missouri. The was demurred to. In the course of the argument an unreported oral decision of Mr. Justice MILLER, overruling a motion fOf rehearing iu the case of Weil v. Polack, 30 Fed. Rep. 813, was referred to by counsel. A. Bin8Wanger, for complainants. Nathan Prank, for , (orally,) With reference to the $tatement of cpunsel as to the ru!ingse,of,Justice to the question now under th:er,e, ,is nodoubt that Justice MIl-LER meant 'to decide, in Weil v. Polack, that there can be no $uch
692
FEDERAL REPORTER.
thing as Ii decree in the federal :courts to the effect that a judgment by confession, regularly entered in a state court, is an assignment. A judg ment of that kind has the same force and effect as if it had been regularly entered after a trial and contest, and it is equally binding on the parties. It cahnot be interfered with by this court A person who has levied on property under a judgment of that kind, anclsold the property, is entiUedtohold the proceeds until the judgment is set aside for fraud, or on some other ground, or by motion in the state court, because of some defect in the proceeding. kIr. Binswanger. Does your honor hold that Justice MILLER went beyond the rulings of your honor in, Weil v. Polaclcf The Churt. I think he clearly overruled the case of Clappv. Nordmeyer, 25 Fed. Rep. 72, and all the cases in the federal courteof this state that have undertaken to construe or decree a judgment of a state court to be an assignment. The state laws authorize confessions of a judgment as .'\fell B.lbvplunta,ry assignm,ents. A confessed judgment is something en';' tirely different from an ,asSignment, ,and, in my opinion, such judgments can only be attacked for the same reasons that you can attack an ordinary judgment; that is, for fraud, or on account of some irregularity in the proceeding. I have several times, since Justice MILLER overruled the motion for a rehearing in Weil v. Polack, (thereby overruling Clapp v. Nordmeyer,) that 4il1s Qould no be entertained in the federal coqrt to declare that a confession of judgment was a voluntary assignment.: 'Judge BREwER,Iam very certain"understands the effect of that decision the same as I do. Mr. Biru>Wdlngef. I understood Justice MILLER'S decision to mean that a confession o.f.judgment will not be regarded as a deed of assigmrient, unless it is an evasion of the state law, and is followed by a deed of assignment'on the same day. The Court. No; he didn't state any such exception to the rule. He held broadly that a 'confession of judgment could not be construed as an assignment, and enforced as such. You may have such a judgment annulled for fraud in a proper proceeding, or set aside for irregularity; but you cannot obiaIn a decree declaring it to be something entirely different from a'judgment and enforcing it as such. I will sustain the demurrer to your bill.
REINEMAN et, ,at
BALL et 01.
«(Jz"rcuit Oourt. S. D. New York. February-l4, 1888.)' REMOVAL OF CAUSES-SE;PARABLE CONTROVERSY.
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