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33 Minn. 505

Wright v. Jewell

Supreme Court of Minnesota

Decided July 3, 1885

Supreme Court of Minnesota · decided 1885-07-03

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Olay county, upon a promissory note for a first cause of action, and to recover the agreed price of services rendered in superintending defendant’s farms as a second cause of action.

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently June 1919

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““While the power to strike out an answer or defense as sham, i. e. false, is given by statute, and has been repeatedly recognized, by this court, it is only when the falsity is clear and indisputable, when the answer or defense is evidently a mere pretense, set up in bad faith, and without color of fact, that the power should be exercised.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Pfaender v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad

Relies on O'Ferrall v. Colby · Barker v. Foster · C. N. Nelson Lumber Co. v. Richardson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1885-07-03

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

BeeRy, J.

¶1The second paragraph of defendant’s amended answer sets up a defence, partial at least, to the second cause of action alleged in the complaint. The third paragraph of the amended answer sets up a counterclaim. Upon the hearing of the motion to strike out the ■entire answer as sham, affidavits of third persons, in addition to his ■own, were read by plaintiff, fairly tending to show that both of the *506paragraphs mentioned were false; and counter-affidavits of third persons, in addition to her own, were read by defendant, fairly tending to show that both paragraphs were true. The court below struck out the answer, and in our opinion this was wrong. While the power to strike out an answer or defence as sham, i. e., false, is given by statute, and has been repeatedly recognized by this court, it is only when the falsity, is clear and indisputable, when the answer or defence is evidently a mere pretence, set up in bad faith and without color of fact, that the power should be exercised. Morton v. Jackson, 2 Minn. 180, (219;) Barker v. Foster, 29 Minn. 166 ; C. N. Nelson Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 31 Minn. 267; Kiefer v. Thomass, 6 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 42.

¶2When the allegations of the answer or defence are fairly supported, as in this case, by the affidavits of the defendant and other persons, as against like affidavits on behalf of plaintiff, it cannot ordinarily be said that the falsity of the answer is clear and indisputable. Por a court to assume to say this, unless in very extraordinary circumstances, such as do not exist here, would, in effect, be to try the controversy between the parties upon affidavits, and to deprive the defendant of his right to a regular trial by jury or otherwise, with all its manifest advantages. Obviously this will not do. Barker v. Foster, supra;Bliss, Code PL § 422. But, as this seems to us to appear by the record to have been what the trial court did do in the present action, the order striking out the answer, and for judgment for plaintiff, is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. •

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