State v. Wright

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01/20/2026 08:11 AM CST




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                                                  STATE V. WRIGHT
                                                Cite as 

                                        State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
                                        Patrick L. Wright, appellant.
                                                     ___ N.W.3d ___

                                         Filed January 13, 2026.   No. A-25-031.

                 1. Rules of Evidence. In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules
                    apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska
                    Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make
                    discretion a factor in determining admissibility.
                 2. Rules of Evidence: Hearsay: Appeal and Error. Apart from rulings
                    under the residual hearsay exception, an appellate court reviews for
                    clear error the factual findings underpinning a trial court’s hearsay ruling and reviews de novo the court’s ultimate determination to admit
                    evidence over a hearsay objection.
                 3. Constitutional Law: Witnesses: Appeal and Error. An appellate
                    court reviews de novo a trial court’s determination of the protections
                    afforded by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
                    U.S. Constitution and article I, § 11, of the Nebraska Constitution and
                    reviews the underlying factual determinations for clear error.
                 4. Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion
                    by the trial court.
                 5. Sentences. It is within the discretion of the trial court to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for separate crimes.
                 6. Rules of Evidence: Hearsay. For a statement to qualify as an excited
                    utterance, the following criteria must be met: (1) There must have been
                    a startling event, (2) the statement must relate to the event, and (3) the
                    statement must have been made by the declarant while under the stress
                    of the event.
                 7. Rules of Evidence: Hearsay: Time. The key requirement for an excited
                    utterance is spontaneity, which requires a showing the statements were
                    made without time for conscious reflection.
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. Constitutional Law. The analysis of the right to confrontation under
    Neb. Const. art. I, § 11, is the same as that under the Sixth Amendment
    to the U.S. Constitution.
 9. Constitutional Law: Trial: Rules of Evidence: Hearsay. Where “testimonial” statements are at issue, the Confrontation Clause demands
    that such hearsay statements be admitted at trial only if the declarant is
    unavailable and there had been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
10. Constitutional Law: Evidence: Intent. Whether a statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes depends on the purpose or
    expectation of the declarant in making the statement, and the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement illuminate the purpose
    or expectation of the declarant.
11. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Where a sentence imposed within the
    statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court
    must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in
    considering and applying the relevant factors, as well as any applicable
    legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed.
12. Sentences. In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant factors
    customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background,
    (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the
    amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.
13. ____. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s
    demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding
    the defendant’s life.
14. Sentences: Records. A sentencing court is not required to articulate on
    the record that it has considered each sentencing factor nor to make specific findings as to the facts pertaining to the factors or the weight given
    them.
15. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Whether a defendant is entitled to credit
    for time served and in what amount are questions of law, subject to
    appellate review independent of the lower court.
16. Sentences. When a court imposes multiple sentences contemporaneously, whether such sentences are ordered to be served consecutively or
    concurrently, all available credit for time served under 

,106(1) (Reissue 2024) is applied just once, to the aggregate of all
    terms imposed.

   Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Molly
B. Keane, Judge. Affirmed.
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                         STATE V. WRIGHT
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  Joseph L. Howard and Jason Wendling, Senior Certified
Law Student, of Dornan, Howard, Breitkreutz, Dahlquist &
Klein, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
  Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Melissa R.
Vincent for appellee.
  Pirtle, Welch, and Freeman, Judges.
  Welch, Judge.
                       I. INTRODUCTION
   Patrick L. Wright appeals from his convictions and sentences for possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, terroristic threats, and use of firearm to commit a felony.
Wright argues that the district court erred in admitting certain
evidence over his objections, in imposing excessive sentences,
and in finding that Wright knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. For the reasons stated herein,
we affirm.
                  II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
                    1. Factual Background
   On October 3, 2023, law enforcement officers Peter Miller
and Andrew Woodard were dispatched to the area of North
21st and Pinkney Streets in Omaha, Nebraska, following a
report from Jomo Graham that Wright approached him there
in a red two-door Chevy Tahoe and pulled a firearm on him.
While heading to the location described by Graham to the 911
emergency dispatch service, officers observed a vehicle matching the description heading northbound on Florence Boulevard
from Ames Avenue, but the officers continued to the scene.
After arriving at the scene, the officers contacted Graham, who
was described as “acting very excited. With his speech, he was
talking fast. He was animated with his motions.”
   Officer Miller testified that after a few minutes, Graham
pointed “to the east towards Florence Boulevard and sa[id],
that’s him right there. At that point, I turn my direction to
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where he’s pointing and I see the same vehicle that Officer
Woodard and I had saw at Florence Boulevard and Ames, a
two-door Chevy 1500.” Thereafter, Officers Logan Moran
and Erin Riley, who recently arrived at the scene, began following the Chevy Tahoe. After making visual contact with
the Tahoe, Officer Moran continued to follow it but was
directed not to perform a traffic stop. Eventually, Officer
Moran “disengage[d]” and other law enforcement officers
in unmarked cruisers took over surveillance of the Tahoe.
Multiple officers, including Sgt. Jacob Chong, Det. Andrew
Ramsay, and Officer Kyle Graber, continued to follow the
Tahoe until it cut through a parking lot and pulled over near
North 61st and Jaynes Streets. At that time, the officers activated their cruiser lights. Sergeant Chong, Detective Ramsay,
and Officer Graber all testified that the Tahoe’s driver, identified as Wright, exited the Tahoe before they exited their
cruisers, that Wright faced the officers’ direction, and that
Wright was holding a handgun and appeared to be attempting
to pull it up. After alerting the other officers to the presence
of a gun, Sergeant Chong fired numerous shots at Wright.
Three other officers also discharged their firearms. At some
point, Wright attempted to flee, and more shots were fired
until Wright fell to the ground. Officers approached Wright,
who had suffered multiple gunshot wounds and was lying on
the ground. Multiple officers testified that upon approaching Wright, they observed a handgun a few feet away from
Wright. After securing the firearm, officers began performing
life-saving measures on Wright until paramedics arrived and
transported Wright to a hospital. Video footage depicting this
interaction was captured by multiple officers’ body cameras
and was admitted into evidence during the trial.
    The forensic team was subsequently dispatched to photograph the scene and collect evidence. The Tahoe was transported to the police impound lot and was searched pursuant to
a search warrant. Wright’s handgun was collected as evidence,
and upon investigation, forensics determined that there was a
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bullet in the chamber of the gun and 10 additional rounds in
the magazine.
   The State charged Wright, in case number CR 23-5794,
with possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, a
Class ID felony; terroristic threats, a Class IIIA felony; and use
of a deadly weapon (firearm) to commit a felony, a Class IC
felony. During the pretrial hearing, Wright specifically stated
he wanted to proceed with his appointed trial counsel, and the
matter was set for trial. Wright was represented by the public
defender’s office at all relevant times during this case.
                     2. Pretrial Motions
   In September 2024, Wright’s counsel filed a motion in
limine and motion to exclude testimony from Graham because
he could not be located for service of a subpoena and had
indicated that he was not willing to participate in the proceedings. Counsel further sought to exclude statements made by
Graham during the 911 call, statements made by officers over
their radios in response to the 911 call, and statements made
by Graham to police officers at the scene on the basis that
the evidence was inadmissible hearsay and violated Wright’s
rights under the Confrontation Clauses in the Nebraska and
U.S. Constitutions.
   Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion to
exclude Graham’s testimony at trial. The court overruled the
motion in limine relating to the statements made by Graham
during the 911 call as nontestimonial excited utterances. As it
related to the statements made by police over the police radio
or dispatch, the court overruled Graham’s motion, stating that
the witnesses “shall be allowed to describe their understanding of the nature of the call to which they were responding
without reference to the specific details of the allegations.”
The court found that the statements were not hearsay “as they
are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but
rather for the effect the statements had on the listener(s).”
As it related to statements made by Graham at the scene, the
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district court sustained it in part, stating that “[s]pecifically,
the State may elicit testimony regarding the statement made
on scene that ‘that’s him right there’ and . . . Graham’s pointing to a specific vehicle. All other statements made on scene
by . . . Graham are excluded as hearsay.”
                            3. Trial
   A jury trial was held in October 2024. During the trial,
the parties stipulated that as of October 3, 2023, Wright was
a prohibited person as defined by statute, having been previously convicted of a felony. Testimony was adduced from
law enforcement officers, a 911 communications officer, and
forensic investigators consistent with the facts as set forth
above. Multiple exhibits were received during trial, including
the recording of the 911 call; officers’ body camera footage;
photographs of the scene of the shooting and the location of
the vehicles; and other photographs, including a screenshot
of Wright from the body camera footage depicting Wright
on the ground near the firearm, a closeup of the firearm and
magazine, the Tahoe, various bullet holes, and the spent bullet
casings at the scene.
                  4. Verdicts and Sentences
   The jury found Wright guilty of the charged offenses of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, terroristic
threats, and use of a firearm to commit a felony.
   In December 2024, a consolidated sentencing hearing was
held during which the court imposed sentences in the instant
case and district court case No. CR 23-5393. In case No.
CR 23-5393, Wright was convicted of two counts of possession
of fentanyl with the intent to deliver and the court sentenced
Wright to 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment on each conviction with
the sentences ordered to run concurrently.
   In the current case, for Wright’s conviction of possession of
a firearm by a prohibited person, the district court sentenced
Wright to 10 to 16 years’ imprisonment with a mandatory
minimum of 3 years; for Wright’s conviction of terroristic
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threats, the district court sentenced Wright to 1 to 2 years’
imprisonment; and for Wright’s conviction for use of a deadly
weapon to commit a felony, the district court sentenced Wright
to 10 to 14 years’ imprisonment with a 5-year mandatory
minimum. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively to
one another and consecutively to his sentence in CR 23-5393.
Wright was given a total of 443 days of credit for time served,
with 431 days applied to CR 23-5393 and 13 days applied to
the present case, CR 23-5794.
   Wright has now timely appealed from his convictions and
sentences, represented by different counsel on appeal.
               III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Wright assigns in his appellate brief that the district court
erred in (1) admitting Graham’s statements to dispatch during
the 911 call and statements to police identifying Wright once
police arrived at the scene on the basis that the statements
constituted testimonial hearsay; (2) admitting cumulative,
inflammatory, and prejudicial photographic evidence, including graphic images of the scene, shell casings, and the firearm,
over his objections; (3) imposing excessive sentences; and (4)
finding that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived
his right to counsel.
   We note that at the beginning of oral argument in this case,
Wright’s attorney orally moved to withdraw assignments of
error Nos. 2 and 4, which request we granted. Therefore, those
two assignments will not be discussed further in this opinion.
                 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply,
the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska
Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the
rules make discretion a factor in determining admissibility.
State v. Montoya, 

, 

 (2020).
   [2] Apart from rulings under the residual hearsay exception, we review for clear error the factual findings underpinning a trial court’s hearsay ruling and review de novo the
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court’s ultimate determination to admit evidence over a hearsay objection. 

   [3] An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court’s determination of the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I,
§ 11, of the Nebraska Constitution and reviews the underlying
factual determinations for clear error. 

   [4] An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed
within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the
trial court. State v. Sutton, 

, 

 (2025).
   [5] It is within the discretion of the trial court to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for separate crimes.
State v. Mora, 

, 

 (2017).
                         V. ANALYSIS
                 1. Admission of Testimonial
                      Hearsay Evidence
   Wright first assigns that the district court erred in admitting
statements made by Graham in his 911 call and in his identification of Wright to officers at the scene. We will discuss the
assignments separately.
            (a) Graham’s Statements During 911 Call
                           (i) Hearsay
   Wright first argues that the district court erred in admitting Graham’s statements made to dispatch during his 911
call because the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay.
Wright’s minimal argument was that Graham’s out-of-court
statements were offered for their truth and that no hearsay
exception applies. The State argues that Wright’s argument
was insufficient to present the assignment. Assuming without
deciding that the minimal argument was sufficient, we will
address it.
   Under 

(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024),
hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
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prove the truth of the matter asserted. Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the rules of evidence, by other
rules adopted by the statutes of the State of Nebraska, or by the
discovery rules of this court. 

 (Cum.
Supp. 2024).
   

 (Cum. Supp. 2024) provides
numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule. One such exception is § 27-803(2), which excepts from the general hearsay
rule “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.” The district court ruled that
Graham’s statements during the 911 call constituted excited
utterances.
   [6,7] For a statement to qualify as an excited utterance, the
following criteria must be met: (1) There must have been a
startling event, (2) the statement must relate to the event, and
(3) the statement must have been made by the declarant while
under the stress of the event. State v. Hembertt, 

,

 (2005). The key requirement is spontaneity,
which requires a showing the statements were made without
time for conscious reflection. 

   Wright contends that Graham’s statements during the 911
call identified Wright by name and alleged that Wright pointed
a firearm at Graham. He argues that the court erred in admitting Graham’s statements to dispatch during the 911 call
because the statements constituted hearsay and were not harmless because “Graham’s account was central to establishing
intent and the credibility of the terroristic threats allegation.”
Brief for appellant at 14.
   The district court found that the statements made by Graham
during the 911 call were nontestimonial excited utterances.
During the trial, the 911 call was played, wherein Graham
stated, “[I] got a gun pulled on me, I’m on 21st and Pinkney.”
He stated that somebody just drove past him in “a red Chevy.
It’s a two-door Chevy, so it had to be, like, a old school Tahoe
or something, you know? But the first part of the license plate
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was YSU.” Graham continued, stating that “they pulled a gun
out on me and I was just standing outside.” When asked where
the individuals went when they left, Graham stated, “When
they left [here,] I know where they going. They going up on
52nd and Ja[yn]es.” The call continued as follows:
         DISPATCH: Okay. And are you injured at all? Do you
     need an ambulance?
         MR. GRAHAM: No. I’m not injured, but I was just
     standing outside with my dog and they drove past and
     stopped and pulled a gun out on me.
         DISPATCH: Okay. And the —
         MR. GRAHAM: And I know the dude who pulled the
     gun on me. His name is Patrick Wright.
         DISPATCH: Okay. Is he white, Black, Hispanic?
         MR. GRAHAM: The dude who pulled the gun out on
     me name is Patrick Wright.
         DISPATCH: Is Patrick white, Black, Hispanic?
         MR. GRAHAM: Wright. Wright. He’s Black. Wright.
         DISPATCH: Okay. And about how old is he?
         MR. GRAHAM: Wright. W-R-I-G-H-T.
         DISPATCH: Okay. How old is he?
         MR. GRAHAM: Yes. He is mid-thirties, maybe. It
     was him and one other dude. I don’t know who was in
     the back. I just seen him and the passenger. But when he
     rolled up, he pulled a gun out and pointed it at me and
     I’m standing outside, you know, and —
         DISPATCH: What address are you at right now?
         MR. GRAHAM: Like, my life could have been over
     right then.
Graham further indicated that he knew exactly where Wright
lived and that he was riding in a “red Chevy, two-door SUV
with . . . gray things around the wheel well.”
   We agree that the statements in the 911 call contained hearsay. Graham’s statements that Wright pulled up in a red Chevy
sport utility vehicle and pointed a gun at him were offered to
prove the truth of those statements. Because Graham did not
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testify at the trial, the 911 call was the only evidence admitted
at trial to support Wright’s convictions for terroristic threats
and use of a weapon to commit a felony.
   However, the statements themselves were properly admitted
if they fall under an exception to the hearsay rule. Following
our review of the record, we agree with the district court that
all three elements of the excited utterance hearsay exception
were met here. First, there is no doubt that Graham experienced
a startling or shocking event in that a firearm was pointed at
him. His statement to dispatch indicating that Wright pulled up
in a “red Chevy, two-door SUV” and pointed a firearm at him
related to that startling event. And, that statement was made
shortly after the startling event occurred while Graham was
still under the stress of the event, as evidenced in his voice.
See State v. Roebuck, 

, 

 (2022)
(holding that call to dispatch met all elements of excited utterance hearsay exception). Therefore, we agree that Graham’s
statements made during the 911 call were hearsay but were
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule. This portion of Wright’s assignment of error fails.
                   (ii) Confrontation Clause
   Wright next argues that the district court erred in admitting
Graham’s statements made to dispatch during the 911 call over
his objections based on the Confrontation Clause.
   [8] The Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const. amend. VI, which
overlaps with the hearsay rules, provides, in relevant part: “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” Neb.
Const. art. I, § 11, provides, in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to meet
the witnesses against him face to face . . . .” The Nebraska
Supreme Court has held that the analysis under article I, § 11,
is the same as that under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. State v. Hembertt, 

, 

 (2005).
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   [9,10] Where “testimonial” statements are at issue, the
Confrontation Clause demands that such hearsay statements be
admitted at trial only if the declarant is unavailable and there
had been a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 

 In determining whether statements are testimonial for
purposes of confrontation issues, the Nebraska Supreme Court,
in relying on U.S. Supreme Court cases, stated:
         The inquiry is whether, under the circumstances, the
      declarant intended to bear testimony against the accused.
      The determinative factor in determining whether a
      declarant bears testimony is the declarant’s awareness or
      expectation that his or her statements may later be used at
      a trial. . . . Thus, some excited utterances are testimonial
      and others are not, depending upon the circumstances
      in which the particular statement was made. . . . Under
      Crawford, statements obtained during police interrogations
      are testimonial fundamentally because police officers who
      obtain a statement during an interrogation are performing
      investigative and evidence-producing functions formerly
      handled by justices of the peace. Kilday, supra. Extension
      of this rationale indicates that a statement made at or near
      the scene of a crime may be an excited utterance, yet may
      also be testimonial under Crawford if obtained through
      questioning by a police officer acting in an investigative
      capacity to produce evidence in anticipation of a potential
      criminal prosecution. Kilday, supra.
         The underlying assumption in these cases is that a
      declarant responding to police questioning, structured
      and conducted for the purpose of producing evidence in
      anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution, should
      reasonably anticipate his or her testimony being used
      against the accused. . . . As the Court noted in Crawford
      v. Washington, 

, 

, 

 (2004), “testimony” is “‘made for the purpose
      of establishing or proving some fact.’ . . . An accuser
      who makes a formal statement to government officers
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      bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a
      casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” In other
      words, whether a statement is testimonial depends on the
      purpose or expectation of the declarant in making the
      statement, and the circumstances surrounding the making
      of the statement illuminate the purpose or expectation of
      the declarant.
Hembertt, 

, 

 (citations omitted).
   Wright specifically argues that Graham’s statements during
the 911 call were testimonial because they were made after the
incident, while Graham was safe and in no imminent danger,
and that the purpose was to provide a detailed account of the
events for a law enforcement investigation, not to obtain emergency assistance.
   In Davis v. Washington, 

, 

, 

 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a consolidated case, considered whether statements made during a 911
call or at a crime scene were testimonial and thus subject to
the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme
Court concluded that a 911 call made while the victim was
facing an ongoing emergency was for the purpose of resolving the emergency and not to investigate events when she was
describing the events as they were occurring. However, in the
other case, the Supreme Court stated that statements made in
response to law enforcement questions on the scene, when
there was no immediate threat to the victim at that time, were
for an investigatory purpose. The Supreme Court stated:
          This is not to say that a conversation which begins
      as an interrogation to determine the need for emergency
      assistance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme Court put
      it, “evolve into testimonial statements,” 829 N.E.2d, at
      457, once that purpose has been achieved. In this case,
      for example, after the operator gained the information
      needed to address the exigency of the moment, the
      emergency appears to have ended (when Davis drove
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     away from the premises). The operator then told [the
     victim] to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of
     questions. It could readily be maintained that, from that
     point on, [the victim’s] statements were testimonial, not
     unlike the “structured police questioning” that occurred
     in Crawford, 

. . . .
        Determining the testimonial or nontestimonial
     character of the statements that were the product of the
     interrogation in Hammon is a much easier task, since
     they were not much different from the statements we
     found to be testimonial in Crawford. It is entirely clear
     from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of
     an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct—as,
     indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged,
     App. in No. 05-5705, at 25, 32, 34. There was no
     emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified
     that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no
     one throw or break anything, id., at 25. When the officers
     first arrived, [the victim] told them that things were
     fine, id., at 14, and there was no immediate threat to
     her person. When the officer questioned [the victim] for
     the second time, and elicited the challenged statements,
     he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) “what
     is happening,” but rather “what happened.” Objectively
     viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of
     the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime—
     which is, of course, precisely what the officer should
     have done.
Davis, 

. The Supreme Court ultimately
concluded:
     Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course
     of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
     indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
     to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
     They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively
     indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and
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      that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
      criminal prosecution.
Davis, 

.
   However, the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Bryant, 

, 

, 

 (2011),
expounded on the definition of “ongoing emergency,” stating
that “whether an emergency exists and is ongoing is a highly
context-dependent inquiry.” The U.S. Supreme Court indicated
that an ongoing emergency may exist, notwithstanding the fact
that the threat to the victim has been neutralized, if the threat
to first responders and the public continues. See 

 The Court
stated that when considering whether the evidence is testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, courts should
consider all the relevant factors in determining whether, objectively, the “primary purpose” of the statements was to gather
information to prove past events relevant to a later prosecution or were for the purpose of seeking assistance in ending
a threatening situation. See Bryant, 

. The U.S.
Supreme Court indicated that the factors to be considered in
determining the primary purpose of the statements included
whether there was an ongoing emergency, the formality of
the questioning, the content of the questions and answers, the
statements and actions of both the declarant and the interrogators, and the circumstances in which the interrogation
occurred. See 

 The Court further stated that in
considering whether there was an ongoing emergency, courts
should consider the possible threat to the victim, police, and
the public; the type of danger posed; the nature of the dispute
or the motive of the perpetrator; whether a weapon was utilized; whether the victim suffered injuries; whether the identity
and location of the perpetrator are known by law enforcement;
and whether the scene was secured. See 

   Further, as the U.S. Supreme Court held, “A 911 call, on
the other hand, and at least the initial interrogation conducted
in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed
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primarily to ‘establis[h] or prov[e]’ some past fact, but to
describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.”
Davis v. Washington, 

, 

, 

 (2006).
   Applying those principles here on this record, Graham’s
report to dispatch included a statement that Wright had just
pointed a gun at him; that he remained at large, as demonstrated by the fact that he drove by the scene once police
arrived and began questioning Graham at the scene; that under
these circumstances, there remained a threat to the victim, the
public, first responders, or all of them; that the type of danger
involved a gun; that police were not aware of the location of the
perpetrator at the time of the 911 call; and that there was a lack
of formality to the questioning that suggested the police dispatcher’s primary purpose was simply to address the ongoing
emergency just described to the dispatcher. Because the circumstances of the call objectively indicate that the “primary
purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency,” Graham’s descriptions in the
911 call were not testimonial and did not bar their admission.
See 

. See, also, U.S. v. Robertson,

 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that court has previously held that “911 calls that are made to ‘enable police to
identify and apprehend an armed, threatening individual . . .
[are] not testimonial in nature and thus d[o] not implicate the
Confrontation Clause’”).
               (b) Graham’s Statements to Law
                     Enforcement at Scene
   Wright similarly contends that Graham’s isolated statement
made to law enforcement at the scene identifying Wright was
testimonial hearsay that violated his right to confrontation. He
asserts that Graham did not testify at trial and that Graham’s
testimony was excluded after the State was unable to serve
him with subpoenas. Wright asserts that, despite Graham’s not
testifying during trial, Graham’s statement was nonetheless
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admitted during trial through a short video segment from
Officer Miller’s body camera footage at the scene. Wright
argues that Graham’s statement to law enforcement at the
scene was testimonial because it was made after the incident,
while Graham was safe and in no imminent danger, and that
the purpose was to provide a detailed account of the events
for a law enforcement investigation as opposed to obtaining
emergency assistance.
   As before, we first address Wright’s contention that the
statement offered and received constituted hearsay and whether
any exception applied.
   Here, during the trial, the State offered redacted body camera footage wherein, during the interaction with law enforcement, Graham pointed and “said, that’s him right there.”
Officer Miller testified that Graham appeared to be acting
“very excited,” that he “was talking fast,” and that “[h]e was
animated with his motions.” Officer Miller testified that during
the conversation with Graham, “He seemed to be backing up
a little bit. As he was saying it, he was pointing out. He got
more excited as he was saying, that’s him right there, that’s
him right there.”
   As before, we acknowledge that the statement made by
Graham was offered for its truth but was provided by Graham
to responding officers following his call to dispatch. Under
similar circumstances, in State v. Hale, 

, 73,

, 546 (2015), the Nebraska Supreme Court
found that the declarant’s statements to law enforcement that
“‘“[h]e did it”’” and pointing at the defendant were admissible
as excited utterances. The court found that the statements were
made after the declarant suffered and witnessed a startling
event, that the statement identifying the perpetrator related
to that event, and that despite differing testimony of the
declarant’s demeanor, the totality of the circumstances showed
that the declarant was still under the stress from the assault
when she identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Like
Graham’s statements to dispatch during the 911 call, we find
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that Graham’s statement identifying Wright to first responders met all three elements of the excited utterance hearsay
exception. As such, the district court did not err in overruling
Wright’s objection related to the identification of Wright.
   And in addressing Wright’s claim that allowing the out-ofcourt statement violated the Confrontation Clause, we again
conclude that the isolated statement was not testimonial. In
short, Graham’s statement was made while talking to police
who first responded to his call, and the statement provided
and received into evidence was not in response to a question
by police. Graham simply recognized the vehicle while talking
to police as the vehicle drove by the scene, and the fact that
it returned underscores that the situation remained an ongoing
emergency in that the person who allegedly brandished the
gun had now returned. We find that the primary purpose here
was directed at addressing an ongoing emergency and that
Graham’s identification was not testimonial when applying the
principles we previously described. This assignment fails.
                     2. Excessive Sentences
   Wright assigns that the district court imposed excessive
sentences. Wright generally argues that the district court failed
to appropriately weigh the sentencing factors and that the
court should have imposed concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences.
   Here, Wright was convicted of possession of a deadly
weapon by a prohibited person, a Class ID felony; terroristic
threats, a Class IIIA felony; and use of a firearm to commit a
felony, a Class IC felony. See, 

(1)(a)
and (3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2022) (possession of firearm by prohibited person); 

 (Reissue 2016)
(terroristic threats); 

(1)(a) and (c)
(Cum. Supp. 2024) (use of firearm to commit felony).
   Regarding Wright’s conviction of possession of a deadly
weapon by a prohibited person, Wright’s sentence of 10 to 16
years’ imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of 3 years’
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imprisonment is within the statutory sentencing range for Class
ID felonies, which are punishable by a mandatory minimum of
3 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of 50 years’ imprisonment. See 

 (Cum. Supp. 2024).
   Regarding Wright’s conviction of terroristic threats, Wright
was sentenced to 1 to 2 years’ imprisonment, which is within
the statutory sentencing range for Class IIIA felonies that are
punishable by no minimum sentence and a maximum sentence
of 3 years’ imprisonment followed by 0 to 18 months’ post-release supervision, a $10,000 fine, or both. Because Wright
was consecutively sentenced to a Class IC felony and a Class
ID felony, Wright was not subject to post-release supervision.
See § 28-105(6).
   Regarding Wright’s conviction of use of a deadly weapon
to commit a felony, Wright was sentenced to 10 to 14 years’
imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of 5 years, which is
within the statutory sentencing range for Class IC felonies that
are punishable by a mandatory minimum of 5 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of 50 years’ imprisonment. See § 28-105.
   [11-13] Where a sentence imposed within the statutory
limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court
must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in considering and applying the relevant factors, as well
as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence
to be imposed. State v. Sutton, 

, 

(2025). In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant factors customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s (1)
age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and
cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as
(7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence
involved in the commission of the crime. 

 The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and
includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s
demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. 

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   [14] Wright does not dispute that the sentences are within
the statutory sentencing range; rather, he argues that the court
failed to consider the appropriate sentencing factors. The
record refutes this claim. During the sentencing hearing, the
district court stated that it had reviewed the presentence report,
which included police reports, and had considered the relevant
factors, including Wright’s age, mentality, education and experience, social and cultural background, past criminal record
or record of law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense,
the nature of the offenses, and the amount, if any, of violence
involved in the commission of the offenses. We further note
that a sentencing court is not required to articulate on the
record that it has considered each sentencing factor nor to
make specific findings as to the facts pertaining to the factors
or the weight given them. State v. Greer, 

, 

 (2021).
   According to the presentence report, Wright was 40 years
old, single, and had three dependents. Wright has a 10th-grade
education and was employed prior to his incarceration. Wright’s
previous criminal history included three convictions for operating a vehicle during suspension, as well as single convictions
for providing false information, accessory to robbery, tampering with a witness, assault, third degree domestic violence
assault, first degree trespassing, and other minor offenses. And
after the current offenses, Wright was convicted of two counts
of possession of fentanyl with the intent to distribute and was
awaiting sentencing. The level of service/case management
inventory assessed Wright to be at a very high risk to reoffend.
Wright reported that he had been struggling with his mental
health and had been diagnosed with anxiety and depression.
He further reported that he had attempted suicide twice in his
life. The probation officer noted that Wright’s criminal record
began at the age of 13 and that Wright had been affiliated with
a gang when he was younger.
   Based upon factors, including that the sentences imposed
were within the relevant statutory sentencing ranges, Wright’s
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criminal history, his prior revocations of parole, his very high
risk to reoffend, and the nature of the offenses, the sentences
imposed were not an abuse of discretion. Further, the court’s
order that the sentences be served consecutively likewise does
not constitute an abuse of discretion. Specifically, regarding
Wright’s conviction for use of a deadly weapon to commit a
felony, § 28-1205(4) provides that “[a] violation of this section shall be treated as a separate and distinct offense from the
underlying crimes being committed, and a sentence imposed
under this section shall be consecutive to any other sentence
imposed.” This assignment of error fails.
   [15,16] Although we find no error regarding Wright’s assignment of error, we note that the district court determined that
Wright had a total of 443 days of credit for time served. The
court applied 431 days to Wright’s sentence in CR 23-5393
and applied 13 days to Wright’s sentence in the present case.
Whether a defendant is entitled to credit for time served and in
what amount are questions of law, subject to appellate review
independent of the lower court. State v. Nelson, 

,

 (2025). In Nelson, 

, 16 N.W.3d
at 894, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that “when a court
imposes multiple sentences contemporaneously, whether such
sentences are ordered to be served consecutively or concurrently, all available credit for time served under [Neb. Rev.
Stat.] § 83-1,106(1) [(Reissue 2024)] is applied just once, to
the aggregate of all terms imposed.” Accordingly, we modify
the sentencing order to provide that Wright is entitled to 443
days of credit for time served against the aggregate of all
terms imposed in the present case and CR 23-5393. We further direct the district court, upon spreading the mandate, to
modify the commitment accordingly.
                      VI. CONCLUSION
  For the reasons stated above, we affirm Wright’s convictions
and sentences.
                                                  Affirmed.