Commonwealth v. FLICK’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “On February 3, 1976, the Attorney General petitioned the court to impose sanctions and penalties upon Defendant, alleging that Defendant had persistently violated both consent decrees. Hearings lasting four days and involving testimony of 26 witnesses were held before the Honorable Maxwell E. Davison who, on July 20, 1976, filed his opinion. In the course of 33 findings of fact, the Chancellor enumerated 17 instances of violation of the 1973 and 1975 orders. Specifically, the court found that Defendant and his agents on numerous occasions had falsely identified themselves; had stated that they represented photo companies, the names of which had not been registered as fictitious names; had repeatedly failed to give oral notice to purchasers of the photo album plans of their right of cancellation; and had failed to call attention to, and sometimes diverted attention from, the written notice contained in the purchase agreements. Additionally, the court found that, when the purchasers in question attempted to cancel their contracts, Defendant stated that the purchasers had no right to cancel, refused to return downpayments, and on several occasions, engaged in intimidating, threatening and abusive language toward the consumer purchasers. The court found that these violations continued up to and even during the pendency of the hearings before it, and found that Defendant had made no effort to comply with the terms of the consent decrees, much less file a report outlining the manne”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pennsylvania Ex Rel. Gornish v. Flick (In Re Flick)

2. “We have held on numerous occasions that the legislative purpose in enacting the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law was to protect the consuming public from unfair or deceptive acts or practices of unscrupulous businessmen. Commonwealth v. Tolleson (First Opinion), 14 Pa.Cmwlth. 72 , 321 A.2d 664 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ziomek, Pa.Cmwlth., 352 A.2d 235 (1976). The unfair or deceptive acts or practices which the law is designed to prevent are enumerated in Section 2(4) of the Act, 73 P.S. § 201-2(4), which concludes with the catch-all clause “(xiii) Engaging in any other fraudulent conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.” Section 4 of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to bring an action in the name of the Commonwealth “to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act or practice.” Once an injunction is granted, or a consent decree is entered into, the Commonwealth, through its Attorney General, is empowered by Section 8 of the Act to seek the assessment of civil penalties against a party to a decree who violates its provisions. Commonwealth v. Tolleson (Second Opinion), 14 Pa.Cmwlth. 140 , 321 A.2d 701 (1974). Section 8, by its own terms, authorizes the imposition of a penalty of up to $5,000 for each violation; and as we held in Tolleson (Second), supra, each improper act, each false statement and each inadequate disclosure may constitute a separate violation. More over, there is no doubt that in”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pennsylvania Ex Rel. Gornish v. Flick (In Re Flick)