Davis v. Dillmeier Enterprises, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
1997
Citation profile
16 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently September 2022
16 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 111 Wash. 2d 903 - Phillips v. City of Seattle · 107 Wash. 2d 563 - Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · 55 Ark. App. 226 - Torrey v. City of Fort Smith · Travelers Insurance v. Smith · Malone v. Trans-States Lines, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[Tjhere is no remedy under the Workers’ Compensation Act for an employee who is terminated from his or her job on the basis of a disability. Thus, the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act does not preclude Appellant from bringing an action under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act based upon Appellee’s alleged discrimination in terminating her on the bases of her permanent restrictions and impairments. In this respect, we agree with the reasoning espoused by the Washington Supreme Court [in Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wash.2d 563 , 731 P.2d 497 (Wash.1987), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wash.2d 903 , 766 P.2d 1099 (Wash.1989) ] that it matters not how the disability came about; rather, the focus should be upon the subsequent deliber ate action by the employer in terminating the employee based upon a disability. Additionally, we are persuaded that the rights and remedies provided by both Acts are considerably different and serve to fulfill different purposes. Appellant has alleged ttvo separate injuries-one being a work-related physical injury, for which she has received workers’ compensation benefits, and one being a subsequent nonphysical injury arising from Appellee’s action in terminating her based upon her physical disability. The first injury is exclusively cognizable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, while the subsequent injury is of the type envisioned by the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Any employer who without reasonable cause refuses to return an employee who is injured in the course of employment to work, where-suitable employment is available within the employee’s physical and mental limitations, upon order of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, and in addition to other benefits, shall be liable to pay to the employee the difference between benefits received and the average weekly wages lost during the period of the refusal, for a period not exceeding one (1) year.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[W]e conclude that there is no remedy under the Workers’ Compensation Act for an employee who is terminated from his or her job on the basis of a disability. Thus, the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act does not preclude Appellant from bringing an action under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act based upon Appellee’s alleged discrimination in terminating her on the bases of her permanent restrictions and impairments.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.