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← 330 FSUPP 615 - Lee v. Boswell

Lee v. Boswell’s Empirical Analysis

1971

Citation profile

39
cited by 39 later decisions
9
states following
January 2014
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 1 district · 25 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently January 2014 · most notably Bland v. McHann (1972), Eagerton v. Williams (1983)

9 federal appellate · 1 district · 25 state decisions

19019711980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 1341 · 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 28 U.S.C. § 2284 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Connally v. General Construction Co. · Ala Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States · Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan · Snyder v. Harris · Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Even if the State of Alabama were permitted by its own Constitution and laws to classify property for tax purposes, it is clear that its present ad valorem tax program still would not comport with the stringent requirements of the Federal Constitution. While distinctions based on geographical areas are not, in and of themselves, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, Salsburg v. Maryland , 346 U.S. 545 , 74 S.Ct. 280 , 98 L.Ed. 281 (1954), a state must demonstrate, if it wishes to establish different classes of property based upon different geographical localities — e.g, rural areas as opposed to urban areas — that the classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary but rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy. State Board of Tax Comm'rs of Indiana v. Jackson , 283 U.S. 527 , 537 , 51 S.Ct. 540 , 75 L.Ed. 1248 (1931). Such a showing has not been made in this case. "Defendant has, for example, offered no explanation in an attempt to justify or explain why an urban area like Jefferson County assesses property at a higher percentage (26.8%) of actual cash value than does a rural area like Elmore County (9.7%), while at the same time an area like Dallas County with one municipality of substantial size — Selma — assesses property at a higher percentage (23.1%) of fair market value than does a similar area like Montgomery County (15.5%), which also has only one municipality of a substantial size. Nor has any evidence been submitted to explain why propert”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"The Court is aware of the impact of the present decision upon the tax structure of the state and its subdivisions, since the type of discriminatory treatment here involved is deep-seated and of long standing. For these reasons, the Court will give defendant [commissioner of revenue] a reasonable period of time, up to one year from the date of this opinion and order, to bring assessments throughout the state into conformity with the mandate of this opinion. It is so ordered."”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “`uniformity and equality among all taxpayers, private corporations, associations and individuals alike', both as to ratio and percentage of taxation and also as to rate of taxation,”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.