Tyler v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

81 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 83 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First, the complaining party has the burden of making a prima facie showing that the other party has exercised its peremptory challenges on an impermissibly discriminatory basis, such as race or gender. ... Second, once the trial court has determined that the party complaining about the use of the peremptory challenges has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the party exercising the peremptory challenges to rebut the prima facie case by offering race-neutral explanations for challenging the excluded jurors. The explanation must be neutral, related to the case to be tried, clear and reasonably specific, and legitimate. The reason offered need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause ... It is insufficient, however, for the party making the peremptory challenges to merely deny that he had a discriminatory motive or merely affirm his good faith. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This includes allowing the complaining party an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons given for the peremptory challenges are pretextual or have a discriminatory impact .., [A]t that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. While the complaining party has the ultimate burden of proving unlawful discrimination, and therefore should be offered the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons off”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Spencer v. State

2. “[I]n the case at hand the prosecutor’s remarks in explaining his use of peremptory challenges with respect to race made perfectly clear that his use of peremptory challenges to exclude women from the jury were gender motivated and, therefore, contrary to Maryland constitutional law. From his own mouth, it is patent that his attempts to exclude women were simply that he believed that he had a better chance to obtain guilty verdicts from a jury composed of men (preferably older men) than one composed of women (particularly young women). In the face of what the prosecutor said at trial, he is not entitled to come forward at this time in an attempt to present a neutral explanation for challenging women jurors.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Spencer v. State

3. “The equality of rights under law, without regard to gender, bestowed by Art. 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, flowing through the equal protection guarantees of Art. 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to Batson v. Kentucky, 467[476] U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), prohibits the State in a criminal prosecution from using peremptory challenges so as to exclude a person from service as a juror because of that person’s sex.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 185 Md. App. 692 - Elliott v. State