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← 330 Mo. 709 - State v. Glover

State v. Glover’s Empirical Analysis

1932

Citation profile

67
cited by 67 later decisions
10
states following
April 2017
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 56 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 67 later decisions — most recently April 2017 · most notably State v. Holt (1980), Commonwealth v. Rhoades (1980)

5 federal appellate · 56 state decisions — followed in 10 states

230193219401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on State v. Wieners · State v. Messino · State v. Hopkirk · State v. Hopper · Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[e]ven though the homicide be unintentional, yet if it be committed in the course of perpetrating the felony, and is a natural and proximate result thereof, such as the defendant reasonably was bound to anticipate, * * * the homicide will be first degree murder under the statute.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and every homicide which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem, shall be deemed murder in the first degree.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “[T]he first degree murder statute embraced only killings which would have been murder at common law; that is was merely a statute of classification, not of definition; and, since at common law there could be no murder without an intent to kill, such intent was necessary under the constructive murder statute. [As a result, Shock ] held ... that if ... one person assail another, though without intending to kill him, and the latter person die, the assault and its result [were] all one offense[.] ... [T]he assault [was] simply a constituent element of the homicide, merging therein, and not a separate, independent felony.... [Thus, under the first degree murder statute as it then read,] the words “or other felony” appearing therein referred to some collateral felony, like arson, robbery, etc., and not to acts which themselves constituted the homicide.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.