State v. Pope

764                  February 14, 2024            No. 102

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                   STATE OF OREGON,
                    Plaintiff-Respondent,
                              v.
                  JASON THOMAS POPE,
                    Defendant-Appellant.
             Washington County Circuit Court
      21CR49891, 21CR55974; A179376 (Control), A179377

  Eric Butterfield, Judge.
  Submitted January 5, 2024.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  PER CURIAM
  Reversed and remanded.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2024)           765

        PER CURIAM
        Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree theft in Case No. 21CR49891 and one count of
second-degree theft in Case No. 21CR55974, and the
cases were tried together. Defendant was found guilty on
all counts and sentenced to consecutive jail terms. The
court also imposed restitution in the amount of $399.98 in
Case No. 21CR49891. Defendant appeals the judgments in
those cases, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying
his request to represent himself and (2) imposing the restitution award.
         The state concedes that the trial court erred in
denying defendant’s request to represent himself and that
the judgments in both cases must be reversed for that reason. We agree and accept the state’s concession. Defendant
unequivocally asked to represent himself at trial. As we
explained in State v. Music, 

, 

 (2020), “[a]bsent special circumstances, a court cannot force counsel upon a defendant who seeks to represent
him or herself.” The record does not support an inference
that such special circumstances were present. The trial
court stated that it would not allow defendant to represent
himself because defendant was “clearly incapable, and I
don’t trust what he’s saying,” but there was no evidence in
the record that defendant suffered from mental illness, let
alone that he was incapable of representing himself because
of a severe mental illness; nor does the record reflect that
defendant engaged in the type of misconduct that would
interfere with the judicial process. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand the judgments in Case No. 21CR49891 and
Case No. 21CR55974. Because we are reversing the judgment
in Case No. 21CR49891, we need not address defendant’s
argument regarding the restitution award in that case.
        Reversed and remanded.