Wallace v. Broyles’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 149 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 157 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wallace v. Broyles, 331 Ark. 58 , 961 S.W.2d 712 (1998), supp. opinion on denial of reh’g, 332 Ark. 189 (1998). Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appellate review, this court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Our review focuses not only on the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Id.”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Inc. v. Irons · Plant v. Wilbur

2. “Also cited by the petitioners is Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), in which the Supreme Court stated that the summary-judgment standard “mirrors the standard for a directed verdict.” That statement was repeated by the Supreme Court, although it was not the basis of the holding, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), a case we have cited often for other language concerning summary-judgment law but not for the “mirror” concept. If it has not been clear heretofore, we hope this opinion clarifies that, although we follow federal courts’ interpretation of the parallel rule, F.R.C.P. 56(c) when possible for the sake of uniformity, we have never gone so far as to say, much less hold, that we will make a “sufficiency of the evidence” determination when a summary-judgment motion is at issue. We regard that directed-verdict standard, used in ruling on motions made pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 50, as being somewhat different from the summary-judgment standard. We have ceased referring to summary judgment as “drastic” remedy. We now regard it simply as one of the tools in a trial court’s efficiency arsenal; however, we only approve the granting of the motion when the state of the evidence as portrayed by the pleadings, affidavits, discovery responses, and admissions on file is such that the nonmoving party is not entitled to a day in court, i.e., when there is not any genuine remaining issue”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 100 Ark. App. 240 - Hamilton v. Allen · Hamilton v. General Insurance Co. of America

3. “[t]o constitute negligence, an act must be one from which a reasonably careful person would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act, or to do it in a more careful manner.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ethyl Corp. v. Johnson · 104 Ark. App. 215 - Schmoll v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co.