State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Williamson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 4 district · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “If an owner reasonably should anticipate that, in view of the scope and nature of the permission granted (even if less than unfettered dominion), and because of the permittee’s relationship to another, the permittee will allow that other to use the car, the owner’s permission, without more, can be found to encompass permission for that use. (Italics ours.)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 45 Wash. App. 272 - Progressive Casualty Insurance v. Cameron · 66 Wash. 2d 38 - Safeco Insurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Pacific Indemnity Co.

2. ““ * * *. The factual determination must be made, in every case where the first permittee permits another to use the insured automobile, whether the initial grant of permission was broad enough to include an implied grant to the permittee of authority to give another use of the automobile and thus to render the latter an additional insured under the omnibus clause of the policy. “Thus, it is almost universally held in the modern cases that where the named insured grants his permittee broad and unfettered dominion over his insured automobile, he also impliedly authorizes his permittee to allow a third person to use it, and thus to render him an additional insured. The first permittee, by being granted complete dominion over the insured automobile, is put in the shoes of the named insured, and therefore his permittee is held to be the named insured’s permittee.” 331 F.2d at 519-520 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cascade Insurance Co. v. Glacier General Ins. Co. · 277 F. Supp. 542 - National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance

3. “The father, mother and Kenneth [son] all testified that Kenneth had been expressly prohibited from permitting anyone else to use the car. Willene [the friend] testified that she knew of this prohibition. On the other side of the ledger were these facts: For eight months prior to the accident Kenneth had been providéd with his own set of keys. During a period of two years, when he was attending Arizona State University, he had been given blanket authority to use the car to go to college. While Kenneth had been frequently cautioned respecting his use of the car and had operated the car under a set of rules laid down by his parents, during the years when he had been using the car he had frequently shown a disregard for these rules. He had, with his parents’ knowledge, received several citations for speeding, and had been involved in two to four accidents. He had, without permission and contrary to instructions, taken the car to Mexico for an overnight trip. His parents knew of his pattern of disregard. While they testified that he had been disciplined for violation of the rules (including depriving him of the use of the car for brief periods), they had thereafter continued to allow him to use the car.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Travelers Corp. v. Kaminski