Jones v. Dillard's, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Substantial doubt about a question of state law upon which a particular case turns should be resolved by certifying the question to the state supreme court.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Alabama Education Ass'n v. State Superintendent of Education · Fla. Ass'n of Prof. Lobbyists v. Div. of Leg. Inf.

2. “"On its face, the AADEA provides that it has the same statute of limitations as the ADEA. The ADEA, however, has two such limiting periods: 180 days and 90 days. Under the ADEA, a plaintiff has 180 days from the occurrence of the allegedly unlawful practice to file a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. Once a plaintiff has received notice that the EEOC has dismissed the charge, she has 90 days to file her suit. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (d)(1) and (e). Thus, the ADEA's statutes of limitations are intertwined with its administrative requirements. "Because of how the limitations operate in the ADEA, it is difficult, if not impossible, to transfer them to the AADEA."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Byrd v. Dillard's, Inc. · 923 So. 2d 315 - Hedegard v. BE&K

3. “"Plaintiff-Appellant Gerda Byrd began working for Gayfer's Department Store in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in 1975. In August 1998, Dillard's, Inc. (`Dillard's' or the `Company'), purchased the Tuscaloosa store, but continued to employ its existing workforce. For the five years preceding the buyout, Byrd held the position of office and credit manager. Dillard's offered no such position within its organizational structure, but placed her in an assistant area sales manager (`AASM') position in order to keep her at the same rate of pay. Shortly thereafter, however, Byrd learned from Richard Lucas, also an AASM, that the store was eliminating AASM positions and that the store had no intention of ever employing AASMs again. "In May 1999, as part of its restructuring, Dillard's offered Byrd an opportunity to sell cosmetics on the sales floor. She declined, however, because she saw lagging store sales as a bad sign for commissions in that department. Moreover, Byrd feared that she would eventually be terminated for failing to reach sales-per-hour (`SPH') goals. Rather than risk termination, Byrd considered her other options. As a manager with her position being eliminated, she was entitled to fill another managerial position in the store or take severance pay. She opted for the latter. Dillard's approved her severance request in May 1999, and she left in the same month. In all, Byrd received forty-seven weeks of severance pay. "On June 8, 1999, Byrd spoke to Andy Poole, operations manager ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Byrd v. Dillard's, Inc. · Pamela Sue Jones v. Dillard's, Inc.