United States v. Oracle Corp.’s Empirical Analysis
2004
Citation profile
5 federal appellate · 7 district ·
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 18 (§ 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 22 (§ 12 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 25 (§ 15 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 7 (§ 8 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 1337 · 28 U.S.C. § 1391
Relies on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. · Brown Shoe Co. v. United States · Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. · United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. · United States v. Philadelphia National Bank
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Like a seller in a perfect competitive market, however, sellers in a “competitive” differentiated products market do not obtain monopoly rents. In differentiated product markets with few barriers to entry, firms will introduce products that are increasingly close, although not perfect substitutes, for the other products in the market. The introduction of additional products causes the demand curve faced by each seller to shift downward and leftward until, at long run equilibrium, the demand curve intersects the average cost curve of the seller (defined as economists define costs to include a reasonable profit) eliminating the monopolistic rent....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Unilateral effects in a differentiated product market are likely to be profitable under the following conditions: (1) the products must be differentiated; (2) the products controlled by the merging firms must be close substitutes, i.e., “a substantial number of the customers of one firm would turn to the other in response to a price increase”; (3) other products must be sufficiently different from the products offered by the merging firms that a merger would make a small but significant and non-transitory price increase profitable for the merging firm; and (4) repositioning must be unlikely.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[s]ubstantial unilateral price elevation in a market for differentiated products requires that there be a significant share of sales in the market accounted for by consumers who regard the products of the merging firms as their first and second choices, and that repositioning of the non-parties’ product lines to replace the localized competition lost through the merger be unlikely.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.