Stephens v. Taylor

¶1dissenting:

¶2Through its verdict, the jury found that the Housing Authority acted with malice. Through its answer to the special interrogatory, however, the jury found that the Housing Authority did not act with willful and wanton disregard for Agnes’ rights. The majority concludes that the answer to the special interrogatory is not irreconcilable with the verdict. The plain meaning of the words “malicious,” “willful,” and “wanton” tells a different story.

¶3An act is willful if it is deliberate1 and done in accordance with one’s will. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1466 (1969). Essentially, willful conduct is intentional conduct. Since malice has an intent component (see Illinois Nurses Ass’n v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 318 Ill. App. 3d 519, 741 N.E.2d 1014 (2000)), a person who acts maliciously also acts willfully.

¶4An act is wanton if it is “[mjaliciously cruel” or merciless. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1444 (1969). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “wanton” signifies “[Unreasonably or maliciously risking harm while being utterly indifferent to the consequences.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1576 (7th ed. 1999). These definitions show that malicious conduct is also wanton conduct.

¶5I do not see how the Housing Authority could have acted maliciously yet not willfully and wantonly. Neither does the majority give an adequate explanation for its contrary view. The jury’s ability to infer malice from an absence of probable cause merely speaks to the method of finding malice; it does not change the essential meaning of that term. Furthermore, the absence of an instruction on willful and wanton conduct (and the fact that the jury did not consider that standard in reaching its verdict) simply does not prove the majority’s point. Nothing about those circumstances diffuses the conflict illustrated by the above-cited definitions.

¶6The trial court recognized a legitimate inconsistency between the verdict and the answer to the special interrogatory. I agree with the court and thus dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing its judgment.