¶1dissenting:
¶2On appeal, defendant contends that he was arrested without probable cause and that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress defendant’s statement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. I agree.
¶3The defendant also contends, as the majority writes (331 Ill. App. 3d at 682), “that mere inconsistent statements do not establish probable cause for arrest.” In this regard, the defendant’s statement is a restatement from the decision proclaimed by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Reynolds, 94 Ill. 2d 160, 166, 415 N.E.2d 766 (1983).
¶4In order to establish probable cause for arrest, facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge must be sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed the offense. People v. Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d 171, 178, 432 N.E.2d 605 (1982). Something more than a mere “hunch” or suspicion is required. People v. Ellis, 131 Ill. App. 3d 639, 642, 476 N.E.2d 22 (1985). The majority in the instant case predicates the decision that probable cause existed to warrant the belief that defendant was a person who had committed the offense upon three inconsistent statements made by the defendant to the officers.
¶5The third inconsistent statement which the majority writes is decisive occurred when the defendant handed Officer Heslin a piece of paper with several telephone numbers and, according to Heslin, stated that “it was telephone numbers of Dre and that Dre was one of the guys that robbed him.” According to the police report, defendant had previously stated to the officers who wrote the report that he didn’t know who robbed him. The majority writes (331 Ill. App. 3d at 684): “The third piece of information, the name of one of the perpetrators, is, we believe, decisive in a probable cause analysis. Under the circumstances, we find that defendant was placed under arrest when he was confined in the locked interview room.” No precedent is cited by the majority to support the decision.
¶6In my view, the majority has erred because no probable cause existed to sanction locking the defendant up while the officers sought for two hours to locate Mondre Vining, a man whom the defendant stated robbed him. Therefore, I dissent.
¶7On another issue in this appeal, I disagree with the State’s contention that it is inappropriate for this court to review the issue of probable cause because there was no suppression hearing conducted below and the State might have presented further evidence to establish probable cause if required to do so. See People v. Stewart, 217 Ill. App. 3d 373, 577 N.E.2d 175 (1991) (defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress cocaine found in defendant’s possession following his arrest was ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Odom, 71 Ill. App. 2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 116 (1966) (defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress defendant’s confession as involuntary amounted to ineffective assistance).
¶8Stewart is instructive. There, an officer observed defendant and another man exchange something on the sidewalk, but the officer admitted that he did not see what was transferred. As the officers approached in their squad car, the men fled. Defendant was apprehended on foot, handcuffed and a search revealed 17 bags of cocaine on his person. Stewart, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 375.
¶9The reviewing court found the question of probable cause to be a “close one.” Stewart, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 376. Since the officer did not see what was transferred, the court reasoned that police could not be certain that an innocent transaction had not occurred. The court noted that the defendant’s only viable defense lay in contesting the propriety of his arrest. The court concluded that defendant did not receive effective assistance because defense counsel failed to move to suppress the cocaine and this undermined the confidence in the outcome. The court reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for consideration of a suppression motion, where the parties would be afforded the opportunity to present further evidence on this issue. Stewart, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 376.
¶10In the instant case, Officer Heslin could not be certain that defendant was involved in the commission of a crime solely based on his inconsistent statements. The identification of Mondre Vining could have confirmed that defendant was probably acquainted with a person whom he named as one of the perpetrators. However, this information does not furnish probable cause that defendant either committed the offense or was accountable for the offense. Inconsistent statements, without more, do not provide probable cause to arrest. Reynolds, 94 Ill. 2d at 166. In my view, counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion undermines the confidence in the outcome. Therefore, defendant’s conviction should be reversed and this cause should be remanded for consideration of a suppression motion, where the parties can be afforded the opportunity to present further evidence in this issue.
¶11Again, I dissent.