Harris v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

219 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 221 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We ... look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account. ... In other words, the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. State · Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. v. Riddle

2. “We stated earlier that section 281A(b), though similar in language to § 924(c)(1), contains language identical to section 36B, and “use” in that statute has been interpreted, by this Court, as requiring conduct different from possession— an active, rather than passive, employment of a handgun. That interpretation, of which the Legislature was aware when it enacted section 281A(b), conflicts with the way “use” has been interpreted by the majority of the federal courts construing § 924(c)(1). The interpretation given a federal statute ordinarily is persuasive in interpreting a state statute patterned upon the federal statute. In the case sub judice, not only is the authority interpreting the federal statute not uniform, but the legislative history of the state statute suggests that a different meaning of “uses” was intended, since the Legislature chose to use the same language in section 281A(b) as it had used in section 36B, knowing the gloss we had put on the latter. It follows that the General Assembly did not intend to equate “uses” with “possesses” as the majority of federal courts have done. This is particularly so where, as here, the Legislature amended the statute specifically to delete “possess” and replaced it with terms that are not, in all circumstances, its equivalent. We are obliged to follow the intent of the Legislature.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 175 Md. App. 538 - Handy v. State

3. “The use of firearms in connection with drug trafficking crimes is an everyday occurrence____ [T]he combination of dealing drugs and possessing a firearm has become too commonplace. The Use or Possession of a Firearm Component. This component recognizes that firearms readily available and that those involved in drug trafficking crimes are quite willing to use those weapons to resolve disputes with their rivals or their customers. III. Use of a Firearm in a Drug Trafficking Crime 1. Why is it necessary to establish that use or possession of a firearm be a separate offense when Article 27, § 36B, already makes it unlawful to use a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence? The current statute is restricted to handguns. The proposed bill would include all firearms. Many drug dealers are using automatic weapons, assault rifles and other firearms that may not fall within the current definition of a handgun---- The language in this bill prohibits anyone to “use or possess” a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. It would affect an individual who carries a handgun while dealing drugs, even though he does not use it.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 191 Md. App. 297 - Neal v. State