State v. M. C.

716                   April 3, 2024                 No. 211

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON
                 In the Matter of M. C.,
         a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                       Respondent,
                            v.
                          M. C.,
                        Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                  22CC02151; A178625

  Debra E. Velure, Judge.
  Submitted September 6, 2023.
    Christopher J. O’Connor and Multnomah Defenders, Inc.,
filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Julia Glick, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  PAGÁN, J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2024)              717

         PAGÁN, J.
         Appellant challenges a judgment committing her to
the custody of Oregon Health Authority (OHA) under ORS
426.130(1)(a)(C) for up to 180 days, on the basis that she was
a person with mental illness as defined by ORS 426.005(1)(f)
and prohibiting her from purchasing or possessing a firearm. ORS 426.130(1)(a)(D). Specifically, appellant assigns
error to the trial court’s finding that she was a danger to
others. Appellant argues that the evidence of her aggressive
behavior in the hospital setting was insufficient for a rational
factfinder to infer that she was a danger to others. Viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to
support the trial court’s determination that appellant was a
danger to others at the time of the hearing. See State v. K. M.,

, 

 (2021) (stating the standard of review for civil commitment cases). Accordingly, we
affirm.
         In order to demonstrate that someone is a danger to
others, the state “must prove that actual future violence is
highly likely.” 

. A single violent act may establish
that someone is a danger to others so long as nothing indicates it was an isolated incident. State v. T. M., 

, 

 (2019). Alternatively, specific violent
acts are unnecessary to establish dangerousness if other
conduct in their recent history “ ‘clearly form[s] a foundation
for predicting future dangerousness.’ ” State v. L. R., 

, 

 (2017) (quoting State v. M. A.,

, 

 (2016) (brackets added)).
This generally requires evidence of actions demonstrating
the person’s “intention and ability to carry out” the acts that
suggest “that actual future violence is highly likely.” 

        In this case, appellant left the behavioral health
unit (BHU) of the hospital, barefoot and in just a bathrobe,
against medical advice. The next day, she was re-admitted
to the BHU and over the next several days exhibited aggressive behavior toward other patients and staff, needing near
constant supervision and redirection from staff trained in
de-escalation techniques. Even with supervision, appellant would invade other patients’ spaces, often screaming
718                                                              State v. M. C.

and cursing at them within inches of their faces and taking
food from their trays. She also exposed herself to staff and
slammed a door in a nurse’s face when she was asked to take
her medications. Her doctor testified that hospital staff’s
familiarity with appellant’s aggression from her previous
admission alerted them to provide appropriate resources to
appellant to avoid any violent interactions.
         Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
finding that the state had proven by clear and convincing
evidence that appellant was a danger to others. Appellant
argues that because her aggressive behavior only occurred
in and around the hospital, we should consider the behavior isolated in nature and thus not predictive of future violence.1 We disagree that these facts are similar to those
in the cases relied on by appellant because her pattern of
aggressive behavior was not singular in nature, nor was it
in response to confinement, unwanted treatment, or perceived threats. While we have previously held that violence
as a response to hospitalization is not sufficient to show
that future violence is highly likely, appellant demonstrated
consistent aggressive behavior toward other patients and
hospital staff unprovoked, rather than as a response to
hospitalization. We also reiterate that declaring particular
facts from precedent as controlling is not helpful in the civil
commitment context because these cases “ ‘must be decided
on [their] individual facts under the applicable standards.’ ”
State v. T. T., 

, 

, rev den,

 (2018) (quoting State v. D. L. W., 

, 

 (2011)).
        Instead, we conclude that considering appellant’s
recent history, her aggressive behavior in the hospital, and
her persistent need for redirection, the trial court did not err
in determining that appellant was highly likely to engage in
future violence if not committed. The trial court relied on
    1
      See State v. J. G., 

, 

 (2020) (holding that a
single act of violence in the hospital setting is not enough to infer future violence
is highly likely); State v. S. E. R., 

, 

 (2019) (concluding that evidence of a single violent act resisting restraint in the hospital was
not sufficient to infer she was dangerous to others outside the hospital setting);
T. M., 

 (reversing the commitment of a woman who threatened
her husband with a fire poker due to the isolated nature of the incident).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2024)            719

the testimony of appellant’s doctor, who treated her during
two previous hospitalizations in the BHU and testified that
appellant’s pattern of behavior caused by her psychosis
leading up to and once inside the hospital, without intervention and redirection by trained staff, was very likely to
result in future violence. See T. M., 

; L. R.,

 (explaining that specific violent acts are
unnecessary to establish dangerousness if other conduct
in recent history “clearly form[s] a foundation for predicting future dangerousness”). The doctor’s prediction was not
based on “mere unsubstantiated apprehension or speculation,” State v. B. B., 

, 

 (2010);
rather, the doctor considered appellant’s recent history and
her propensity for aggressive acts toward others to be a pattern of impulsivity that, without intervention, made future
violence highly likely.
         There was legally sufficient evidence in the record
for the trial court to determine that appellant was a danger
to others.
        Affirmed.