Williams v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Upon consideration of article 148 in light of its objective, we conclude that the trial court erred in declaring the article unconstitutional. The article does not discriminate arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably against males. Husbands and wives are not similarly situated under Louisiana's community property system. The legislative conferral of the right of claiming alimony pendente lite only to wives bears a fair and substantial relation to the legitimate objective of the article—a fair and orderly termination of the community regime. Accordingly, article 148 does not deprive males of equal protection or due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, nor does it violate article I, sections 2 and 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gravel v. Gravel · 382 So. 2d 972 - Smith v. Smith

2. “"Nor does the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution deny this state the power to accord differing treatment to the sexes in its legislation. The United States Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause does not prohibit a legislative classification based on sex, provided that the classification is reasonable, not arbitrary, and rests upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 , 95 S.Ct. 1373 , 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 , 95 S.Ct. 1225 , 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 , 95 S.Ct. 572 , 42 L.Ed.2d 610 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 , 94 S.Ct. 1734 , 40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Loyacano v. Loyacano

3. “"The first sentence of the section was intended only as a restatement of the federal equal protection guarantee . . . The second sentence (which uses absolute language), in comparison with the third sentence (which employs the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable formula), permits no discrimination because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. "The third sentence delineates the limitation on the power of the state to discriminate by law against persons of specified classes, including members of either sex. The limitation imposed does not absolutely preclude the legislature from defining the range of persons affected by legislation according to the various classes listed in the section; rather, it proscribes the unreasonable or arbitrary definition of those affected according to class. Accordingly, if the discrimination that results from the legislative classification is found to be within reason, the statute is not in violation of the constitution."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Loyacano v. Loyacano