Herr v. Ruprecht’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * Defendant’s statutory duty extended beyond stopping at the entrance to the intersection and giving preference to vehicles already in it. She was also required to yield the right of way to vehicles approaching the intersection so closely on the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. And defendant’s duty to ‘yield the right of way’ existed not merely at the entrance and while she was stopped, but it continued with her into the intersection if and when it appeared (or reasonably should have appeared) to her that plaintiff’s approach had then created an immediate hazard; this is true, at least to the extent that she might then be able to stop or slacken and let the other car pass. See Wilson v. Toliver, 365 Mo. 640 , 285 S.W.2d 575, 582 ; James v. Berry, Mo.App., 301 S.W.2d 530 . In other words, the duty to ‘yield’ may not be wholly disregarded once a motorist gets the front end of his vehicle into an intersection with a through highway. * * * ””

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Anthony v. Jennings · Riley v. Bi-State Transit System

2. ““The driver of any vehicle shall stop as required by this section at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection on the through highway or which are approaching so closely on the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. The state highway commission may erect stop signs at the entrance of any public road into a through highway.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Schaetty v. Kimberlin · Riley v. Bi-State Transit System

3. ““Defendant cites, to a large extent, humanitarian cases where evidence of a driver’s ability to avoid the collision is imperative and precise calculations are often required. The theory may have some analogy here, but we cannot decide this case upon the peculiar characteristics of that doctrine, nor are we required to make precise calculations. * * * Certainly here plaintiff was ‘approaching’, — at some distance and at 40 miles per hour. He was within a range where a collision was likely to occur, and by defendant’s own evidence she could see for probably a quarter of a mile east-wardly. Defendant’s rate of speed in miles per hour was not shown but, in her written argument, her counsel calculate the distance plaintiff’s car would have covered at 40 miles per hour while the defendant would have moved the 53 feet necessary for her to clear the crossing at assumed speeds ranging from two to ten miles per hour. This computation serves at least to demonstrate that the statutory language ‘so closely * * * as to constitute an immediate hazard’ is a variable term, depending in part on matters peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the driver crossing the through highway. * * * It was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove directly his distance from the intersection when the defendant entered it, or the speed at which the defendant was crossing. We think that this evidence fairly supports an in.ference that at some point, either when defendant entered the intersection or whi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jefferies v. Saalberg