Virgil Norton, Virgil Wesley and James Chapman v. James P. McShane’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

136 federal appellate · 12 district · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 231 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “' * * * manifestly or palpably beyond [their] authority.'”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gross v. Sederstrom · Currie v. Guthrie

2. ““A. The Governor of the State has immunity from damage suits for acts within the sphere of executive activity. Barr v. Matteo, 1959, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 2 Cir. 1949, 177 F.2d 579 ; Norton v. McShane, 5 Cir. 1964, 332 F.2d 855 . As Judge Learned Hand said in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 851 : ‘The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’ ””

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Boreta v. Kirby · Kirker v. Moore

3. ““ . . . [T]he privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government. The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so great that there must of necessity be a delegation and redelegation of authority as to many functions, and we cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they are exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive hierarchy. “To be sure, the occasions upon which the acts of the head of an executive department will be protected by the privilege are doubtless far broader than in the case of an officer with less sweeping functions. But that is because the higher the post, the broader the range of responsibilities and duties, and the wider the scope of discretion, it entails. It is not the title of his office but the duties with which the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted — the relation of the act complained of to ‘matters committed by law to his control or supervision,’ Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U.S. [483] at 498, 16 S.Ct. at page 637 [631, 40 L.Ed. 780 ] — which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official acts of the executive officer with immunity from civil defamation suits.” [ 360 U.S. at 572-574 , 79 S.Ct. at 1340 ]”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Whitner v. Henderson · 586 F. Supp. 330 - Kemp v. Block