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← 332 F.3d 1347 - Bogle v. McClure

Bogle v. McClure’s Empirical Analysis

332 F.3d 1347 · 2003

Citation profile

75
cited by 75 later decisions
2
states following
September 2020
most recently cited

24 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 75 later decisions — most recently September 2020 · most notably Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co. (2008), Rioux v. City of Atlanta (2008)

24 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

420200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1981A

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Duncan v. Walker · SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al. · Hope v. Pelzer · BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he Supreme Court has been reluctant to “identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.” Campbell, 123 S.Ct. at 1524 . Although declining to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed, the Court has recognized that, “in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” Id. Citing a long history of providing sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish, the Court recently stated in Campbell : While these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios of 500 to 1 [as in Gore ], or in this case, of 145 to 1. Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. The converse is also true, however. When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee. The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the fac”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evidenced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “When describing their emotional harm, the [plaintiffs] testified the transfers ‘upset,’ ‘embarrassed,’ ‘humiliated,’ and 'ashamed' them. Some Librarians testified the transfers caused them to become depressed and one even became suicidal.”); Brown v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 286 F.3d 1040, 1046 (8th Cir.2002) (awarding damages for emotional distress where”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.