¶1specially concurring:
¶2I agree with all of the holdings of the majority. I write separately to further address the issues which arise when the State provides benefits to its witnesses who have criminal charges pending or are under sentence. In addition to the cases cited by the majority, the defense also relied on the holdings in People v. Nino, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (1996), and People v. Diaz, 297 Ill. App. 3d 362 (1998). Even more recently, in People v. Ellis, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1108 (2000), this court addressed the issue of what constitutes sufficient disclosure of benefits received by witnesses for the State who had criminal cases pending at some point during the time they were cooperating with the State. This court first pointed out that in several recent cases convictions had been reversed due to the lack of disclosure of such benefits. We then noted:
“In none of these cases was the nature of the benefit the witness was to receive ever reduced to writing. This is not to imply that the State is endeavoring to hide the material fact of the benefit; rather, the failure to memorialize these benefits makes it much more likely that their existence would not be disclosed (whatever the motivation on the part of the prosecutors involved) and may encourage benefitting witnesses themselves later to mischaracterize what they were to receive in consideration for their testimony. The position the State finds itself in regarding these situations can be resolved in the future by the simple expedient of memorializing the benefit the witness is to receive and to reveal such circumstances with candor and alacrity.” People v. Ellis, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1117-18.
¶3In the instant case, the State asserts (and the defense does not deny) that, prior to trial, the defense was tendered Kelly Quarles’ federal plea agreements. Also during discovery, the State explained on the record that Quarles’ federal sentence was reduced in exchange for information that he had provided. Quarles testified at trial that his federal sentence had been reduced because of his cooperation in this case and in a case in Missouri. Finally, during closing arguments, the State again advised the jurors that Quarles’ federal sentence has been reduced after the court was notified of his cooperation in this case and the case in Missouri.
¶4The State in this case complied with this court’s holding in Ellis even though Ellis was decided months after this trial. The actions of the State in this case provide an excellent example of the conduct that the trial courts and courts of review should require of the State in other cases.
¶5On March 1, 2001, Supreme Court Rule 412, Disclosure to Accused, was amended. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 412. The Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases wrote the committee comments, which in pertinent part state: “Examples of information that clearly tends to be exculpatory or mitigating include: … information concerning promises or expectations of leniency for a State witness ….” 188 Ill. 2d R. 412, Committee Comments, at lxvii. This language demonstrates that the committee recognized the importance of this issue and clarified the State’s duty to disclose such benefits. I believe that the actions of the State in the instant case clearly comply with the dictates of amended Supreme Court Rule 412.
¶6The defense, both at trial and on appeal, argues strongly that Quarles’ testimony that his sentence reduction was not due to a “deal” or an “agreement” is false and is sufficient grounds to reverse defendant’s conviction. The facts of this case amply demonstrate that the State fully complied with its duty to disclose and that the jury was fully apprised of the basis for the defense contention that Quarles had a motive to lie.
¶7This may not be true in other cases. I am especially concerned about those instances where a witness has a criminal case pending at the time he is testifying at trial. The most common scenario seen by this court involves the witness testifying that “no promises had been made” and there was no agreement as to the resolution or sentence (if any) in the witness’s pending case. I believe that this factual situation is rife with the potential for abuse. As this court held in Ellis, “[w]hen the State intends to notify a judge who is to sentence a witness with a pending case of that witness’ cooperation, such notification constitutes a benefit to the witness which must be disclosed.” People v. Ellis, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1117. I would go further and suggest that when the State informs the defense that “no promises have been made” regarding a witness’s pending criminal case, the trial court should insist that the jury be informed that this language means that the witness’s criminal case may be resolved in any way permissible under the law— the witness’s charges may be nol-prossed by the State, they may be reduced by the State, the witness may be sentenced on any charge the State wishes to file, the witness may plead to the charges currently pending against him and receive whatever sentence is statutorily permitted, or the witness may go to trial with the same possible results as above (with the substitution of a not guilty finding rather than a nolle prosequi). To allow a witness to testify that there are no “promises,” “deals,” or “agreements” as to criminal charges pending against him without explaining the import of that testimony does not advance the truth-seeking process; it hinders that process.
¶8Finally, I disagree with the majority’s criticism of the State’s comments in closing argument that gangs cause “mayhem on the streets” and that “shootings happen” as a result of the sale of narcotics. The jury was given evidence that multiple gunmen shot the victim pursuant to the orders of a gang chieftain, inflicting 17 gunshot wounds. This shooting occurred while the victim was driving on a public street. The primary purpose of street gangs is to sell narcotics and this activity irrefutably leads to a large percentage of the murders committed in Chicago. Consequently, the State’s comments were completely proper.