332 So. 2d 427 - State v. Page’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Although due process is required before a driver’s license may be revoked, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Smith v. Department of Public Safety, 254 So.2d 515 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1971), it does not necessarily follow that the revocation of a license constitutes criminal punishment. On the contrary, the revocation of one’s license to operate a motor vehicle under the habitual offender law does not constitute punishment. Rather, it is a civil measure considered necessary by the Legislature to adequately provide for public safety. It is a finding by a court that the person in question is no longer fit to enjoy the privilege of driving a motor vehicle. The result of the finding is to deny the person the fight to drive on the public highways of the state; he suffers no loss of liberty, no incarceration nor fine.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Butler v. DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS · State v. Bates

2. “| .¡Factors which militate in favor of the conclusion that the proceeding is civil are these: 1) The Act directs that the petition be filed, not in the parish where the offenses were committed, as would be the case in a criminal action (La. Const, art. I, § 16 (1974); C.Cr.P. art. 611) or a criminal enhancement proceeding [R.S. 15:529.1(D)], but in the parish of the defendant’s residence. 2) An appeal taken from any final action or judgment entered under the provisions of the Act is in the same manner and form as appeals in civil actions. R.S. 32:1478. 3) The fundamental purpose of the Act is to promote highway safety by denying driving privileges to habitual traffic law offenders (32:1471), a distinctly non-criminal objective. One purpose of the Act is, of course, to discourage repetition of criminal acts, but this alone is not sufficient to give the Act a penal character since deterrence of wrongful criminal conduct while often an object of criminal statutes may be an objective of a regulatory statute as well. See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 , 33 S.Ct. 431 , 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913); United States v. Kordel, 164 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.1947), aff'd, 335 U.S. 345 , 69 S.Ct. 106 , 93 L.Ed. 52 (1948). There are, of course, features of the Act not now before us which are penal, or criminal. For instance, 32:1480 may result in imprisonment for driving while classified as a habitual offender. However, this is an independent feature of the Act separate and distinct from the revocati”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Vickers · 869 So. 2d 962 - City of Broussard v. Watkins

3. “Under the 1921 Louisiana Constitution the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans was vested with `the same exclusive original civil jurisdiction as that of District Courts throughout the State....' La. Const. art. VII, ž 81 (1921). The original civil jurisdiction of the district courts alluded to in Section 81 was original jurisdiction `in all civil matters.' La. Const. art. VII, ž 35 (1921). Under that same 1921 Louisiana Constitution the Criminal District Court was vested with `exclusive jurisdiction of the trial and punishment of all crimes, misdemeanors and offenses committed within the parish of Orleans, the jurisdiction of which is not vested by this Constitution in some other court.' La. Const. art. VII, ž 83 (1921). There was, however, another provision of the 1921 Constitution which authorized the Legislature `by two-thirds vote of all members elected to each house' to change, alter or repeal any or all of the constitutional provisions covering the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans. (FN6) FN6. Article VII, s 87 of 1921 Constitution provided that: "The Legislature may, after January 1st, 1924, by a two-thirds vote of all members elected to each house, change, alter or repeal any or all of the above provisions covering the criminal courts of the City of New Orleans and parish of Orleans." For two cases which discuss and apply this provision, See State v. Brady, 310 So.2d 593 (La.1975); Sciambra v. Edwards, 270 So.2d 167 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1972), ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Matter Under Investigation