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333 Or. App. 389

553 P.3d 62

State v. Dehaven

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided June 26, 2024

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2024-06-26

Applies OR 137 § 137.106 · OR 163 § 163.160 · OR 163 § 163.187

Decided 2024-06-26

No. 423                June 26, 2024                     389

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
               CURTIS GLEN DEHAVEN,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                 22CR43876; A180227

   Erin A. Fennerty, Judge.
   Submitted May 31, 2024.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Emily P. Seltzer, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Joyce, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and
Armstrong, Senior Judge.
   JOYCE, P. J.
   Supplemental judgment reversed; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
390   State v. Dehaven
Cite as 
333 Or App 389
 (2024)                             391

        JOYCE, P. J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for
two counts of felony strangulation constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.187(4), and one count of felony fourth-degree
assault constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.160(3). In
three assignments of error, defendant argues that the trial
court erred by (1) provisionally admitting as impeachment
evidence defendant’s prior convictions under OEC 609, (2)
failing to instruct the jury that a culpable mental state
applied to the “physical injury” element of fourth-degree
assault, and (3) imposing restitution without a hearing or
evidence to support it. We are not persuaded that the first
two assignments of error merit reversal. As to the last, the
state concedes that the trial court erred, and we agree.
Accordingly, we reverse the supplemental judgment, remand
for resentencing, and otherwise affirm.
          Prior Convictions under OEC 609. In a pretrial
motion, defendant sought an advance ruling on the admissibility of his prior convictions to impeach his character for
truthfulness under OEC 609. He argued that due process
required that the convictions be excluded because they could
not survive OEC 403 balancing. The trial court engaged in
OEC 403 balancing and denied in part defendant’s motion.
Due to the trial court’s ruling, defendant decided not to testify. He challenges the trial court’s ruling on appeal.
         After this case was submitted, the Oregon Supreme
Court issued State v. Aranda, 
372 Or 363
, 406, ___ P3d ___
(2024), in which the court held that due process does not
require a trial court to engage in OEC 403 balancing when
determining the admissibility of evidence under OEC 609.
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that a “defendant’s right to due process overrides any state rule of criminal procedure that would render his trial fundamentally
unfair,” the application of that standard is not governed by
OEC 403’s balancing test. Aranda, 372 Or at 401. Because
defendant’s argument rests on the application of OEC 403
and we do not otherwise find that the admission of defendant’s prior convictions under OEC 609 was “so extremely
unfair as to deprive … defendant of a fundamentally fair
392                                          State v. Dehaven

trial,” Aranda, 372 Or at 401 (internal quotation marks
omitted), we cannot find any error in the trial court’s ruling.
        Culpable Mental State. The state charged defendant with fourth-degree assault, alleging that he knowingly
caused physical injury to the victim. On appeal, defendant
argues that the trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct
the jury as to the culpable mental state of at least criminal
negligence for the “physical injury” element of the crime.
         We agree that the trial court’s instruction was
plainly erroneous. See State v. Raney, 
331 Or App 693
,
703, 
547 P3d 172
 (2024) (finding that a similar instruction
was plainly erroneous where state alleged that the defendant knowingly caused physical injury to the victim). And,
because there was some ambiguity in the mechanism of S’s
injuries, we cannot say that the error was harmless. See
State v. Pfannenstiel, 
331 Or App 591
, 
546 P3d 945
 (2024)
(concluding that error was not harmless where the precise mechanism of injury was ambiguous and, had it been
properly instructed, the jury would have had to resolve
that ambiguity to consider whether the defendant acted
with criminal negligence regarding the extent of injury).
However, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the
error because, “even though there is some likelihood that
the verdict would have been different (such that the error
was not legally harmless), it is an extremely low likelihood.”
State v. Horton, 
327 Or App 256, 266
, 
535 P3d 338
 (2023)
(emphasis omitted).
          This case went to trial after the Supreme Court
issued State v. Owen, 
369 Or 288, 322
, 
505 P3d 953
 (2022)
(holding that a culpable mental state applies to the physical-injury element of assault crimes), but defendant did not
raise as a defense the lack of a culpable mental state with
regard to S’s injuries. Instead, the central dispute at trial
was whether defendant caused the injuries at all or, if he
did, whether he acted in self-defense. The jury necessarily rejected the claim of self-defense and found that defendant knowingly engaged in assaultive conduct. The possible
source of S’s injuries, according to the evidence presented
at trial, was that defendant threw her to the floor and that
he straddled S while strangling her. We conclude that it is
Cite as 
333 Or App 389
 (2024)                           393

extremely likely that, had it been properly instructed, the
jury would have found that defendant was at least criminally negligent in causing physical injury by engaging in
either type of conduct.
        Restitution. Defendant was sentenced in November
2022. On January 23, 2023, the state filed and served on
defendant a copy of a restitution schedule. On February 10,
2023, the trial court signed a supplemental restitution judgment. On February 14, 2023, defendant filed an objection
to the restitution schedule and requested a hearing. The
supplemental judgment was entered the following day. The
court did not hold a restitution hearing.
         On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred when it imposed restitution without a hearing and
without any evidence in the record to support the restitution
award. The state concedes that the trial court plainly erred
under ORS 137.106(1)(b)(B), which required the court to set
a hearing in these circumstances, and that remand is appropriate. We accept and agree with the state’s concession.
        Supplemental judgment reversed; remanded for
resentencing; otherwise affirmed.

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