Woods v. Stone’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

88 federal appellate · 18 district · 44 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 208 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * The statute and regulations made his rentals tentative but not unlawful. Until the contingency of readjustment occurred, the tenant could have had no cause of action for recovery of any part of the rental exacted by the landlord. The cause of action now does not rest upon, and hence cannot date from, mere collection. The duty to refund was created and measured by the refund order and was not breached until that order was disobeyed. It would be unusual, to say the least, if a statutory scheme were to be construed to include a period during which an action could not be commenced as a part of the time within which it would become barred. United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414 , 58 S.Ct. 637 , 82 L.Ed. 932 . We think no such result was expressed or intended. It was from the violation which occurred when the order was not obeyed within the required time that the statute of limitations commenced to run. Cf. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 , 61 S.Ct. 473 , 85 L.Ed. 605 ; Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U.S. 217 , 602, 63 S.Ct. 175 , 87 L.Ed. 223 ; Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 , 67 S.Ct. 1340 [ 91 L.Ed. 1602 ]. “It is now suggested that no cause of action can be based on a refund order, irrespective of its validity. As we have pointed out, the validity of the regulation and order are conclusive upon us here. This cause of action is based upon violation of an ‘order * * * prescribing a maximum [rent] * * The command to refund cannot 'be treated as a thing apart, but must be taken in its se”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Woods v. Webb · Gaglione v. Katz

2. ““It is also suggested that the refund order applies the law to the landlord retroactively. Quite apart from the fact that this is an objection to the order itself rather than to the question of limitation of time, we think the suggestion to be without merit. This is not the case of a new law reaching backwards to make payments illegal that were free of infirmity when made. By legislation and regulation in force before the collections were made, the landlord’s own default in registering had rendered these payments conditional, subject to revision and to refund. Readjustment under these conditions cannot be said to be retroactive law making.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fancher v. Clark · Pearce v. Vandagriff

3. ““No question is raised, and none could have been raised in this proceeding, as to the validity of the relevant regulations and the refund order, either on the ground of retroactivity or otherwise, because any challenge to the validity of either would have to go to the Emergency Court of Appeals. 50 U.S.C.App. Supp. V, § 924, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 924; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 , 64 S.Ct. 641 , 88 L.Ed. 892 . See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Company, 333 U.S. 138 , 68 S.Ct. 421 .””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fleming v. Phoenix Chair Co. · Vélez de Buil v. López de La Bosa Hnos., Inc.