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← 334 F.2d 262 - Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz

Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz’s Empirical Analysis

334 F.2d 262 · 1964

Citation profile

160
cited by 160 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
August 2014
most recently cited

45 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 160 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2014 · most notably Stone v. Commissioner (1971), Otsuki v. Commissioner (1969)

45 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

580196419701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 145

Relies on Helvering v. Mitchell · Jordan v. De George · Emich Motors Corporation v. General Motors Corporation · Helvering v. Mitchell · Local 167 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters Chauffeurs Stablemen Helpers of America v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 160 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, supra, the court at page 264 said: “This Court made a thorough analysis of collateral estoppel in Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 509-11 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 , 79 S.Ct. 589 , 3 L.Ed.2d 575 (1959). The general principle was stated to be that 'a fact decided in an earlier suit is conclusively established between their parties and their privies, provided it was necessary to the result in the first suit.’ Id. at 510 of 258 F.2d. In setting the limits of its application, the Court observed, in reliance upon Restatement, Judgments § 68 (o), (p), that only facts essential to the judgment, as opposed to the evidentiary facts on which the facts in issue depend, are subject to collateral estoppel. See id. at 510-11. Once the issue is actually determined, however, it cannot be relitigated between the parties even in a suit on a different cause of action. See United States v. Burch, 294 F.2d 1 , 5 and n. 4 (5th Cir. 1961). Moreover, an issue resolved in favor of the United States in a criminal prosecution may not be contested by the same defendants in a civil suit brought by the Government. Local 167, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, etc. v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 , 54 S.Ct. 396 , 78 L.Ed. 804 (1934); see Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U. S. 558, 568-69 , 71 S.Ct. 408 , 95 L.Ed. 534 (1951). The converse is not true, however; the Government is not estopped to raise in a civil proceeding an issue on which it lost in a crimi”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[t]he parties agreed by stipulation . . . what issues of fact and law were to be decided by the trial court. This point was not included in those issues remaining open for consideration. Thus the appellant should not be permitted to raise the issue here for the first time.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.