S. Harold Levitt v. Edward C. Johnson, 2d’s Empirical Analysis
334 F.2d 815 · 1964
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 6 district · 9 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 40 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2002 · most notably Burks v. Lasker (1979), 109 Wash. 2d 107 - Haberman v. Washington Public Power Supply System (1988)
7 federal appellate · 6 district · 9 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on J. I. Case Co. v. Borak · Stern v. Board of Levee Commissioners · United Copper Securities Company v. Amalgamated Copper Company · Price v. Gurney · Gottesman v. General Motors Corp.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““United Copper Securities v. Amalgamated Copper Co., supra, held that the fact that the cause of action was based upon an alleged violation of the Sherman Act did not obviate, or reduce, the necessity of a demand by the minority stockholders. This is a quite different situation. As the SEC points out in its amicus brief filed herein in opposition to the ‘Massachusetts rule,’ there is a ‘great difference between the policy underlying the federal antitrust laws and that underlying the Investment Company Act. On the one hand, the policy of the antitrust laws is the preservation and protection of competition in our economy in its broadest scope. Those laws are thus geared to the protection of competing businesses, as businesses, whether in the corporate form or not. On the other hand, the policy of the Investment Company Act is to provide a comprehensive network of restrictions upon the organization, operation and management of investment companies to the end that individual investors might be protected.’ ” 334 F.2d at 820 n. 5.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. In re KMF Actions““Neither of the more limited purposes we outlined in Halprin could be accomplished in any real sense unless the demand evoked a full and fair consideration of the issues, in depth, by the other stockholders. If their number is small, as in Halprin, and the minority could reasonably be expected to put its case before them, it should be obliged to do so. However, on the allegations of the present complaint not only would such a burden be enormous, but no disclosure that plaintiff could be expected to make would be likely to persuade a majority to take over the action, or, conversely, permit an informed decision by the majority that the action be not instituted. As a pointless or, alternatively, impossibly burdensome act it should be excused.” Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815, 818 (1st Cir. 1964).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. In re KMF Actions““The district court’s reasoning that since the stockholder’s right is a derivative one his right to bring suit must be controlled by the local law of the state of incorporation in the absence of an explicit congressional direction to the contrary negates the intendment of the act and underestimates the role to be played by the federal courts in the implementation of national regulatory legislation.” Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815, 819 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. den., 379 U.S. 961 , 85 S.Ct. 649 , 13 L.Ed.2d 556 (1965). (Emphasis added.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.