Smith v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

65 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “‘ ‘ Courts of equity have no inherent powers in cases of divorce. The jurisdiction of courts of equity to hear and determine divorce cases, and all matters relating thereto, is conferred only by statute. While such courts may exercise their powers within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute, the jurisdiction depends upon the grant of the statute and not upon general equity powers. (Smith v. Johnson, 321 Ill. 134 .) Section 18 of the Divorce act does not enlarge the general equity powers of the court. It reserves a limited power to review alimony decrees. Being in the nature of a special power .it will not be extended beyond its terms. It only authorizes the court to make such ‘alterations’ in the allowance of alimony ‘as shall appear reasonable and proper. ’ . . . “ . . . The limit of its jurisdiction is to ‘make such alterations in the allowance of alimony ... as shall appear reasonable and just. ’ . . . “It is the settled construction of section 18 that it authorizes the change of a decree for alimony based only upon a changed condition or betterment of property qualifications after the decree to meet additional needs of one entitled to alimony arising after the decree. This is the only ground justifying or authorizing a re-adjustment of alimony by supplemental decree. (Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill. 19 ; Herrick v. Herrick, 319 id. 146 .) The criterion is not whether the decree was right when entered, because all presumptions are in its favor, but the question i”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Barraclough v. Barraclough · 340 Ill. App. 353 - San Fillippo v. San Fillippo

2. ““The consent decree [with respect to the property settlement provisions therein] did not affect the question of divorce, which is beyond the power of the parties to adjust by agreement or collusion. As a contract it is binding on the parties unless induced by fraud. If so, it must, like any other contract, be attacked by some method recognized by courts of equity for relief from fraud.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Garmisa v. Garmisa

3. ““The decree for support and maintenance was a consent decree, and as such must be regarded as a contract between the parties to the suit.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 341 Ill. App. 561 - Walters v. Walters