Havens v. Pearson’s Empirical Analysis
1939
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 18 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently May 2018 · most notably Morris Brothers Lumber Company v. David E. Eakin, Frances B. Eakin, John L. Eakin, Jr., Also Known as Lester Eakin, and Mary Louise Eakin (1959), 182 F. Supp. 253 - Onyx Refining Co. v. Evans Production Corp. (1959)
7 federal appellate · 18 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Robbins v. Farwell · Huff v. McCauley · Strause v. Berger · Knoll v. N. Y. etc. Ry. Co. · Cole v. Ellwood Power Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Ordinarily a contract for the sale of standing timber to be cut and removed, or one that gives the purchaser discretion as to the time of removal, is a sale of land within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. Where, however, timber is to be cut and [removed] by the purchaser within a definite or reasonable time, it becomes a question of the intent of the parties as to whether a sale of realty, the creation of a chattel real, or a sale of personalty was intended. It has been stated in many of our cases that the contract to be a sale of personalty must intend an ‘immediate severance’; it would be more accurate to say that the real test is, considering the nature and extent of the land, the number of feet of merchantable timber and the time given for removal, whether the vendor intended the vendee to have an interest in the standing timber as land, or whether he contemplated a removal within a time reasonably necessary therefor, in which case the vendee would have a chattel interest.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“■ “Assuming that the contract was a sale of personalty, what was its effect upon the lien of the judgment on the land, which then included the timber? Appellant insists that instantly there was a complete severance. He says that since Detwiler, the judgment-debtor and owner, had a right to sell and cut the standing timber, free of the lien, the effect of this contract was to sever the trees from the realty and convert them into personalty even though all or part remained standing on the land. As between vendor and vendee this conclusion may be correct. Vendee acquired title to such trees as he cut and removed, as chattels, but, as to the judgment-creditor, the agreement did not create the fiction of an immediate severance and conversion of all timber within the 1300 acres. The standing timber was part of the 'freehold under the judgment, and though sold as personalty, it continued to be realty as to the judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.