Wright v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

74 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A custodial confession is presumptively involuntary and the burden is on the State to show that the waiver and confession was voluntarily made. Clark v. State, 328 Ark. 501 , 944 S.W.2d 533 (1997). In examining the voluntariness of confessions, this court makes an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, and reverses the trial court only if its decision was clearly erroneous. Kennedy v. State, 325 Ark. 3 , 923 S.W.2d 274 (1996). As explained in Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235 , 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992), the inquiry into the validity of the defendants waiver has two separate components: whether the waiver was voluntary, and whether the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. In determining voluntariness, we consider the following factors: age, education, and intelligence of the accused, lack of advice as to his constitutional rights, length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, or the use of physical punishment. Hood v. State, 329 Ark. 21 , 947 S.W.2d 328 (1997). Other relevant factors in considering the totality of the circumstances include the statements made by the interrogating officer and the vulnerability of the defendant. Id. In addition, the accused must have a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it in order for his waiver to be knowingly and intelligently made. Esmeyer v. State, 325 Ark. 491 , 930 S.W.2d 302 (1996).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2010 Ark. App. 238 - Wallis v. State · Bunch v. State

2. “In reviewing a trial judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based upon the totahty of the circumstances, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, and we reverse only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Tabor v. State, 333 Ark. 429 , 971 S.W.2d 227 (1998). The credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing about the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s in-custody confession is for the trial judge to determine, and we defer to the superior position of the trial judge in matters of credibility. Id. Conflicts in the testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and the judge is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the accused since he or she is the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings. Id.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bunch v. State

3. “A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the Miranda opinion must rest on the intention of the Court in that case to adopt “fully effective means ... to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored. . . .” 384 U.S., at 479 . The critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a person’s “right to cut off questioning.” Id., at 474 . Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person’s exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bunch v. State