Volume 335 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant landlords, R and D, for personal injuries that the plaintiff sustained when she slipped and fell on a staircase outside of her apartment building. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were negligent in failing to keep the steps of the staircase free of dirt and sand and by allowing the surface of the steps to become pitted, worn and uneven. The defendants denied the allegations of negligence and pleaded a special defense that contained four specifications of contributory negligence. At trial, R testified that other individuals helped him with snow removal at the property and that, together, they would remove snow and spread salt and sand on the staircase but that no one would return thereafter to clear the staircase after spreading salt and sand. In light of R's testimony, the plaintiff requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the defendants had a nondelegable duty to maintain the safety of the premises and to submit to the jury three interrogatories that addressed certain grounds on which it could determine liability. The trial court declined to instruct the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine or to submit the plaintiff's proposed interrogatories, determining that neither was necessary. After the trial court charged the jury on the applicable law, which did not include an explanation regarding the nondelegable duty doctrine, the trial court asked counsel if there were an exceptions to the court's charge, to which the plaintiff's attorney responded, ''[o]ther than what I had filed previously, no . . . .'' The jury subsequently returned a verdict for the defendants, and the trial court denied the plaintiff's motions to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court had improperly rejected her request to charge and improperly failed to instruct the jury on the defendants' nondelegable duty to main- tain the premises. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judg- ment, concluding that the plaintiff's claim of instructional error was not reviewable. The Appellate Court reasoned that the general verdict rule applied because the plaintiff did not object when the trial court declined to submit her proposed interrogatories to the jury and did not specifically claim on appeal that the trial court improperly failed to submit her interrogatories to the jury. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the general verdict rule did not apply because she sought to submit properly framed interrogatories to the trial court and plainly conveyed her objection to the court's denial of her request. The plaintiff further claimed that, on appeal to the Appellate Court, she was not required to assert as an independent claim of error that the trial court declined to submit her proposed interrogatories to the jury. Held: 1. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the general verdict rule precluded it from reviewing the plaintiff's claim of instructional error: the plaintiff made every reasonable effort to avoid the application of the rule by filing interrogatories, eliciting the trial court's justification for its decision not to submit them to the jury, and renewing her objection after the trial court charged the jury on the applicable law, and, although the plaintiff did not use the precise language, ''I object,'' she alerted the court to her claim of instructional error, and the court explained the reasoning for its decision while there was still an opportunity for correc- tion; moreover, the interrogatories were properly framed even though they did not address all four specifications of contributory negligence in the special defense, as one of the interrogatories encompassed the four factual allegations in the special defense that could have resulted in a finding that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to her injuries, the single defense that the defendants raised, and the interrogatories would have shed light on the verdict, as they could have eliminated any negligence attributable to the plaintiff and fleshed out whether and on what grounds the jury attributed any negligence to the defendants; furthermore, the jury's consideration of the plaintiff's allegation of negli- gence and the defendants' special defense of contributory negligence was intertwined with the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine, as the jury could have concluded, without having had the benefit of an instruction on that doctrine, that the individuals who helped R remove the snow, rather than the defendants, acted negligently, and, therefore, the jury had no untainted route to its verdict. 2. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff's instructional error claim was not reviewable on the ground that she had failed to raise an independent claim of error on appeal with respect to the trial court's decision not to submit her proposed interrogatories to the jury: the plaintiff clearly preserved her claim, as she plainly alerted the trial court to her position by filing the interrogatories, addressing the trial court's decision not to submit them to the jury, and raising her objection again after the trial court charged the jury on the applicable law; more- over, the plaintiff made every reasonable effort to protect herself from the consequences of a general verdict and had no reason to anticipate that that rule would prevent review of her instructional error claim until the Appellate Court raised the issue of the general verdict rule at oral argument before that court. Argued November 20, 2019—officially released March 17, 2020

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of posses- sion of child pornography in the second degree, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the warrant authorizing a search of the defen- dant's residence and ultimately leading to the seizure of more than 400 images and some videos of suspected child pornography was supported by probable cause. The affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant provided that one of the defendant's roommates called the police after he observed the defendant looking at his computer screen, which displayed a photograph of what appeared to be an eight to nine year boy standing naked with no pubic hair and his genitals exposed, followed by a photograph of a naked girl with very small breasts and her hand covering her genital area. The two photographs appeared to be in a slide projection program, and there appeared to be other thumbnail photographs that were too small to identify. After the defendant was arrested on the basis of the seized images and videos, he filed a motion to suppress, claiming, inter alia, that there was no probable cause to search his residence for child pornography. The motion to suppress was denied. On the defendant's appeal from the judgment of conviction, held: 1. The court issuing the search warrant correctly found that there was probable cause to search the defendant's residence because that court reasonably could have determined, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances described in the search warrant affidavit and the reason- able inferences drawn therefrom, that there was a substantial chance that a search of the defendant's residence would uncover evidence of possession of child pornography: the descriptions in the affidavit of the two photographs of nude children provided a fair probability that the defendant was in possession of lascivious images of children, as the court could have inferred from those descriptions that the defendant possessed and used for a sexual purpose photographs of nude, coy, and posed children, and there was no immediately apparent, innocent, alternative explanation for his behavior; moreover, the affidavit explained that the defendant's roommate observed the defendant view- ing the two photographs in succession, in what appeared to be a slideshow, as part of a larger collection of thumbnails that were too small to identify, which provided the basis for inferences that the defendant possessed and viewed the photographs intentionally, there was a sub- stantial chance that at least some of the thumbnails were lascivious depictions of nude children, and the defendant was using the photo- graphs for a sexual purpose; furthermore, although the defendant claimed that the court that denied his motion to suppress incorrectly concluded that whether the two photographs depicted child pornogra- phy was irrelevant to the probable cause inquiry, this court did not interpret the trial court's explanation to mean that whether the photo- graphs were in fact child pornography could have no bearing on the probable cause determination but, rather, that the probable cause inquiry did not require the court issuing the warrant to be able to determine conclusively that the photographs were in fact pornographic, as it required the issuing court only to determine from the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that there was a substantial chance that a search of the defendant's residence would uncover evidence of possession of child pornography. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that this court should adopt a more demanding standard under the Connecticut consti- tution for assessing whether there is probable cause to issue a search warrant and, specifically, that it should construe probable cause to require a degree of probability of more probable than not, at least in cases in which it is unknown when the warrant issues whether a crime has occurred, because the factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) weigh in favor of a more stringent standard: it is well settled that, under the Connecticut constitution, proof of probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and, in the absence of a compelling reason to break from the long-standing approach of this court, as well as the federal courts and a majority of other states, this court declined to disturb the established probable cause standard; moreover, this court declined to adopt a more probable than not standard of probable cause in cases in which it is unknown when the warrant issues whether a crime has occurred, as the creation of two separate and distinct probable cause standards would represent a gratuitous and unnecessary complication of an already complicated area of constitu- tional law; accordingly, because this court left in place the existing probable cause standard and determined that the search warrant in the present case was supported by probable cause, the defendant could not establish that a constitutional violation existed and, therefore, could not prevail on his unpreserved claim. Argued October 16, 2019—officially released March 24, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of home invasion, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court denied the petitioner's habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that the petition- er's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge, to which the petitioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25). On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed from the habeas court's judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that the habeas court incorrectly concluded that his trial counsel's failure to file a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge did not constitute ineffective assis- tance. In affirming the habeas court's judgment, the Appellate Court declined to address the merits of the petitioner's ineffective assistance claim, concluding, instead, that the petitioner had waived that claim by virtue of the entry and acceptance of his Alford plea. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court improperly raised and decided the unpreserved issue of waiver without first providing the parties an opportunity to be heard on that issue, in contravention of this court's decision in Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc. (311 Conn. 123) (Blumberg), the record having reflected that the issue of waiver was not raised by the parties in the habeas court or before the Appellate Court, that the Appellate Court did not instruct the parties to file supplemental briefs before or after oral argument or otherwise instruct the parties to be prepared to discuss the waiver issue at oral argument, and that the waiver issue served as the dispositive ground on which the Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court's judgment; moreover, this court rejected the petitioner's claim that, on remand to the Appellate Court, that court should consider only his ineffective assistance claim and not the waiver claim, as the Appellate Court has discretion, within the parameters set forth in Blumberg, to determine whether to raise and decide an issue that was never the subject of a claim by the parties; accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case to that court with direction to deter- mine, following briefing by the parties and in a manner otherwise consis- tent with this court's decision in Blumberg, whether it has discretion to raise and decide the waiver issue sua sponte and whether it should address the petitioner's ineffective assistance claim. Argued November 20, 2019—officially released April 7, 2020

The plaintiffs, whose home was insured by the defendant insurance com- pany, sought to recover damages from the defendant in an action brought in the United District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had breached certain provisions of the applicable homeowners insurance policy by declining coverage for the purported collapse of their concrete basement walls. The founda- tion to the plaintiffs' home had been constructed with defective concrete, causing it to crack and deteriorate prematurely. Although the plaintiffs' basement walls did not actually collapse, they suffered from severe cracking, were bowing inward, and required wood shoring for reinforce- ment, without which the walls could become unsafe at some point in the future. The plaintiffs claimed that they were covered under the policy because the deterioration of the concrete in their basement walls constituted hidden decay that had so substantially impaired their struc- tural integrity that they were in a state of collapse, as that term had been defined in Beach v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. (205 Conn. 246), in which this court concluded that that the term ''collapse'' in a homeowners insurance policy, when otherwise undefined, is sufficiently ambiguous to include coverage for any substantial impairment of the structural integrity of an insured's home. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' loss was excluded under the provisions of the policy that expressly precluded coverage for the collapse of a building subject to certain exceptions that were inapplicable and that, alternatively, the plaintiffs' claim fell within an express exclusion in the policy for loss caused by the collapse of the home's foundation, of which, according to the defendant, the home's basement walls were a part. The District Court denied the defen- dant's motion as to the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, and, there- after, that court certified a question of law to this court concerning what constitutes substantial impairment of structural integrity for purposes of applying the collapse provision of the plaintiffs' homeowners' insurance policy. Subsequently, this court issued an order reformulating the certi- fied question to include additional questions. Held: 1. The substantial impairment of structural integrity standard, as set forth in Beach, was applicable to the collapse provision of the plaintiffs' homeowners insurance policy: the plaintiffs' policy having failed to define the term ''collapse'' or to limit collapse coverage in words that unmistakably connoted an actual collapse, there was ambiguity per- taining to that term, and a policy's use of the term ''collapse,'' when not clearly defined, is fairly susceptible of being interpreted as including settling or cracking that results in the substantial impairment of the home's structural integrity; moreover, although the collapse provision in the plaintiffs' policy purported to exclude settling and cracking from its purview, it did not express a clear intent to exclude coverage for a collapse that ensues from what initially begins as unexceptional settling or cracking and what later develops into a far more serious structural infirmity culminating in an actual or imminent collapse. 2. This court concluded that, to satisfy the substantial impairment of struc- tural integrity standard, an insured whose home has not actually col- lapsed must present evidence demonstrating that the home nevertheless is in imminent danger of falling down or caving in, that is, in imminent danger of an actual collapse; such a conclusion was implicit in this court's holding in Beach, as the cases on which the court in Beach relied for the proposition that the term ''collapse'' could encompass something short of an actual collapse each involved buildings, or parts thereof, that, like the house in Beach, were in imminent danger of collapsing or that otherwise had been declared unsafe for their intended purposes; moreover, the substantial impairment standard is not satisfied merely by evidence that a building will eventually fall down, particularly when it is not in immediate danger of collapsing and it likely can be safely occupied for years, if not decades, into the future. 3. The coverage exclusion in the plaintiffs' homeowners insurance policy for the collapse of the ''foundation'' unambiguously includes the base- ment walls of the plaintiffs' home: basement walls invariably are consid- ered part of a building's foundation in state and local building codes, laypersons with no special knowledge of building codes or the intricacies of home construction generally understand that the concrete basement walls of a home are part of its foundation, definitions of the term ''foundation'' in dictionaries circulating at or around the time the applica- ble homeowners insurance policy was issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs support the view that concrete basement walls, and not just the footings beneath them, comprise a home's foundation, and various governmental entities consistently have referred, in public pronounce- ments concerning Connecticut's crumbling foundations problem, to the affected basement walls as crumbling foundations; moreover, this court, for more than one century, has used the term ''foundation wall'' when referring to the basement wall of a building, a reference to the term ''foundation'' in an exclusion in the plaintiffs' homeowners insurance policy led to the conclusion that that term must mean more than just a footing, and this court rejected the reasoning of those federal and state courts that have concluded that the term ''foundation'' reasonably may be understood to refer solely to the footings beneath the base- ment walls. Argued December 18, 2018—officially released November 12, 2019

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-593a (a)), ''a cause or right of action shall not be lost . . . if the process to be served is personally delivered to a state marshal'' before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and the process is served within thirty days of such delivery. The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of murder, filed a petition for a new trial based on a claim of newly discovered evidence. The respondent state's attorney asserted as a special defense that the petition was time barred because the petitioner did not serve the petition on him until August 6, 2014, which was one day after the three year statutory (§ 52-582) limitation period for filing such petitions had expired. Thereafter, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the office manager for the petitioner's attorney, P, testified that, at 4:59 p.m. on August 5, 2014, the final day of the limitation period, she had sent the petition by facsimile to the office of a state marshal, L, for service on the respondent. The petitioner also introduced into evidence the facsimile cover sheet, in which P instructed L to make service as soon as possible, as well as the facsimile transmission report, which indicated that the petition had been successfully delivered to L's fax machine at 5:01 p.m. on August 5, 2014. Although the facsimile transmission report indicated that the petition was successfully transmit- ted to L's office on August 5, 2014, and L served the respondent on August 6, 2014, L could not recall whether he had been in the office or if he personally had handled the petition on August 5, 2014. The trial court concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that he had served the petition on the respondent prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations because there was no proof that the process had been ''personally delivered'' to L on August 5, 2014, for purposes of § 52-593a (a). The court reasoned that L did not endorse the date of delivery on the return of service and that the petitioner provided no authority for the proposition that sending process to a marshal by facsimile constitutes personal delivery under § 52-593a (a). Accordingly, the trial court ren- dered judgment dismissing the petition, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which agreed with the trial court that sending the petition by facsimile to a marshal did not constitute personal delivery sufficient to save the otherwise untimely petition under § 52-593a (a). On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner presented sufficient evidence to establish that, by successfully sending the petition to L by facsimile on August 5, 2014, the process was personally delivered to a marshal within the meaning of § 52-293a (a) prior to the expiration of the applicable limitation period, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that § 52- 593a did not save the petition from dismissal: because the language of § 52-293a (a) was ambiguous as to whether a successful transmission of process by facsimile constitutes personal delivery, this court considered extratextual sources, including the statute's legislative history, and, fol- lowing a consideration of case law interpreting the term ''personal deliv- ery,'' concluded that delivery of process via facsimile is not excluded as a proper method of personal delivery, as allowing a petitioner to satisfy the personal delivery requirement by sending process to a marshal by facsimile was consistent with the remedial purpose of the statute, which was to assist plaintiffs in preserving their causes of action, as long as process is delivered to a marshal for service prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations; moreover, there was sufficient, circumstantial evidence to establish that the process was personally delivered to L prior to the expiration of the applicable limitation period, including P's testimony that she sent the process to L on the final day of the limitation period, the facsimile transmission report confirming delivery of the petition to L's fax machine on that date, the facsimile cover sheet instructing L to serve the process as soon as possible, and the fact that L served the process on the respondent the day after it was transmitted to L's office. (Three justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued February 22, 2019—officially released March 24, 2020

Under the statute (§ 29-35 (a)) making it a crime for any person to carry a pistol or revolver on his person outside of a dwelling house or place of business without a permit, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, inter alia, the barrel of the pistol or revolver the defendant was carrying is less than twelve inches in length. The defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, among other crimes, in connection with an incident in which several gunshots emanated from an automobile that was occupied by the defendant and his friend, R, who owned the vehicle. Two people suffered gunshot wounds as a result of the shooting. Following the shooting, the defendant drove the vehicle to the residence of his girl- friend's family, where the sister of the defendant's girlfriend, C, observed R remove a handgun from his waistband and hand it to the defendant. At the defendant's trial, the state did not present direct, numerical evidence of the length of the barrel of the firearm that it alleged he had used in connection with the shooting, as the firearm was never recovered by the police, and none of the state's witnesses specifically described its barrel length. The jury, however, was presented with circumstantial evidence about the firearm, which included testimony from C and from a firearms examiner, W, who testified about his examination of the two bullets retrieved from the body of one of the victims. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, which rejected the defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence that he was carrying a firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that there was suffi- cient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction under § 29-35 (a), as the state presented sufficient, circumstantial evidence to permit the jury reasonably to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the barrel of the firearm the defendant carried without a permit was less than twelve inches in length: C testified that, a few hours before the shooting, she observed a gun inside the glove compartment of R's vehicle, the state introduced into evidence a photograph of the interior of R's vehicle that depicted the general size of the glove compartment, and C also testified that, shortly after the shooting occurred, she saw R pull a handgun out of his waistband and hand it to the defendant, and it was not unreasonable for the jury to have concluded, on the basis of such evidence, that a firearm with a barrel of one foot or longer, plus the additional size and length of the handle, would have been too large and unwieldy to store in the glove compartment of R's vehicle and for R to transport inside his waistband; moreover, the jury's finding that the firearm the defendant was carrying had a barrel length of less than twelve inches was further supported by W's testimony that the bullets recovered from the body of one of the victims were consistent with bullets that would have been fired out of a .32 caliber ''handgun or revolver,'' and by the trial court's instruction to the jury that the term ''pistol'' or ''revolver'' means any firearm having a barrel of less than twelve inches in length. Argued November 14, 2019—officially released March 25, 2020

Convicted of, among other crimes, criminal possession of a firearm and having a weapon in a motor vehicle, the defendant appealed. The defen- dant had been driving a car with a passenger, S, a drug dealer with whom the defendant had a long-standing relationship. They drove around for approximately forty-five minutes, stopped at a gas station-conve- nience store, and then drove for another forty-five minutes. The defen- dant then stopped the car in the lane of travel as they approached a large, outdoor social gathering, and S exited the car and fired multiple gunshots from a gun he had been carrying. S then reentered the car and instructed the defendant to drive. Police officers witnessed the shooting, and a high-speed police chase ensued, after which the defen- dant and S were ultimately apprehended. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she possessed a firearm and, therefore, that there was insufficient evi- dence to sustain her conviction of criminal possession of a firearm. The defendant also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of having a weapon in a motor vehicle. Held: 1. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant constructively possessed the firearm that S used in the shooting, as the record contained sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew that the firearm was in the car and that she was in a position to and intended to control the firearm, and, accordingly, this court upheld the defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a firearm: the jury reasonably could have inferred that, by the time of the police chase, the defendant knew that the firearm was in the vehicle, the defendant likely knew that S was a drug dealer and that he, therefore, often carried a gun, the fact that the defendant was driving and thereby controlling the car suggested that she was able to and intended to control the firearm, the defendant's attempt to flee from the police after the shooting indicated a consciousness of guilt stemming from her knowledge of and intent to exercise control over the gun, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant and S were not just close friends but willing partners in a joint criminal venture, and, in view of the fact that there was no evidence indicating that the firearm was anywhere other than in the area of the front seat, the jury reasonably could have inferred that she was physically in a position to exercise control over it; moreover, there was no merit to the defendant's contention that, because S testified that he had actively sought to conceal the firearm on his side of the car by sitting on it or by keeping it between his seat and the passenger's side door, her convic- tion of criminal possession of a firearm could not stand, as the jury was not required to credit the testimony of S, who lacked credibility and whose testimony was at odds with other evidence presented and the relationship between S and the defendant, whose interests were aligned; furthermore, this court declined to adopt the defendant's position that, because S allegedly had actual possession of the firearm, she could not have constructively possessed that firearm. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of having a weapon in a motor vehicle on the ground that the ''knowingly has'' element of the statute ((Rev. to 2013) § 29-38 (a)) under which she was convicted should be construed to mean ''knowingly possesses'': constructive possession of a firearm would support a conviction even under the defendant's proposed reading of § 29-38 (a), as constructive possession requires knowledge and control of the object, and, in light of this court's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm in connection with her conviction of criminal possession of a firearm, the defendant also must have knowingly possessed that firearm for purposes of her conviction under § 29-38 (a); moreover, the jury's finding that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm for pur- poses of her conviction of criminal possession of a firearm rendered any potential instructional error harmless, the trial court did not commit plain error in applying the law concerning the construction of the term ''knowingly has'' in § 29-38 (a) that existed at the time of the defendant's trial, and this court declined the defendant's request to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to resolve an issue of statutory construction and evidentiary sufficiency, as that authority is generally reserved for the adoption of procedural rules. (One justice concurring separately; three justices concurring and dissenting in one opinion) Argued September 12, 2018—officially released March 27, 2020

The plaintiffs, potential beneficiaries of two family trusts, sought a judgment declaring the proper distribution of assets from those trusts. Each trust contained explicit language that, upon the expiration of the trust term, the trust principal was to be distributed to the grantor's issue then living, per stirpes. The plaintiffs claimed that, upon the passing of the last measuring life, the principal of the trusts should be distributed in six equal amounts to the six grandchildren of H, the grantor of one of the trusts, and the son of the grantor of the other trust, and that the refer- enced distribution will be per stirpes, such that the one-sixth share that would have gone to any deceased grandchild of H will instead go to the issue of that grandchild. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the trusts grant the principal to the grandchildren of H or their families in equal shares. Certain defendants, other potential beneficiaries of the trust, also filed motions for summary judgment, claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the interpretation of the two trusts and that the court should render judgment declaring that, at the expiration of the term of those trusts, the principal of the trusts should be distributed such that each of the three children of H shall be the head of each stirpe. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and rendered judgment declaring that, upon the termination of the two trusts, the corpus of each trust will be distributed in equal shares to the three children of H, with living descendants of each of the three children succeeding to the shares of their deceased ancestors. The plaintiffs and the defendant C filed separate appeals from the trial court's judgment. On appeal, although the parties generally agreed that the grantors of the trusts intended a per stirpes distribution, the plaintiffs claimed that the stirpital roots should begin at the level of the grandchil- dren, resulting in the trust principal being initially divided into six equal shares. C claimed that the stirpital roots should be determined once the trust terms expire and that the roots should be at whatever level of descendants has members living at the time of expiration. The other defendants participating in these appeals claimed that the trial court correctly determined that the stirpital roots should be at the level of the children, resulting in the trust principal being initially divided into three equal shares. Held that the trial court correctly determined that the trusts unambiguously provided that the heads of the respective stirpes should be the grantors' children and, accordingly, properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in their favor: Connecticut case law and the Restatement (Second) of Property, which provides that, when a gift is made to a class described as the ''issue'' of a designated person, in the absence of additional language or circumstances that indicate otherwise, the initial division into shares will be on the basis of the number of class members, whether alive or deceased, in the first generation below the designated person, supported the conclusion that the grantors' use of the term ''issue'' in the trusts at issue indicated that the grantors intended the trust principal to be divided into equal shares on the basis of the number of their children, which was the first generation below each grantor, and that conclusion was consistent with case law favoring an equal distribution of a grantor's estate among the several branches of his or her family, which could be accomplished in the present case only if the trust principal is divided with the three children of H serving as the stirpital roots, consistent with this state's intestate statutes (§§ 45a- 438 (a) and 45a-437), which provide for a per stirpes plan of distribution and provide for the stirpital roots to be established at the first generation after the decedent, and consistent with the Uniform Probate Code, which provides that, if an instrument calls for property to be distributed ''per stirpes,'' the property must be divided into as many equal shares as there are surviving children of the designated person and deceased children who left surviving descendants; moreover, contrary to the claim of the plaintiffs and C that, because the two trusts both provided for the principal to be distributed to the grantors' issue ''then living,'' mean- ing that the grantors intended the initial division of each trust to be to the issue living when the trust terminates, the grantors could not have intended for the initial division to be at the level of the three children of H, who were measuring lives of each trust, as the use of the term ''then living'' did not modify the method of distributing the trust principal but merely conditioned the receipt of a distribution from those trusts on those issue who survive their expiration; furthermore, although the plaintiffs and C relied on Connecticut cases for the proposition that, if a testator excludes the children as beneficiaries under the trust and directs the gifts to the grandchildren, then the children cannot receive the gifts as representatives of their parents, those authorities, which involved trust documents that directed the gift to a particular class or group of persons, rather than to the more general class of ''issue,'' were not applicable to the present case, as the two trusts at issue do not name a particular class to receive the gifts. Argued September 17, 2019—officially released March 30, 2020

The defendant, who had been charged with murder and tampering with physical evidence, filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that the police prejudiced her prosecution when they executed search warrants for her home and seized and exam- ined privileged information that was thereafter published in their arrest warrant application. The police had gone to the home that the defendant shared with H, the defendant's husband, to perform a wellness check after H's employer reported that he had not been seen in several months. After observing human remains in the home, the police executed two search warrants. During the second search, the police seized three sepa- rate files from a filing cabinet. The first file, labeled ''INCIDENT 2017,'' contained about twenty-five pages, most of which were handwritten. The second file, labeled ''CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY Oct 2017,'' contained about 150 pages. The third file contained estate planning documents. The police then obtained an arrest warrant for the defen- dant's alleged murder of H. The arrest warrant application included the verbatim text of a handwritten, four page narrative from the seized material that apparently described the events that led to H's death. The defendant alleged that, during the search of her home, the police read and inspected two documents that were protected by the attorney-client privilege, namely, the four page narrative and a document that reflected her trial strategy, both of which, she claimed, the state could use in preparation of its case against her in violation of her constitutional rights to a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to State v. Lenarz (301 Conn. 417) to determine the extent of the violation of the attorney-client privilege and the prejudice to the defendant, and whether the state's remedial actions and other remedies could serve to cure any prejudice. During the hearing, the court accepted the parties' written stipulation that the contents of the second file were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The court also heard the testimony of witnesses from the state's attorney's office, who stated that they had acted to limit additional exposure to potentially privileged materials by halting the investigation until after the resolution of the Lenarz hearing and by having the case handled by a different state's attorney's office. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the defendant failed to establish that the contents of the first file were protected by the attorney- client privilege or that much of the contents of the third file were protected by that privilege. The court further determined that the preju- dice to the defendant that was caused by the invasion of the attorney- client privilege could be cured by a remedy short of dismissal of the charges. The court also ordered the state to take certain remedial actions to limit further prejudice to the defendant before prosecution could resume. Following the court's denial of the defendant's motion to dis- miss, the defendant appealed to this court pursuant to the statute (§ 52- 265a) permitting the Chief Justice to certify an appeal involving a matter of substantial public interest and in which a delay may work a substantial injustice. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court committed clear error in determining that she had failed to establish that the docu- ments in the first file and many of the documents in the third file were protected by the attorney-client privilege: a. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding one of the defendant's expert witnesses, D, from testifying regarding the substance of certain out-of-court statements that the defendant made to D regarding the fact that she had created the documents in the first file for the purpose of seeking legal advice, as those statements constituted inadmis- sible hearsay and were properly admitted only as a basis for D's expert opinion, and the record contained no other evidence that would serve to establish the defendant's intent when she created those documents; moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the testimony of two other expert witnesses, W and S, as W and S had no knowledge relating to the defendant's intent in creating the documents in the first file and, thus, could not have provided any information that would have assisted the court as the trier of fact, and W's and S's testimony would have been cumulative of D's testimony and centered on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant established that those documents were privileged, which was a determination for the trial court alone to make. b. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the manner in which she maintained the documents in the first file established that they were privileged; the location of the privileged second file next to the first file in the filing cabinet did not serve to transfer the attorney- client privilege from one file to another, and the defendant's proximity claim was contrary to the well established principle that the attorney- client privilege must be established for each document separately. c. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the documents in the first file were sufficient in and of themselves to be considered privileged on the ground that their content was obviously useful to preparing her defense: the defendant failed to establish whether the handwritten documents in the first file describing her medical issues and the incident that led to H's death were created for the purpose of seeking legal advice or for some other personal purpose, as the docu- ments did not reflect notes describing actual communications or memo- rializations of communications between the defendant and her attorney, and the defendant did not adduce any additional evidence to establish that she had created those documents for the purpose of seeking legal advice or that she had communicated or intended to communicate those documents to her attorney; moreover, the printouts of the defendant's medical records in the first file were preexisting documents that were outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege, as they predated the incident that gave rise to the attorney-client relationship at issue by approximately nine years, and the defendant did not introduce evidence to establish that those printouts were created for the purpose of seeking legal advice. d. Although the documents contained in the first file were substantively identical to the documents in the privileged second file, the documents in those two files were not the same and, thus, the first file was not privileged: both files contained documents containing the narrative describing the incident that led to H's death, but they were not exact copies, and there were many versions of the narrative that were told in substantively different ways and were of different lengths and detail; moreover, nothing in the first file suggested that the documents con- tained therein were communications between the defendant and her attorney or that they were created at the behest of an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice; furthermore, the first file contained a variety of documents, some of which appeared like journal entries, others that were in a narrative style that described traumatic events, and others that were preexisting documents, and the record did not support the defendant's claim that the state's stipulation that the second file was privileged should transfer to the first file. e. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the estate planning documents in the third file should be covered by the attorney-client privilege as communications made to an attorney for the purposes of drafting a will: that file contained an executed will rather than a draft of a will that would be considered a communication in the context of a will dispute; moreover, other records and documents in the third file were insufficient to support the defendant's assertion that those records and documents were communications inextricably linked to the giving of legal advice, and the records and documents therein did not contain anything suggestive of the defendant's trial strategy. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that dismissal of the charges against the defendant was not warranted and that the state met its burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the remedial steps it took could cure any presumed prejudice and prevent future prejudice to the defendant: the court credited the testimony of witnesses at the Lenarz hearing that the police officers' exposure to privileged materials was not intentional, and the state, once it was alerted to the privileged nature of the documents, halted its investigation of the defendant, created a taint team to remove privileged documents before they could reach new prosecutors, removed the case from the original investigative body, and assigned new prosecutors; moreover, the defendant's state constitutional (article first, § 19) right to individual voir dire could serve to mitigate any prejudice by exposing whether prospective jurors had been exposed to privileged materials and by uncovering potential biases; furthermore, the trial court's preclusion of testimony by the defendant's expert witness about media exposure of the privileged materials did not prevent the defendant from demonstra- ting the extent of the prejudice she suffered, as that expert's testimony was not relevant or sufficiently reliable and would not have assisted the court in determining whether any prejudice could be remedied. (One justice concurring separately) Argued October 15, 2019—officially released April 8, 2020

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment of civil contempt rendered against him in the course of marital dissolu- tion proceedings. Following the commencement of the dissolution action, the parties entered into a stipulation, which was approved by the trial court and made a court order. The stipulation required that certain funds be deposited into a joint account and provided that the signatures of both parties were required for withdrawals from that account. In contravention of the stipulation, the parties set up a joint account that did not require signatures for withdrawals. After the plain- tiff withdrew money from the account and placed it in a separate, personal account, the defendant filed a motion for contempt, which the trial court granted. The trial court thereafter rendered a judgment of dissolution, incorporating the parties' separation agreement, which con- tained a provision that they would file a joint motion to open and vacate the trial court's contempt finding. Although the parties subsequently filed the joint motion to open and vacate, the trial court denied it. While the plaintiff's appeal to the Appellate Court was pending, that court ordered the trial court to issue an articulation, in which the trial court stated, inter alia, that its decision to grant the defendant's motion for contempt was predicated on its finding that the plaintiff had violated the court's prior order when he initially deposited funds into the non- compliant joint account and on two other occasions when the plaintiff made unilateral withdrawals from the account. The plaintiff claimed in his appeal to the Appellate Court that the trial court had abused its discretion in finding him in contempt without addressing his claim that, in violating the court order, he acted in reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that, although the plaintiff testified before the trial court that he had consulted with counsel prior to withdrawing funds from the joint account, he did not testify that counsel advised him to do so. With respect to the trial court's denial of the parties' joint motion to open and vacate, the Appellate Court determined that, although the basis for that motion was that the contempt judgment would have a deleterious effect on the plaintiff's career, the trial court properly denied it because the plaintiff had not offered any evidence supporting that assertion. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff in contempt on the basis of his wilful violation of a court order: the plaintiff did not present testimony or other evidence during the hearing on the motion for contempt that would have adequately apprised the trial court that he intended to claim that he acted reasonably in reliance on the advice of counsel, and, although the plaintiff did make that claim for the first time in his motion for reconsideration of the trial court's finding of contempt, he failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim; moreover, the trial court found three independent violations of the court order by the plaintiff, and, even if this court agreed with the plaintiff that his testimony regarding his consultations with counsel was sufficient to demonstrate that he reasonably relied on the advice of counsel in making the with- drawals, he did not testify that he had consulted with counsel prior to setting up the noncompliant joint account or that he had done so in reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel, and the plaintiff admitted that he did not recall raising the issue of the noncompliant account with his attorney; furthermore, certain e-mail exchanges between the plaintiff and counsel, which the plaintiff offered as evidence in connection with his motion for reconsideration, did not support his claim that he acted on the advice of counsel but, rather, supported the trial court's conclu- sion that the plaintiff's dissatisfaction with his attorney's services was not a basis for reconsideration of the court's finding of wilful contempt. 2. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parties' joint motion to open and vacate the finding of contempt: the trial court enjoyed broad discretion in determining whether to grant the joint motion to open and vacate, and the court was not required to grant the motion merely because the parties were in agreement; moreover, the plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that the contempt finding would negatively impact his career, which, the plaintiff contended, formed the basis for the granting of the motion. Argued October 17, 2019—officially released April 13, 2020

The plaintiffs, M and V, sought to recover damages from, among others, the defendant H, a urogynecologist, for, inter alia, lack of informed consent and innocent misrepresentation in connection with an unsuccessful surgery in which H implanted a mesh product in M's body for the purpose of treating M's pelvic organ prolapse. M experienced bleeding and pain after the procedure, and, despite several follow-up procedures to allevi- ate the pain and to remove the mesh product, her pain continued. M subsequently was diagnosed with nerve damage. Prior to trial, the plain- tiffs sought to introduce into evidence two articles from medical journals containing certain statements regarding the limited data about the mesh product used in the present case and the experimental nature of the implantation procedure, including statements that patients should con- sent to the surgery with an understanding of the risks and experimental nature of the procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that the statements in the articles were admissible to demonstrate that H knew or should have known that the mesh surgery was experimental and the subject of medical controversy, and that H failed to properly advise M of the risks associated with the mesh product. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the articles were being offered not for purposes of notice but for the truth of the matter asserted therein and, therefore, were inadmissible hearsay. At the conclusion of the trial, the court directed a verdict in favor of H and another remaining defendant on the innocent misrepresentation claim. The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on the remaining claims, and the trial court rendered judgment thereon. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court concluded, inter alia, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the two journal articles on the ground that they were inadmissible hearsay and that the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendants on the innocent misrepresentation claim because innocent misrepresentation claims primarily apply to business transactions, typically between a buyer and seller. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit into evidence the two journal articles offered by the plaintiffs on the ground that those articles were inadmissi- ble hearsay: the plaintiffs could not introduce the articles for the non- hearsay purpose of proving what H, as a physician, knew or reasonably should have known with respect to the experimental nature of the mesh product and procedure, as the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that H read or reasonably should have read the contents of the articles; moreover, the defendants contested the authority of the articles, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding them for the purpose of establishing that they were so authoritative in the field that H should have been on constructive notice of their content. 2. The Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's decision to direct a verdict for the defendants on the plaintiffs' innocent misrepresentation claim, this court having concluded that such a claim does not lie in the context of the present case: innocent misrepresentation claims in Connecticut generally are governed by § 552C of the Restatement (Sec- ond) of Torts, which requires that the misrepresentation occur in a ''sale, rental or exchange transaction with another,'' and, in the present case, the plaintiffs and H were not parties to such a commercial transac- tion because M sought out the services of H not to purchase the mesh product but primarily for the provision of medical services, namely, the implantation of the mesh product; moreover, this court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that liability for innocent misrepresentation should be extended to statements made by physicians in the course of providing medical services because, although § 552C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts acknowledges that claims for innocent misrepresentation may be brought in the context of other types of business transactions, the provision of medical care often requires physicians to provide medical opinions rather than statement of facts, and a physician who makes a false statement of fact still may be liable for misrepresentation; further- more, even if this court assumed that innocent misrepresentation claims could be pursued in the product liability context, that was of no conse- quence because the plaintiffs did not seek to recover from H for product liability, and this court declined to apply the doctrine of strict liability for innocent misrepresentations made in the course of providing medical treatment, as such liability would be doctrinally inconsistent with the existing framework governing claims against physicians arising from acts of omission or commission during physician-patient communica- tions. Argued October 25, 2019—officially released April 15, 2020

The plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant employer, alleging that he was constructively discharged in violation of public policy. The plaintiff had been employed as a licensed optician manager in the defendant's optical department in a JCPenney store and alleged that the defendant improperly required him to provide optomet- ric assistance services to the doctor of optometry in the store. The plaintiff claimed that, under a declaratory ruling issued by the Board of Examiners for Optometrists and a cease and desist consent order issued by the Board of Examiners for Opticians, employees, including opticians, under the control of unlicensed third parties were prohibited from performing services for licensed optometrists. The plaintiff also alleged that his duties violated the public policy embodied in the statute (§ 31-130 (i)) requiring JCPenney and the defendant to have a staffing permit before providing staffing services to the optometrist. The plaintiff further alleged that he was forced to resign when the defendant refused his requests to be excused from these duties. The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that its allegations could not satisfy the requirements of a constructive discharge claim. The defendant asserted that the declaratory ruling and the cease and desist order were not binding and did not create a private right of action for optometric assistants. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff's reliance on § 31-130 (i) was misplaced because the plaintiff did not allege that optometrists employed by the defendant charged the defendant for hiring opticians. The trial court, relying on Brittell v. Dept. of Correction (247 Conn. 148), determined that, to prevail on his constructive discharge claim, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant intended to force him to resign. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court, interpreting and applying Brittell in the same manner as the trial court, concluded, inter alia, that there was no allegation in the plaintiff's complaint that reasonably could be construed to claim that the defendant intended to create conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's shoes would be compelled to resign. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court incorrectly interpreted the standard set forth in Brittell to require the plaintiff to assert facts demonstrating that the defendant intended to force him to resign, Brittell having required the plaintiff to establish only that the defendant intended to create an intoler- able work atmosphere; the Brittell standard for constructive discharge requires a subjective inquiry into whether the employer intended to create the complained of employment atmosphere or condition and an objective inquiry into whether that atmosphere or condition would have led a reasonable person in the employee's shoes to feel compelled to resign, and that standard does not require the employee to allege facts showing that the employer intended to force the employee to resign. 2. Although the Appellate Court incorrectly applied the standard for con- structive discharge in Brittell, that court correctly upheld the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the alternative ground that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts establishing that his work atmosphere was so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in his shoes would have felt compelled to resign, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court: nothing in the plaintiff's complaint established that the defendant required him to violate the law, as the declaratory ruling evaluated the circumstances under which an optometrist would be considered an employee of an unlicensed person or entity, and the plaintiff was employed as an optician rather than an optometrist, the declaratory rul- ing was binding only on those, unlike the plaintiff, who participated in the hearing that led to the ruling, and the ruling, which was intended to provide guidance to optometrists, did not establish criminal liability or inflict repercussions for specific conduct that would compel a reason- able optician in the plaintiff's shoes to resign; moreover, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the cease and desist order either applied to him or bound the defendant, as the order required that a store different from the one in which the plaintiff worked not permit a licensed optician to act in the capacity of an optometric assistant to an independent optometrist leasing space in the store, and also failed to demonstrate how the consent order functionally created a work condition so intolera- ble that a person in the plaintiff's shoes would have been justified in walking off the job as if he had been fired; furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's claim, § 31-130 (i) was inapplicable, as it requires only that a person who procures or offers to procure employees for employers register with the Commissioner of Labor, and the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint did not suggest that the defendant intended to create conditions different from what the plaintiff would have expected when he agreed to work as a licensed optician manager for the defendant. Argued December 12, 2019—officially released April 15, 2020

The plaintiff, W, who had been appointed by the Probate Court as administra- trix of the estate of her deceased son, D, sought to recover damages on behalf of D's estate from the defendants, various health care provid- ers, for medical negligence. Approximately three years after W com- menced the action, the trial court issued a notice indicating that the case had been reported settled and ordered the parties to file any with- drawals or motions for stipulated judgment by a certain date or the case would be dismissed. At around the same time, the Probate Court appointed D's father, P, as coadministrator of D's estate. W failed to file the withdrawal by the deadline, and the court issued a second notice, again ordering the parties to file the necessary paperwork. W successfully sought an extension of time to file the withdrawal for the purpose of scheduling a hearing with the Probate Court and P to confirm that she had the authority to unilaterally withdraw the action. W failed to file the withdrawal by the extended deadline, however, and the trial court dismissed the action. Thereafter, P moved to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal, claiming that he had been prevented from requesting a further extension of time to withdraw or pursue the action due to mistake, accident or fraud. Specifically, P claimed that, at the time W commenced the action, she had misrepresented to the Probate Court that she was unaware of any pending litigation and that, after the Probate Court ordered W to turn over the case file to P for the hearing that W had requested, P expected that the action would remain pending and open until after the hearing. P also claimed that, in light of the ongoing issues in the Probate Court, W's failure to request additional extensions of time within which to file the withdrawal was a result of mistake or accident, and that W's counsel was aware of these circum- stances but nonetheless failed to request an extension of time. Finally, P indicated that the Probate Court had removed W as administratrix of D's estate and appointed P as the sole administrator, with the authority to handle all litigation. The defendants objected to P's motion, claiming that P lacked standing because he was not a party to the action and had not filed a motion to be substituted as the plaintiff, and that P's motion to open did not comply with the statutory (§ 52-212) requirements that the motion be verified by oath and demonstrate both that a good cause of action existed and that W had been prevented from prosecuting the action due to mistake, accident or other reasonable cause. There- after, P filed a supplemental motion to open and vacate, claiming that a fraud had been committed, in that he believed a settlement had been reached, without the Probate Court's knowledge or authorization, and D's estate should have received the settlement proceeds. The defendants responded that no settlement payments had been made and that P had not alleged that the defendants had participated in the alleged fraud. The trial court, without explanation, granted P's motion to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal, and the defendants appealed. The trial court thereafter issued an articulation, stating that it was substituting P, as administrator of D's estate, as the plaintiff, and finding that the filing of the withdrawal had been prevented by reasonable cause, namely, the proceedings in the Probate Court removing W as administratrix of D's estate. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted P's motion to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal because he lacked standing, the motion failed to comply with § 52-212, and any fraud had been perpetrated by W rather than the defendants. Held: 1. This court lacked jurisdiction over the defendants' claims that the trial court improperly granted P's motion to open and vacate the judgment on the grounds that the motion failed to comply with § 52-212 and the alleged fraud had been perpetrated by W rather than the defendants, as those claims did not raise a colorable challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion but, rather, challenged the trial court's common-law and statutory authority to grant the motion, and, therefore, this court dismissed that portion of the defendants' appeal relating to those claims for lack of a final judgment: although this court has recognized a limited exception to the rule that the granting of a motion to open renders a trial court's judgment nonfinal and, therefore, not an appealable final judgment, that exception applies only when the issue that the appellant raises involves a colorable challenge to the jurisdiction of the trial court to open the judgment, and the exception does not apply when the issue involves a claim that the trial court improperly exercised its jurisdiction to open the judgment under the applicable statutes, rules of practice, or common-law principles; in the present case, the defendants' claims concerning whether P's motion complied with § 52-212 and who perpetrated the alleged fraud challenged only the trial court's exercise of its jurisdiction, requiring this court to dismiss the appeal as to those claims for lack of a final judgment, whereas the defendants' claim that P lacked standing to move to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal raised a colorable challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction and, therefore, was reviewable on appeal. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that P lacked standing to move to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal on the ground that P was not a party to the action: although P was not the named plaintiff when the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the action, the original plaintiff, W, was removed as administratrix of D's estate, and P was appointed as the sole administrator with full legal authority to prosecute all actions that had been initiated by W on behalf of D's estate, and, as the replacement administrator, P stepped into the shoes of W and acquired all of her rights and responsibilities, including her aggrievement stemming from the dismissal of the present action; more- over, once the judgment was opened, the trial court properly substituted P as the plaintiff in accordance with the statute (§ 45a-242 (e)) providing that all actions brought by a fiduciary, including the administrator of an estate, shall survive to be prosecuted by the person appointed to succeed such fiduciary. Argued November 15, 2019—officially released April 22, 2020

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-599 (b)), a civil action or proceeding, including a dissolution action, shall not abate by reason of the death of any party but may be continued by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased party, and, if a defendant dies, the plaintiff, within one year after receiving notification of the defendant's death, may apply for an order to substitute the defendant's executor or administrator in the place of the defendant. Pursuant further to statute (§ 52-599 (c) (1)), substitution under § 52-599 (b) is precluded when the purpose or object of the civil action is defeated or rendered useless by the death of a party. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's denial of her motion to substitute the coexecutors of the estate of R, the defendant and the plaintiff's former husband, pursuant to § 52-599 (b), in place of R. Approximately four years after the marriage of the plaintiff and R had been dissolved, and while R was still living, the plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment of dissolution on the ground of fraud, claiming that R wilfully had failed to disclose assets he held in offshore accounts. The plaintiff and R stipulated that the judgment could be opened for the limited purpose of conducting discovery regarding the plaintiff's allegations, but, prior to complying with the court's discovery orders, R died. At the time of R's death, the motion to open was pending and the dissolution judgment remained open. In denying the plaintiff's motion to substitute, the trial court concluded that R's death defeated or rendered useless the underlying motion to open the dissolution judgment, and, thus, substitution of the coexecutors as defendants was prohibited under § 52-599 (c) (1). The court reasoned that, if the plaintiff's motion to open were granted, the marriage would be reinstated but would have automatically dissolved on the date of R's death pursuant to statute (§ 46b-40). Accordingly, the court determined, it could not again dissolve the marriage and redistribute the financial assets, as the plaintiff had requested in her motion to open. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that R's death did not defeat or render useless her motion to open the dissolution judgment and thereby prohibit substitution of the coexecu- tors as defendants under § 52-599. Held that the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's motion to substitute as defendants the coexecutors of R's estate: substitution of an executor or administrator for a deceased defendant is permitted under § 52-599 (b) when the action or proceeding to which the deceased defendant is a party is pending, and, in the present case, the plaintiff's motion to open was pending before the trial court at the time of R's death; moreover, when a motion to open a dissolution judgment on the basis of financial fraud, such as the plaintiff's motion, seeks to open that judgment only for the purpose of reconsideration of the financial orders, the granting of that motion does not reinstate the marriage and, thus, does not defeat or render useless the underlying divorce proceeding; in the present case, although the plaintiff did not specifically request, in her motion to open, that the trial court open the dissolution judgment for the limited purpose of reconsideration of the financial orders, the allegations in that motion and the supporting memo- randum of law made clear that the plaintiff was seeking to have the court open the judgment for that limited purpose rather than for the purpose of reinstating the marriage, and, therefore, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, substitution was not precluded under § 52-599 (c) (1). Argued January 22—officially released April 27, 2020

The plaintiff, as trustee, sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant L Co. In the first count of his complaint, the plaintiff sought foreclosure of his mortgage, alleging, inter alia, that there were encumbrances on the subject property that were subsequent and subordinate to his mortgage, including the mortgage of the defen- dants K and D. In the second count, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the mortgage of K and D, which was purportedly recorded before the plaintiff's mortgage, was subordinate to the plaintiff's mort- gage on the ground that the plaintiff had no notice of K and D's mortgage because it had been incorrectly indexed by the town clerk's office. K and D denied the allegation in each count that their mortgage was subordinate to the plaintiff's mortgage and asserted a special defense that L Co. had mortgaged the subject property to them and that their mortgage was prior in right and title to the plaintiff's mortgage. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on both counts and ordered a foreclosure by sale. Prior to the sale date set by the court, K and D appealed from the judgment of foreclosure to the Appellate Court. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the Appellate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the priority of mort- gages cannot be challenged until after the foreclosure sale has taken place, and that court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. On the granting of certification, K and D appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the appeal of K and D for lack of a final judgment, as the judgment of foreclosure by sale in the present case was a final judgment: the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and against K and D, on both counts of the complaint and ordered the full measure of relief sought therein, and the determina- tion of priorities as between the plaintiff and K and D was an integral part of the judgment of foreclosure, as it was the joint status of K and D as a subsequent encumbrancer that permitted the foreclosure action to proceed against them because, if the mortgage of K and D had priority over the plaintiff's mortgage, K and D would not be proper parties to the foreclosure action and would retain their full property interest, rather than be left with only a claim to a portion of any proceeds from the sale after the plaintiff is paid in full; moreover, the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that K and D were not appealing to the Appellate Court from the judgment of foreclosure by sale because their appeal challenged the trial court's priority determination rather than the plain- tiff's right to foreclose on his mortgage, as the priority issue was in dispute as to both counts of the complaint, and the mere fact that the trial court resolved this dispute by first disposing of the declaratory judgment count did not negate its legal effect on the foreclosure count; furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that an appeal of a priority determination before the trial court's approval of the sale and the rendering of a supplemental judgment is premature, as the priority of the foreclosing plaintiff is a proper and essential aspect of the judgment of foreclosure by sale, a supplemental judgment is intended to resolve disputes only as between parties holding interests subsequent in priority, the trial court's priority determination was ripe for adjudica- tion before the sale was approved because K and D's loss of priority was neither hypothetical nor contingent on an event that could never transpire, and practical and pragmatic considerations, including the concern that the ability to calculate an appropriate bid on the property would be impaired by the uncertainty of whether the foreclosing plaintiff or a defendant encumbrancer has first priority, weighed strongly in favor of permitting an appeal before the foreclosure sale has been ratified. Argued October 24, 2019—officially released May 18, 2020

Convicted of breach of the peace in the second degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, and threatening in the second degree in connection with a confrontation involving C, a tow truck driver, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had violated his rights to confrontation and to present a defense when it precluded him from cross-examining C about the facts underlying certain of C's prior convictions. In response to C's attempt to tow the defendant's vehicle from a fire lane at a condominium complex, the defendant confronted C, demanding to know why his vehicle was being towed. After the defendant opened the driver's door of his vehicle, C raised the vehicle off the ground to prevent the defendant from driving it off of the back of the tow truck. The defendant then retrieved a pipe from a nearby garage and used it to strike the tow truck. Thereafter, C, fearing that the defendant was going to hit him with the pipe, retrieved a can of Mace and sprayed it in the defendant's face. The defendant then took a knife out of his pocket, and C, fearing for his life, drove away in the tow truck. At trial, the defendant raised the defenses of self-defense and defense of property, arguing that C was attempting to steal the defendant's vehicle for his own financial benefit. The defendant was permitted to and did ask C about previously having been convicted of larceny. In response to the trial court's decision to preclude the defendant from cross-examining C about the specific facts underlying C's prior misdemeanor convictions of larceny and breach of the peace, the defendant claimed that this evidence would have served to impeach C by showing his character for untruthfulness and by establishing his motive, intent and interest in attempting to steal the defendant's vehicle to finance his drug habit and in lying about having sprayed the defendant with Mace in self-defense. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the defendant's cross- examination of C and rejected the defendant's constitutional claims. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it precluded the defendant from cross-exam- ining C regarding the facts underlying his prior larceny convictions in order to show that C had stolen cell phones to support a drug habit: C's motivation for the prior theft of the cell phones was not probative of his veracity, as the trial court reasonably could have concluded that C's motive for stealing them to finance a drug habit two to three years prior to the incident in the present case was not relevant to his character for truthfulness any more than the fact that he generally had a history of theft, which was made known to the jury when the defendant asked C whether he previously had been convicted of larceny, preclusion of evidence of drug use to show character for untruthfulness was in line with the general rule that propensity evidence is inadmissible, as addic- tion alone could not reasonably be thought to amount to more than a compelling propensity to use drugs, and the trial court reasonably could have determined that any possible connection between C's prior drug habit and his character for untruthfulness was outweighed by the poten- tial for prejudice, as there was no evidence that C was using drugs or had a drug addiction at the time of the incident in question; moreover, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that the facts underlying C's larceny convictions were admissible to establish C's motive, interest and intent to falsely inculpate the defendant and to cover up his own misconduct, the defendant having failed to establish that C had an ongoing drug habit at the time of the incident at issue or that C's conduct underlying his prior larceny convictions was sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue in the present case. 2. The Appellate Court correctly determined that the defendant had failed to establish that the trial court violated his rights to confrontation and to present a defense when it precluded him from cross-examining C about the fact that C, by pleading guilty to the crime of breach of the peace in connection with a prior incident involving an altercation with another individual, had admitted that he was lying about using pepper spray in self-defense during that incident: the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that C's prior statements to the police about acting in self-defense in connection with that prior incident were not inconsistent with his guilty plea to the charge of breach of the peace and, thus, were not evidence of C's having previously lied about acting in self-defense, as C had maintained throughout the plea proceedings on the breach of the peace charge that he had used pepper spray in self-defense; moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim that a guilty plea is an admission of guilt, a myriad of reasons may explain why an individual would plead guilty, and there is no open and visible connection between a guilty plea and an individual's state of mind at the time of the crime for which the plea is entered. Argued February 26—officially released June 10, 2020

The respondent father appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the petition filed by the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, to adjudicate T, the child of the respondent parents, neglected. T was born in Florida, and, after the Florida Depart- ment of Children and Families took emergency custody of T and con- tacted the Connecticut Department of Children and Families to report that the respondent mother had given birth to T, the petitioner filed the neglect petition at issue. Shortly thereafter, the Florida Department of Children and Families filed in a Florida court a motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Connecticut court on the basis of the family's history with service providers and child protective services in Connecticut. A Florida magistrate issued a report and a recommendation to grant the motion. The magistrate concluded that Connecticut was a more conve- nient forum, in part because the petitioner wanted to add T to a pending dependency case in Connecticut filed in connection with a petition for termination of the respondents' parental rights with respect to T's older sibling. The Florida court ratified and adopted the magistrate's recom- mendation to transfer jurisdiction to the Connecticut court. Subse- quently, the father filed a motion to dismiss the pending neglect petition filed in Connecticut on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied that motion, and the father appealed, claiming, inter alia, that, regardless of whether a petition to terminate the respon- dents' parental rights with respect to another child of the respondents was pending in Connecticut when they relocated to Florida, a Connecti- cut court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over T's neglect petition because any neglect of her would not occur in Connecticut. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the determination by a Florida court that Connecticut would be a more appropriate forum provided a proper basis for the Connecticut trial court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which has been adopted by both Connecticut and Florida. Held: 1. The trial court's denial of the father's motion to dismiss the neglect petition was immediately appealable because, although that decision was an interlocutory ruling, it constituted an appealable final judgment under the second prong of the test for determining the appealability of interlocutory orders set forth in State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27), as there was a colorable claim that delaying a determination with respect to the issue of jurisdiction would cause irreparable harm to the parent-child relationship and the best interest of the child; the Connecticut court's exercise of jurisdiction necessarily would have some adverse impact on the nature and extent of visitation and, in turn, the father's ability to bond with T, and, if an appeal after an adverse decision on the merits resulted in a determination that the Connecticut court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition, the issue of neglect undoubt- edly would have been relitigated in Florida, and such a delayed resolution of that issue would have impacted T's interests in permanency and sta- bility. 2. The trial court improperly denied the father's motion to dismiss the neglect petition because the failure to satisfy the statute (§ 46b-121 (a) (1)) imposing a territorial limitation on jurisdiction over proceedings con- cerning allegedly neglected children prevented a Connecticut court from exercising jurisdiction over the petition, irrespective of whether the conditions for exercising jurisdiction under the UCCJEA were satisfied, as there were no allegations from which this court reasonably could infer that T likely would be neglected in this state: courts from other states that have considered whether a territorial limitation dictated by statute or common law must be satisfied even though the matter was a child custody proceeding subject to the UCCJEA or its predecessor have all indicated that the respective state's territorial limitation must be satisfied; moreover, the purpose of the UCCJEA, which is to deter- mine which state having jurisdiction will be permitted to exercise it when two or more states have concurrent jurisdiction, indicates that the UCCJEA does not permit the exercise of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional requirements of a statute specific to the matter at hand are not met, and, because the UCCJEA does not confer subject matter jurisdiction but, instead, determines whether a court may exercise juris- diction or must defer to another state's jurisdiction, it provided no impediment to statutes, such as § 46b-121, that determine the scope of jurisdiction; furthermore, contrary to the petitioner's claim, giving effect to the territorial limitation set forth in § 46b-121 will not impede the operation of the UCCJEA by creating a possible scenario under which Florida lacks home state or significant connection jurisdiction, and Connecticut has significant connection jurisdiction under the UCCJEA but is prevented from exercising its jurisdiction because of the territorial limitation applicable to neglect proceedings, as Connecticut would not have significant connection jurisdiction if the territorial limitations under § 46b-121 were not met, and, even if Connecticut would have significant connection jurisdiction under the facts of the present case, Florida would be permitted to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA's temporary emergency jurisdiction provision. (Three justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in one opinion) Argued March 27, 2019—officially released June 24, 2020