Bryan v. Mullin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

49 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that— (A) the claim relies on— (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Cannon v. Mullin · Coronado v. Ward

2. “his allegations, if true and not contravened by the existing factual record, would entitle him to habeas relief.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Matthews v. Workman · Matthews v. Workman

3. “The proper measure of attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms, considering all of the surrounding circumstances. The Court has been crystal clear that “[jjudicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” For that reason, a reviewing court must “reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct [and] evaluate [that] conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Because of the difficulties that inhere in such a process, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Orange