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← 335 F. Supp. 308 - Walker v. Caldwell

335 F. Supp. 308 - Walker v. Caldwell’s Empirical Analysis

1971

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
3
states following
June 1975
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Boykin v. Alabama · Carnley v. Cochran · Rice v. Olson · Schnautz v. Beto · Smith v. Cox

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “. . . in situations where the question of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is raised in a habeas corpus action the court is authorized and should either hold an evidentiary hearing to establish a record whereby it can be determined that a plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily entered or else rely on a record established in a state habeas corpus hearing, which record is adequate under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2254.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““Clearly, Carnley did not require that the waiver of counsel must appear on the trial court record, but rather recognized that a later habeas corpus hearing could make a record from which it could be conclusively established that a waiver was, in fact, voluntary and understanding. In Rice v. Olson, cited in Carnley, the record was silent as to whether the defendant had requested that counsel be appointed to assist him in making a plea of guilty; however, this silence did not, in and of itself, require reversal. Rather the Court held that the plea of guilty raised a fact issue as to whether the accused did intelligently and understandingly waive his constitutional right to counsel. Therefore, a hearing was required to resolve this issue. In Carnley, the Court specifically recognized that under the proper circumstances a hearing would be proper where the record was silent. In that case, however, the Court held that since there was no allegation of an affirmative waiver and no guilty plea, there was no disputed fact question requiring a hearing. ‘The record must show, or there must he an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.’ Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516 , 82 S.Ct. at 8 L.Ed.2d at 77. (Em phasis added). Had there been an affirmative allegation that the defendant had waived the right to counsel there would be a factual question requiring a hearing. Thus, in stating that ‘presuming waiver from ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “To credit the testimony of petitioner would require that we discredit the testimony [deposition] of a member of the bar, the Sheriff of Baldwin County along with two of his deputies and of Judge Carpenter [the state trial judge]. Judge Carpenter affirmatively stated that he would never countenance an involuntary plea of guilty. I happen to know Judge Carpenter and I know that he would not do so even if he had not so testified. It is unthinkable that this experienced, capable and conscientious Judge would sentence a man to 30 years after that man told him that he was not guilty of the charges against him. Nor can it be presumed that a member of the bar would plead a man guilty without authority to do so and over his protestations of innocence. To make a finding that the events did transpire as alleged by petitioner would require a much stronger showing than we have here.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.