State v. C. M.

No. 650             September 11, 2024                  13

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  In the Matter of C. M.,
          a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                      Respondent,
                           v.
                         C. M.,
                       Appellant.
             Clackamas County Circuit Court
                  23CC02175; A181341

  Jeffrey S. Jones, Judge.
  Argued and submitted April 30, 2024.
   Christopher J. O’Connor argued the cause for appellant.
Also on the brief was Multnomah Defenders, Inc.
   Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Kamins,
Judge.
  EGAN, J.
  Judgment vacated; remanded for further proceedings.
14                                                      State v. C. M.

           EGAN, J.
         In this civil commitment case, appellant seeks
reversal of the trial court’s judgment committing her to the
custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to
exceed 180 days based on a finding that she suffered from
a mental disorder that made her a danger to others. ORS
426.130; ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). Appellant raises two assignments of error. First, appellant argues that the trial court
erred when it denied her motion for an in-person hearing,
because state statutes and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
entitled her to an in-person hearing. Second, appellant
argues that the trial court erred in finding that appellant
was a person with a mental illness because she is dangerous
to others due to her mental disorder. For the reasons that
follow, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this
case for further proceedings.
         Appellant argues that her due process rights were
violated by the trial court’s decision to require a remote hearing pursuant to the Clackamas County Presiding Judge’s
order (PJO), which required that all civil commitment hearings will “be held remotely.” We addressed the same issue
in State v. A. M., 

, 

 (2024). In
A. M., we sought to determine whether due process required
an in-person commitment hearing, noting that the court
must consider the following three factors to decide what process is due:
     “ ‘First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
     such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
     safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
     requirement would entail.’ ”

 at 462-67 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 

, 

, 

 (1976)). Although the record
permitted our review of the first and third factor, we concluded that the second factor turned on a factual issue, and
the record contained “no evidence one way or the other on
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2024)                                    15

[these] factual issues, much less a resolution of any competing evidence.” Id. at 465-66. We remanded the case so that
the parties could submit evidence, and the trial court could
“balance the three Mathews factors and determine whether
due process requires an in-person commitment hearing.” Id.
at 457.
          In this case, the procedural facts are nearly identical
to A. M. The trial court did not hold a hearing on appellant’s
motion for an in-person hearing, and based on the PJO, the
court denied appellant’s motion on the same day that she
filed it. Neither party submitted evidence as to the second
factor, and the court did not weigh the Mathews factors in
making its decision. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s
judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.1
           Judgment vacated; remanded for further proceedings.




    1
      We briefly address appellant’s second assignment of error. Despite any procedural issues, we conclude that, based on the record in this case, a reasonable
factfinder could find by clear and convincing evidence that appellant poses a danger to others due to her mental disorder. See State v. J. D. S., 

, 

 (2011) (stating the standard of review). Appellant’s disorder
caused her to commit violence against her husband, her symptoms continued
at the time of the hearing, she lacked insight into her condition, and she had
not taken medications to adequately treat her disorder. Based on those facts, a
reasonable factfinder could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that appellant
was likely to engage in future violence if she did not remain hospitalized. See
State v. T. T., 

, 

 (2018) (“To prove that a person is
a danger to others, the state must establish that actual future violence is highly
likely. … [P]ast acts, including verbal acts, can justify a finding that a person
is mentally ill if the acts form a foundation for predicting future dangerousness.”
(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)).