410 October 9, 2024 No. 715
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of K. B.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
K. B.,
Appellant.
Lane County Circuit Court
23CC05214; A182349
Stephen W. Morgan, Judge.
Submitted September 13, 2024.
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Joanna J. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Kistler,
Senior Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 335 Or App 410 (2024) 411
TOOKEY, P. J.
Appellant appeals a judgment committing him to
the custody of the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) for a
period not to exceed 180 days and prohibiting him from purchasing and possessing a firearm. In his sole assignment of
error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in determining that he was a “person with a mental illness” within
the meaning of ORS 426.130(1)(a) and ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A),
because “the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that
due to a mental disorder appellant was a danger to self.” We
conclude that the record contains legally sufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s conclusion. We affirm.
Appellant has multiple mental health diagnoses and
a history of suicide attempts, including one recent attempt.
In the months prior to his hospitalization in this case, appellant suffered a mental health decline. After appellant was
hospitalized, he refused medication and his condition did
not improve.
At appellant’s commitment hearing, his mental
health providers testified that appellant’s symptoms were
a barrier to appellant resuming medication. Providers further confirmed that appellant had exhibited impulsivity and
“suicidality” in the days prior to the hearing. But appellant
testified that he had no current intentions to harm himself.
Nevertheless, the trial court determined that, due
to appellant’s diagnoses, his impulsivity and “suicidality,”
and his refusal of medication, appellant was an imminent
danger to himself as a result of his mental disorder, and
entered a judgment committing appellant to the custody
of OHA. Appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that appellant is a “person with a mental illness.”
In considering a question of the sufficiency of the
evidence to civilly commit a person alleged to have a mental illness, “we view the evidence, as supplemented and
buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and assess
whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient
412 State v. K. B.
to permit that outcome.” State v. M. A., 276 Or App 624, 625,
371 P3d 495 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A trial court may commit a person if the state
proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is
a “person with a mental illness,” ORS 426.130(1)(a), because
the person is a danger to self as a result of a mental disorder, ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). A person alleged to have a mental
illness is a danger to self only if “serious,” “life-threatening”
harm is “likely [to occur] in the near future.” State v. B. B.,
240 Or App 75, 82-83,
245 P3d 697 (2010) (“[A]lthough a person can be committed on the ‘danger to self’ basis before he
or she is on the ‘brink of death,’ the prospect of serious physical harm must be more than merely ‘speculative.’ ”); cf. State
v. M. J. F.,
306 Or App 544, 546-47,
473 P3d 1141 (2020)
(There was concrete and imminent risk of harm to self
where the appellant had recently attempted suicide, continued to threaten suicide while hospitalized, and demanded
his release from the hospital despite providers’ concerns.).
As noted above, appellant contends that the trial
court erred in determining that appellant was a “person
with a mental illness,” because the record was insufficient to
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that appellant
posed a “near term” danger to himself. In appellant’s view,
that is so because “appellant did not appear suicidal at the
commitment hearing,” and appellant “had not harmed [himself] or presented a particularized threat of causing [himself] serious physical harm” in the days prior to the hearing.
The state responds that the evidence in the record—including appellant’s history, his current mental state, and the
fact that he “had not improved by the time of the hearing”—
was sufficiently clear and convincing to support the trial
court’s conclusion that appellant posed an imminent danger
to himself.
We agree with the state and conclude that there is
legally sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s finding that appellant was at imminent risk of serious physical harm at the time of the hearing. In particular, appellant’s treating psychiatrist testified that appellant
was at “high risk of harm to self” due to his impulsivity and
suicidal ideation. That appellant “did not appear suicidal
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 335 Or App 410 (2024) 413
at the commitment hearing” does not alter that conclusion.
The trial court acknowledged appellant’s statement that he
had no current intentions to harm himself. But the trial
court credited the testimony of appellant’s mental health
providers, who indicated that appellant’s mental health condition had not improved over the course of his hospitalization because he had refused treatment in the form of psychiatric medication. Appellant confirmed that he was not
taking medication, and that, if released, he would not take
medication.
In light of that evidence and resolving inferences in
favor of the trial court’s disposition, this record is sufficient
to support the trial court’s determination that appellant was
a danger to self as a result of his mental disorder and was
thus a “person with a mental illness” within the meaning of
ORS chapter 426.
Affirmed.
